political corruption essay in the philippines

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Webinar: how to create a successful podcast, fp @ unga79, ai for healthy cities, her power @ unga79, why corruption thrives in the philippines, a marcos might soon be back in power in manila. that’s because political dynasties are more powerful than parties..

• Southeast Asia

With Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte ineligible for reelection, Ferdinand Marcos Jr.—widely known as “Bongbong”—is poised to win a landslide victory at the polls on May 9. His father, Ferdinand Marcos Sr., who ruled as a dictator for 14 years under martial law, was known for his big infrastructure projects but also for his enormous corruption. (The World Bank estimates he stole between $5 billion and $10 billion over the course of his rule.) Marcos Jr., in turn, has been accused of graft and convicted of tax evasion.  

So what accounts for Marcos Jr.’s popularity in spite of his legacy of malfeasance? Like voters everywhere, Filipinos say they don’t support corruption. In fact, 86 percent of Filipinos surveyed in 2020 by Transparency International called corruption in government a big problem. One famous scandal involved members of congress funneling money to phony nongovernmental organizations in exchange for kickbacks in what is known widely as the pork barrel scam and which came to light in July of 2013. Janet Lim-Napoles, a businesswoman and the convicted ringleader of the scheme, claimed Marcos Jr. was involved, although he denied any knowledge and said his signature on forms releasing money to fake NGOs was forged.  

In a political system dominated by powerful families, corrupt politicians can still succeed. Dynasties are so influential that they have largely replaced political parties as the bedrock of Philippine politics. Politicians commonly jump from one party to another, making party labels meaningless. In a country where parties come and go overnight, voters look to families to evaluate candidates.

The history of the Philippine elite—and why voters continue to uphold their power—has colonial roots. 

Over the past four years, I have examined the impact of political dynasties on election outcomes in the Philippines and analyzed the results of 10 election cycles since 1992 involving 500,000 candidates. The results may help explain the Marcos family’s political staying power. Despite being chased out of the country when Marcos Sr. fell from power in 1986, the family bounced back to political prominence in only a few years: Marcos Jr. became a governor in 1998 and a senator in 2010. Imee Marcos later took on his former role as governor and is currently a senator, having been succeeded as governor by her own son Matthew Manotoc in 2019.      

My research shows that, when given a choice, Philippine voters are less likely to vote for corrupt politicians. After accounting for a candidate previously holding office—since incumbents are more likely to be reelected and more likely to face corruption charges—candidates indicted for corruption are 5 percent to 7 percent less likely to be elected. This is similar to how voters react to corruption in other countries. In Brazil, which also suffers from substantial corruption, researchers Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan showed that in the 2004 election, when there was evidence that a mayor had engaged in corruption on one occasion, that mayor was 4.6 percent less likely to be reelected.

A supporter holds pictures of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and his wife Imelda Marcos as Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. and Sara Duterte-Carpio take part in an election rally in Caloocan, Philippines, on Feb. 19. Ezra Acayan/Getty Images

But Philippine voters don’t punish politicians from large political dynasties even when they’ve been indicted for corruption. Ronald Mendoza and researchers at the Ateneo School of Government calculated that, as of 2019, 80 percent of governors, 67 percent of members of the House of Representatives, and 53 percent of mayors had at least one relative in office. These rich and powerful family networks can protect politicians from real accountability and keep reform at bay.  

The history of the Philippine elite—and why voters continue to uphold their power—has colonial roots. When the United States seized control of the Philippines in 1898, it pledged to give land to the poor. The opposite happened. The United States spent $7 million—almost as much as it paid for Alaska in the 1860s—to buy land from Catholic friars who had run much of the country. But the land was sold at prices well above what the poor could afford. The United States also instituted a system of land titles. This could have helped protect poor farmers from being dispossessed, but the land titles were so expensive and complicated to acquire that only the well-off got titles. The rich were able to buy up more land, while the poor were left without titles or access to the best land. My research shows that areas in the Philippines with more land inequality and where more of these titles were issued by 1918 have a higher concentration of dynasties today.  

The United States created a system where only property owners could vote, limiting the franchise to 1 percent of the population in the 1907 legislative elections. Wealthy landowners appointed allies to run the civil service and passed laws to cement their power. For example, in 1912, the Philippine Assembly made it a crime to break a labor contract, which effectively forced sharecroppers to stay on large plantations. Don Joaquín Ortega was appointed the first governor of La Union in 1901, and 120 years later his descendants are still governors.  

Voters turn to political dynasties for a variety of reasons. Familiarity certainly helps. Families are also known for delivering pork barrel projects and even direct payouts before elections. Vote buying in the form of gifts or cash is common in the Philippines. Some dynasties have also used force to turn out votes of limited competition. In return, the ruling families tend to commission populist projects. Jinggoy Estrada, son of former President Joseph Estrada, helped build day care centers when he was mayor of San Juan. He also was twice indicted for corruption but never convicted.  

The youthfulness of the Philippine population helps obscure the truth of the Marcos dictatorship. About 70 percent are under 40 years old, compared to 51 percent in the United States. Marcos Sr. was forced out of office 36 years ago, which is well before much of the electorate was even born. Few have a recollection of martial law.  

Deeply entrenched political dynasties have hollowed out the political process, making elections not about parties or ideas but about family names.

Over the intervening years, the Marcos clan has spruced up its image: Marcos Jr. appeared as a child in a movie glorifying his father. His older sister ran a children’s TV show when Marcos Sr. was in power. Marcos Sr. projected an air of power and pride that older voters remember. In addition, current Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte gave the clan a boost in 2016 when he had Marcos Sr. reburied in the “Cemetery of Heroes” in Manila.  

Marcos Jr.’s campaign also appeals to nostalgia among voters who lived during the era when Marcos Sr. built new rail lines, cultural centers, hospitals, and other infrastructure projects, as well as among younger voters who have been sold on this sanitized image of the Marcos era. Some recall the martial law period as one of peace (although not for the 34,000 political dissenters whom Amnesty International estimates were tortured by the government). The Philippine economy grew rapidly during much of the Marcos period, though it ended in a steep downturn in GDP and a huge increase in government debt.  

The other major candidates running against Marcos Jr. don’t come from such important families with such deep political connections. Marcos Jr. has avoided saying much about his opponents who have attacked him and his revisionist Marcos history. This has made the campaign all about him and left his opponents looking small. Marcos Jr. has also played up his alliance with the Duterte family, as the outgoing president remains widely popular despite the brutal violence of his anti-drug campaign. Duterte’s daughter Sara Duterte-Carpio is running for vice president, further cementing a Duterte-Marcos alliance.  

Across generations, the deeply entrenched political dynasties of the Philippines have hollowed out the political process, making elections not about parties or ideas but about family names. Powerful families date back to the Spanish period and have cemented their hold on power. While voters categorically oppose corruption, they continue to support families who deliver pork spending but do little for the long-term health of the country. Marcos Jr. has traded on carefully curated nostalgia about his father’s reign to propel himself to the presidency.

Daniel Bruno Davis is a Ph.D. graduate from the University of Virginia, where he studied Philippine politics and corruption. X:  @Daniel_B_Davis

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A look at how corruption works in the Philippines

The Philippines is perceived to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Of 180 countries, the Philippines ranked 116 in terms of being least corrupt. This means that the country is almost on the top one-third of the most corrupt countries, based on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International.

According to CPI, the Philippines scored a total of 33 points out of 100. Even as far back as 2012, it has fluctuated around the same CPI score, with the highest score being 38 points in 2014 and the lowest being 33 points in 2021 and 2022. To further contextualize how low it scored, the regional average CPI score for the Asia-Pacific region is 45, with zero as highly corrupt. And of the 31 countries and territories in the region, the Philippines placed 22nd (tied with Mongolia).

It must be noted, however, that CPI measures perceptions of corruption and is not necessarily the reality of the state of corruption. CPI reflects the views of experts or surveys of business people on a number of corrupt behavior in the public sector (such as bribery, diversion of public funds, nepotism in the civil service, use of public office for private gain, etc.). CPI also measures the available mechanisms to prevent corruption, such as enforcement mechanisms, effective prosecution of corrupt officials, red tape, laws on adequate financial disclosure and legal protection for whistleblowers.

These data are taken from other international organizations, such as the World Bank, World Economic Forum, private consulting companies and think tanks.

Of course, measuring actual corruption is quite difficult, especially as it involves under-the-table activities that are only discovered when they are prosecuted, like in the case of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, which was estimated to be up to $10 billion based on now-deleted Guinness World Records and cited as the “biggest robbery of a government.” Nevertheless, there still exists a correlation between corruption and corruption perceptions.

4 Syndromes

Corruption does not come in a single form as well. In a 2007 study, Michael Johnston, a political scientist and professor emeritus at Colgate University in the United States, studied four syndromes (categories) of corruption that were predominant in Asia, citing Japan, Korea, China and the Philippines as prime examples of each category.

The first category is Influence Market Corruption, wherein politicians peddle their influence to provide connections to other people, essentially serving as middlemen. The second category is Elite Cartel Corruption, wherein there exist networks of elites that may collude to protect their economic and political advantages. The third form of corruption is the Official Mogul Corruption, wherein economic moguls (or their clients) are usually the top political figures and face few constraints from the state or their competitors.

Finally, there is the form of corruption that the Philippines is familiar with. Oligarch-and-Clan Corruption is present in countries with major political and economic liberalization and weak institutions. Corruption of this kind has been characterized by Johnston as having “disorderly, sometimes violent scramble among contending oligarchs seeking to parlay personal resources into wealth and power.” Other than the Philippines, corruption in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka falls under the same syndrome.

In the Philippines, Oligarch-and-Clan Corruption manifests itself in the political system. As Johnston noted, in this kind of corruption, there is difficulty in determining what is public and what is private (i.e., who is a politician and who is an entrepreneur). Oligarchs attempt to use their power for their private benefit or the benefit of their families. From the Aquinos, Binays, Dutertes, Roxases and, most notoriously, the Marcoses, the Philippines is no stranger to political families. In a 2017 chart by Todd Cabrera Lucero, he traced the lineage of Philippine presidents and noted them to be either related by affinity or consanguinity.

Corruption in the Philippines by oligarch families is not unheard of. In fact, the most notable case of corruption in the Philippines was committed by an oligarchic family—the Marcos family. The extent of the wealth stolen by former dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and his wife has been well-documented. In fact, several Supreme Court cases clearly show the extent of the wealth that the Marcoses had stolen.

In an Oligarch-and-Clan system of corruption, oligarchs will also leverage whatever governmental authority they have to their advantage. Going back to the Marcos example, despite their convictions, the Marcoses have managed to weasel their way back into power, with Ferdinand Marcos Jr. becoming the 17th President despite his conviction for tax violation. Several politicians have also been convicted of graft and corruption (or have at least been hounded by allegations of corruption) and still remain in politics. As observed by Johnston in his article, though Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos are the popular images of corruption in the Philippines, he also noted other entrenched oligarchs throughout the country.

Finally, factions also tend to be “unstable and poorly disciplined.” The term “balimbing” is often thrown around in local politics but, more than that, the Philippines is also familiar with politically-motivated violence and disorder.

All these features are characteristics of Oligarch-and-Clan corruption, where these oligarchic families continue to hold power and politicians exploit their positions to enrich themselves or their families.

Corruption, no matter what kind, needs to be curbed. It results in loss of government money, which could have been used to boost the economy and help ordinary citizens, especially those from the lower income sectors.

According to the 2007 study, the Office of the Ombudsman had, in 1999, pegged losses arising from corruption at P100 million daily, whereas the World Bank estimates the losses at one-fifth of the national government budget. For relatively more updated figures, former Deputy Ombudsman Cyril Ramos claimed that the Philippines had lost a total of P1.4 trillion in 2017 and 2018. These estimates are in line with the World Bank estimates of one-fifth (or 20 percent) of the national budget.

So grave is the adverse effect of corruption that the international community recognized it as an international crime under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption where perpetual disqualification of convicted officials is recommended.

But the question stands: can corruption be eradicated in developing countries like the Philippines? Many Philippine presidents promised to end corruption in their political campaigning, but none has achieved it so far. If the government truly wants to end corruption, it must implement policies directed against corruption, such as lifting the bank secrecy law, prosecuting and punishing corrupt officials, increasing government transparency and more. INQ

This is part of the author’s presentation at DPI 543 Corruption: Finding It and Fixing It course at Harvard Kennedy School, where he is MPA/Mason fellow.

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This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and not the official stand of the Management Association of the Philippines or MAP. He is a member of MAP Tax Committee and MAP Ease of Doing Business Committee, co-chair of Paying Taxes on Ease of Doing Business Task Force and chief tax advisor of Asian Consulting Group. Feedback at [email protected] and [email protected] .

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The problem of corruption and corruption of power

Thinking beyond politics.

By Prof. Victor Andres Manhit

Transparency International (TI) has been fighting corruption for 27 years in over 100 countries. Here in the Philippines, I remember their prominent voices such as Randy David, Solita Monsod, Attorney Lilia de Lima, and Judge Dolores Español — all passionate advocates for transparency and accountability, issues that are still very relevant in our society.

Accordingly, TI defines corruption as “the abuse of power for private gain.” By this, corruption has deprived countless citizens around the globe of much-needed public services and benefits of development.

Under the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), corruption indicators pertain to “bribery; the diversion of public funds; the effective prosecution of corruption cases; adequate legal frameworks, access to information; and legal protections to whistleblowers, journalists and investigators.”

But what has corruption caused us?

In September 2018, the United Nations (UN), citing World Economic Forum (WEF) data, expressed that global corruption eats up 5% of the world’s gross domestic product; in November, the World Financial Review stated that Philippines had lost $10 BILLION annually due to illicit financial flows; in December, the UN and the WEF disclosed that $3.6 TRILLION had been lost due to bribes and stolen money; and in December 2019, the WEF published that “corruption, bribery, theft and tax evasion, and other illicit financial flows cost developing countries $1.26 TRILLION a year.”

In the Philippines, an estimated P1.4 TRILLION has been lost to corruption in the years 2017 (P670 BILLION) and 2018 (P752 BILLION), Deputy Ombudsman Cyril Ramos said, where around 20% of the annual government appropriation goes to corruption. Also, according to a study by Carandang and Balboa-Cahig (2020), “some of the more notable typologies and their accompanying corruption cases in the Philippine context are as follows: non-Compliance with the Government Procurement Reform, technical malversation, political dynasty, ghost project, income and asset misdeclaration, red tape, influencing a subordinate to defy order and protocol, bribery, connivance of government officials with drug lords.”

Further, the wide-ranging impact of corruption could result in a myriad of outcomes. In April 2020, the Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Center (GIACC) said that corruption may cause

“inadequate infrastructure, dangerous infrastructure, displacement of people, damage to the environment, reduced spending in infrastructure, reduced public expenditure, and reduced foreign investment.”

The said CPI indicators and data culled to substantiate them, and the gargantuan multi-level impact of corruption represent a formidable platform in instigating institutional reforms to achieve bureaucratic coherence and improve the development capacity of the state. With a multi-stakeholder roadmap against corruption, the plans and investments for economic recovery and development in the new normal will not be for naught. In turn, succeeding economic growths could be dispersed effectively.

Specifically, combating corruption in our country instantly augments the chance of helping the following: the 1.3 million people who have perceived themselves as poor in 2019 (self-rated poverty) and the families suffering from hunger (20.9%) during the pandemic, according to an SWS survey; the 16.7% of the population in poverty (Philippine Statistics Authority); and the additional 1.5 million Filipinos pushed into poverty by the pandemic (Philippine Institute for Development Studies).

But the problem of corruption could dangerously be translated into corruption of power. This happens if political opportunism becomes a trend. Rather than harmonize national unity in a pandemic-ravaged country, division and confusion among the population or a particular sector is instead espoused. In turn, false promises and hopes could frustrate the holistic approach being forged by a wide-range of social actors attuned to the long-standing battle against corruption.

More so, corruption of power could be exacerbated whenever the law is weaponized and used to benefit a new or selected few. Empirically, two examples could be cited. First if more than half of Filipinos agree that “It is dangerous to print or broadcast anything critical of the administration, even if it is the truth,” (SWS, July 3-6, 2020 survey), then what we have now is a terrified citizenry.

Second, the latest political charade in “handling” the country’s elite is not really about dismantling the oligarchy as pronounced. What’s happening is a mere changing of the old guards; the overt creation and empowerment of a new oligarchy, the “Dutertegarchs,” as William Pesek has pointedly raised.

To address corruption, political-institutional and economic reforms beg to be independently and holistically crafted and implemented.

Victor Andres “Dindo” C. Manhit is the President of Stratbase ADR Institute.

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The Philippines: a social structure of corruption

• Published: 06 February 2024
• Volume 82 , pages 223–247, ( 2024 )

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The anticorruption community largely views corruption as a government or development issue. But in the Philippines, corruption is a social structure. The very social bonds and social structures that are good at building civic unity and solidarity are also good at spreading and maintaining corruption, and this is why corruption is so difficult to remove. Patrons use these societal features to implement a ubiquitous social structure of corruption by means of maneuvered friendships that makes it difficult for the masses to know when a patron is acting as a friend or foe. The social structure encompasses the whole of society and corrupts the encircled government, political, and development systems as easily as it infiltrates all other segments of society. It is why oversight and sector-based anticorruption initiatives underperform, and why initiatives must pivot towards addressing this social structure.

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Anti-corruption Institutions: Some History and Theory

Corruption as a political phenomenon.

International Anti-Corruption Initiatives: a Classification of Policy Interventions

Data availability.

The author’s interview notes generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are not publicly available to help ensure confidentiality of the interviewees, but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Pronounced ‘leader’ in English, lider is a term used in the Philippines specifically referring to individuals (or leaders) in the community that are sought by candidates to convince the electorate to vote for that particular candidate. Liders are the individuals that perform the physical exchange of money for votes with the electorate.

A barangay is the lowest level of elected government. Each city or municipality is comprised of multiple barangays (villages).

See Appendix for a full list of respondents.

Interviews 2–3, 6, 14–16, 18–20, 22, 25, 39, 41–42, 44–50.

Utang na loob is usually translated as “debt of gratitude.” The literal translation is “debt of inside” or “internal debt.” It can also be translated as “reciprocity” or “lifelong reciprocation.”

Interviews 1,14,21,24,42–44.

The paper uses the term ‘client’ to represent the economically lower-class voters who are in clientelistic relationships with political families/candidates (patrons).

Interviews 1,14,24,42–44.

Clans are a connection of least ten extended families – usually more – where each extended family could have more than a hundred members. Clans then have a minimum of a thousand members and usually much more.

Interviews 2,5–6,9–10,14–51.

Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.

Interviews 3–6, 9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.

Interviews 14–22,25–26,39,47–50.

Interviews 16,22,27–38.

Interviews 14,16,21,24,39,42–44.

Interviews 16,22.

Interview 22.

Interview 23.

Interviews 1,20.

Interviews 2,5,14–23,26,32–39,41,45,47–51.

Interviews 15–16,20,22.

Interviews 27–31.

Interview 24.

Interviews 2,6,10.

Interview 22–23.

Interviews 14,18,32–38.

Interviews 32–38.

Interviews 1,10,18–22,32–38,47–49,50–51.

Interviews 2–4,6,14–15,20,22,40,45–49.

Interview 16.

Interviews 2–3.

Interview 3.

Interviews 1,3–6,10,12,15,50.

Interview 15.

Interviews 2–3,6,15.

BARMM consists of the region formally known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) plus the addition of Cotabato City and villages in northern Cotabato.

Interviews 3–4.

Interview 1.

Interview 3–4,6,10,12.

Interview 7.

Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–20,22,25,39,41–42,44–50.

Interviews 1,3–7,10,12,14–15.

Interviews 1,3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.

Interviews 1, 3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.

COMELEC is the Commission on Elections in charge of ensuring fair and free elections.

Interviews 3–4,6–7.

Interview 6.

Interviews 14–15,25–26.

Interviews 14–16,25–26,32–38.

Interviews 14–15,25–26,32–38.

Interviews 14–16,20,22–23,25–38.

Interview 21.

Interview 2.

Interview 14,21,49.

Interviews 2,16,20,22–23,27–31.

Interviews 1,2.

Interviews 52,54–59,61–64,66–67.

Interviews 6,14,16,18–19,21–23,25,50.

Interviews 3–4,18,52,54–59,61–64,66–67.

Interviews 3–4,6–8,52,54–55,56–58,61,64.

Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–22,25,39,41–42,44–50.

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Guth, A. The Philippines: a social structure of corruption. Crime Law Soc Change 82 , 223–247 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-024-10140-2

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Invisible no more: Shedding light on police violence and corruption in the Philippines

The Philippines was romanticized and dubbed the “ Pearl of the Orient Seas ” by national hero and writer José Rizal due to the country’s elegant organic beauty. However, the pearl’s beauty has been tainted by increasing police brutality, accelerated in recent years.

After becoming the 16th President of the Philippines in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was quick and adamant about carrying out a “ war on drugs ” campaign. Duterte implemented extreme measures targeting criminals and non-compliant citizens from impoverished communities to restore peace and order in the country.

In his first press conference after being elected as president, Duterte pledged to end crime, corruption, and the illegal drug trade within three to six months of being elected. However, Duterte implemented this pledge through the promotion of a new measure: “shoot-to-kill” orders.

“What I will do is urge Congress to restore [the] death penalty by hanging,” Duterte said in his first press conference. “If you resist, show violent resistance, my order to police [will be] to shoot to kill. Shoot to kill for organized crime. You heard that? Shoot to kill for every organized crime.”

Unfortunately, Duterte’s strategies to combat the issues faced by Filipinos have conditioned and emboldened the police, creating a sense of invincibility. The implications of Duterte’s extreme strategies include the manslaughter of innocent citizens and the manifestation of police corruption in the country. However, as a new president leads the country, the future of the Philippines’ criminal justice system seems committed to less violent means.

‘Shoot-To-Kill’

Duterte’s shoot-to-kill orders evolved dangerously, putting more innocent Filipino lives at risk and perpetuating the human rights crisis in the country. The global COVID-19 pandemic was not a barrier to Duterte’s anti-crime operations.

Amidst the pandemic, the government implemented an “ Enhanced Community Quarantine ” (ECQ) for the country’s capital, Manila, as well as the entire island of Luzon in an effort to mitigate the spread of the virus. During the lockdown, Filipinos were confined in their homes, transportation was suspended, food and health services were regulated, and uniformed personnel patrolled the streets to enforce strict quarantine measures.

During the ECQ, the government did not fulfill its promises as residents did not receive relief support. On April 1, 2020, frustration from community members erupted into political demonstrations in the streets of San Roque, Quezon City. Advocates and protestors asked for answers from the government in regard to their promised supplies and food aid.

Duterte’s response? “ Shoot them dead .”

In a televised address on the same day as the protests, Duterte ordered the police and military to shoot troublemakers if they felt their lives were in danger. “My orders are to the police and military, also village officials, that if there is trouble or the situation arises that people fight and your lives are on the line, shoot them dead,” Duterte said.

According to the World Population Review’s most recent annual data, the Philippines is the country with the world’s highest number of police killings, with over 6,000 between 2016 and 2021.

As of February 2022, based on the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency’s (PDEA) Real Numbers PH data , since Duterte took office in 2016, the government implemented 229,868 operations against illegal drugs, which resulted in the arrest of a total of 331,694 suspects. Beyond this, according to the PDEA, the total number of killings during anti-drug operations reached 6,235.

In November 2021, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project published a comprehensive database of the Philippines revealing that since 2016, at least 7,742 civilians have been killed in anti-drug raids, which is approximately 25 percent higher than the figure issued by the government.

As described by Eliza Romero, a coordinator for the Malaya Movement , a US-based alliance that advocates for human rights, freedom, and democracy in the Philippines, Duterte’s fierce rhetoric has given an invitation to vigilante and extrajudicial violence among the community.

“The shoot-to-kill order will just encourage more extrajudicial killings and vigilantism,” Romero said in an interview with Foreign Policy. “It will give private citizens and barangay [village] captains impunity to commit more human rights violations with the protection of the law while normalizing carnage.”

Behind every number is a real person—whose story has been invisible and whose life has been reduced by police officers who one day decided to target an innocent victim; a brother or sister; a son or daughter; a husband or wife; a father or mother.

Karla A., daughter of Renato A. who was killed in December 2016, recounts her experiences after losing her father at the age of 10, stating in an interview with the Human Rights Watch (HRW), “I was there when it happened when my papa was shot. I saw everything, how my papa was shot. … Our happy family is gone. We don’t have anyone to call father now. We want to be with him, but we can’t anymore.”

Emboldening the Police

Duterte’s enforcement measures to achieve public order put innocent citizens in a battle they have already lost. What is worse is that Duterte not only normalized but justified the killing of innocent citizens. Duterte assured the police impunity , stating that he would not only protect them from human rights abuses but ultimately pardon them if ever they are convicted for carrying out his anti-drug campaigns. This leads to the intensification of corruption within police departments in the country.

Duterte’s shoot-to-kill orders have not shown mercy to victims as he has always been in favor of the police. He never failed to show support for the police in carrying out his campaigns in his public and televised addresses. For instance, Duterte gave orders to Bureau of Customs Commissioner Rey Leonardo Guerrero stating that “Drugs are still flowing in. I'd like you to kill there [in communities]… anyway, I'll back you up and you won't get jailed. If it's drugs, you shoot and kill. That’s the arrangement,” Duterte said .

Duterte’s vow to protect the police results in police officers feeling emboldened and invincible. Police officers who have followed Duterte’s orders are promoted through the ranks. Police officers are not held accountable for the deaths of innocent civilians; the country’s own President pardons them. On top of this, police officers are falsifying evidence to justify unlawful killings and avoid legal repercussions.

The HRW published a report titled “‘License to Kill’: Philippine Police Killings in Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs,” which analyzed a total of 24 incidents that led to 32 deaths, involving Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel between October 2016 and January 2017. The report concluded that police officers would falsely claim self-defense to justify these killings.

To further strengthen their claims, police officers would plant guns, spent ammunition, and drug packets next to the bodies of victims. In turn, the victims would seem more guilty of being part of drug-related activities. Other times, police officers would work closely with masked gunmen to carry out these extrajudicial killings. In other words, police officers have succeeded in rooting their endeavors in deceit.

Fortunately, there have been instances where some police officers were legally prosecuted in police killings. Three police officers were found guilty of murdering a 17-year-old teenager in 2017, the first conviction of officers ever since Duterte launched his war on drugs.

A Look Into the Future

The Philippines as the “Pearl of the Orient Seas” has lost its luster due to the many problems that the nation continues to face—one of the most prominent ones is Duterte’s explicit abuse of police power. Similar to how pearls lose their glow when not provided with the care it needs, the integrity of police officers has dried out and become yellowed over time due to the government’s complicity.

Time and time again, Duterte has remained an instigator in instances relating to police brutality in the country. Luckily, the Philippines can combat pearl discoloration through the implementation of robust policies that would ensure increased transparency within police departments.

Freshly elected Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. makes the restoration of the yellowed pearl an achievable goal. At the 121st Police Service anniversary celebration held at Camp General Rafael T. Crame in Quezon City—the national headquarters of the PNP—Marcos Jr. brings an opportunity for redemption. Aside from calling the PNP officers “vanguards of peace,” Marcos Jr. urged them to continue serving the community with integrity in order to restore public confidence.

“The use of force must always be reasonable, justifiable, and only undertaken when necessary. Execution of authority must be fair, it must be impartial,” Marcos Jr. said . “It must be devoid of favoritism and discrimination, regardless of race, gender, social economic status, political affiliation, [and] religious belief. It is only then that you can effectively sustain with great respect and wide support the authority that you possess as uniformed servicemen of the Republic.”

Beyond this, Marcos Jr. highlighted his hope for reforming the police system under the leadership of newly installed PNP Chief Police General Rodolfo Azurin Jr. Moreover, Marcos Jr.’s aspirations to increase accountability within police departments will be complemented by Azurin Jr.’s launching of a peace and security framework titled “MKK=K” or “Malasakit + Kaayusan + Kapayapaan = Kaunlaran” which translates to policies founded on “the combination of care, order and peace shall equate to progress.”

On the other hand, it is understandable if Filipino citizens and human rights activists have lost hope for the possibility of achieving meaningful progress in reforming the broken police system. Marcos Jr. is the son of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. , an ousted dictator who infamously declared martial law in the country, and Filipinos are still navigating the trauma of the Marcos era 50 years later.

Currently, Marcos Jr. pledges to continue the campaign against illegal drugs but with an emphasis on drug prevention and rehabilitation . Under this new framework, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented a program dubbed “Buhay Ingatan, Droga’y Ayawan (Value Life, Shun Drugs)” which aims to address the root of the problem by suppressing the demand for illegal drugs. According to DILG Secretary Benjamin ‘Benhur’ Abalos Jr., the initiative needs support and solidarity from all sectors of the community in order to ensure its effectiveness.

Simultaneously, Marcos Jr. has no intention to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) on their investigation of the country’s drug war killings. Based on the ICC ’s official website, their purpose “is intended to complement, not to replace, national criminal systems; it prosecutes cases only when States do not are unwilling or unable to do so genuinely.” However, Marcos Jr. stated in an interview that “The ICC, very simply, is supposed to take action when a country no longer has a functioning judiciary… That condition does not exist in the Philippines. So I do not see what role the ICC will play in the Philippines.”

Nearly five months into Marcos Jr.’s administration, the University of the Philippines’ Dahas Project revealed that 152 people have died in anti-drug police raids as of Nov. 30. The report further disclosed that the drug casualties under Marcos Jr. “[are] exceeding the 149 killings recorded during the final six months of the Duterte government. During the first half of the year under Duterte, the average daily rate was 0.8. So far under Marcos, the rate stands at one per day.”

In the Philippines, police officers have repeatedly assumed the roles of prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner. HRW Deputy Director for Asia Phil Robertson points out shortcomings in Marcos Jr.’s campaigns describing that “Using a drug rehabilitation approach means little when police and mystery gunmen are still executing suspected drug users and dealers. Law enforcers should receive clear orders to stop the ‘drug war’ enforcement once and for all.” The only way to effectively mitigate police killings in the Philippines is by abandoning violent and punitive measures against illegal drugs.

Ultimately, despite these obstacles, the yellowed pearl can still brighten. Under new leadership for both the national government and police department, the Philippines may embark on a journey of reconstruction and rehabilitation. In this process, the hope is to finally shed light on the issue of police violence in the country, implement fruitful solutions to combat the problem and advocate for innocent victims who might have felt invisible in their battle against police brutality. Once the light has been restored, the Philippines can finally live up to its billing as the beautiful and pure “Pearl of the Orient Seas”.

Laurinne Jamie Eugenio

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Corruption in the Philippines: Framework and context

• E. D. Dios , Ricardo D. Ferrer
• Published 2000
• Political Science

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27 Citations

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A broken vow: an examination of the cases of Corruption in the Philippines

• Christian Gonzales Isabela State University - Cauayan https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7712-359X

The problem of corruption in the Philippines seems to be humongous as if no solution is available for its cure. This study used a descriptive and qualitative research design. It exposed the anti-corruption laws and the cases decided by the various Philippine courts. It found out that even with the existence of laws as well as the removal or the conviction of several government officials and employees, corrupt practices seem to be undeterred. The continuance of corruption in the country resulted to the promise of President Duterte to be a broken vow.

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Araja, R. N. (2020, October 28). Ombudsman suspends 44 BI execs over ’pastillas’ scam. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from ManilaStandard.Net: https://manilastandard.net/mobile/article/337994

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Ballaran, J. (2018, April 6). Aguirre resigned due to public’s loss of trust in him – official. Retrieved December 5, 2020, from Inquirer.Net: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/980581/aguirre-resigned-due-to-publics-loss-of-trust-in-him-official

Batalla, E. V. (2020, June 10). Grand corruption scandals in the Philippines. Emerald Insight, 23(1), 73-86. doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/PAP-11-2019-0036

Buan, L. (2018, May 8). Ombudsman probes P60-million DOT-Tulfo controversy. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from Rappler: https://www.rappler.com/nation/ombudsman-investigation-wanda-teo-tourism-department-tulfo-controversy

Bueza, M. (2018, June 29). Notable Duterte admin exits and reappointments. Retrieved December 5, 2020, from Rappler: https://specials.rappler.com/newsbreak/videos-podcasts/205964-firing-resignations-reappointments-duterte-administration/index.html

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Ferrer, E. S., & De Dios, R. D. (2001, January-June). Corruption in the Philippines: Framework and Context. Philippine Journal of Public Policy, 5(1), 1-42. Retrieved November 28, 2020, from https://cids.up.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/Corruption-in-the-Philippines-vol.5-no.1-Jan-June-2001-2.pdf

Gonzales, C. (2020, February 18). 5 immigration officers sacked over ‘pastillas’ bribery scheme for Pogo workers. Inquirer.Net, p. n/a. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1230159/5-immigration-officers-relieved-from-posts-due-to-pastillas-scheme

Gotinga, J. (2020, September 22). Drilon calls for reorganization of Bureau of Immigration over ‘pastillas’ bribery scheme. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from Rappler: https://www.rappler.com/nation/drilon-calls-reorganization-bureau-immigration-pastillas-bribery-scheme

Gregorio, X. (2019, July 22). From ‘three to six months’ to three years: Drugs, corruption still among Duterte’s woes. Retrieved from CNN Philippines: https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/7/22/SONA-2019-Rodrigo-Duterte-corruption.html?fbclid=lwAR2

Gutierrez, J. (2016, June 30). Rodrigo Duterte inaugurated as Philippines President. CNN World, p. n/a. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/29/asia/philippines-duterte-inauguration/index.html

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Jalea, G., & Peralta, J. (2020, August 4). Whistleblower claims ₱15 billion stolen by PhilHealth execs in fraud schemes. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from CNN Philippines: https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/8/4/PhilHealth-P15-billion-stolen-mafia-execs.html

Legaspi, A., & Macas, T. (2017, April 4). Sueno fired from DILG post. Retrieved December 5, 2020, from GMA News Online: https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/605738/sueno-fired-from-dilg-post/story/

Lopez, M. L. (2020, September 28). PACC probing 40 names in PhilHealth scandal, filing more cases 'very soon'. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from CNN Philippines: https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/9/28/PACC-PhilHealth-more-cases-coming.html

Magsambol, B. (2020, August 4). Resigned officer says PhilHealth chief ordered him to 'massage' overpriced testing kits issue. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from Rappler: https://www.rappler.com/nation/ex-philhealth-officer-says-morales-ordered-massage-overpriced-covid-19-testing-kits-issue

Malcolm, G. A. (1926). Philippine Constitutional Law 2nd Edition. Manila: P.I. & Rochester, NY, Lawyers Co-op.

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Marcelo, E. (2017, November 25). Ex-CamSur mayor pleads guilty to ethics violation. Philstar Global, p. n/a. Retrieved December 3, 2020, from https://www.philstar.com/nation/2017/11/25/1762384/ex-camsur-mayor-pleads-guilty-ethics-violation

Merez, A., Quintos, P., Reformina, I., & Manabat, J. (2018). Supreme Court ousts Chief Justice Sereno. Manila: ABS-CBN News. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/05/11/18/supreme-court-ousts-chief-justice-sereno

Nachura, A. E. (2016). Outline Reviewer in Political Law. Quezon City: VJ Graphic Arts, Inc.

Nicolas, F. (2016, December 13). Immigration Deputy Commissioners Argosino, Robles: Our integrity is intact. CNN Philippines, p. n/a. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/12/13/bureau-of-immigration-commissioners-argosino-robles-justice-secretary-aguirre-jack-lam-sombrero.html

Nolasco, M. C. (2017, May). SMUGGLING OF ILLICIT DRUGS AIDED BY CUSTOMS PLAYERS. WORK PRODUCT OF THE 169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE (pp. 59-62). Tokyo, Japan: United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offendeers: https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/RS_No106/No106_12_IP_Philippines.pdf

Office of the Ombudsman. (2018, November 30). 2017 National Household Survey on Experience with Corruption in the Philippines. Retrieved December 3, 2020, from www.obudsman.gov.ph: https://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/docs/08%20Resources/2017%20National%20Household%20Survey%20on%20Experience%20with%20Corruption%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf

Ombudsman. (2017, October 27). OMB indicts immigration commissioners in extortion plot for plunder. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from Office of the Ombudsman: https://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/omb-indicts-immigration-commissioners-in-extortion-plot-for-plunder/

Parpan, L., & Lardizabal, C. (2017, July 31). Senate alleges corruption and incompetence in customs bureau over biggest haul yet of shabu smuggled into PH. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from CNN Philippines: https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/07/31/senate-probe-customs-drugs-china-faeldon.html

Press, A. (2017, March 15). Philippine lawmakers kill impeachment case against Duterte. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from USA Today: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/05/15/philippine-lawmakers-kill-impeachment-case-against-duterte/101700122/

Purugganan, J. (2019, May 8). Selective Transparency, Inconsistent Accountability:Unpacking Duterte’s Anti-Corruption Campaign. Retrieved December 5, 2020, from Focus on the Global South: https://focusweb.org/selective-transparency-inconsistent-accountabilityunpacking-dutertes-anti-corruption-campaign/

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Ranada, P. (2020, October 27). Duterte orders DOJ to probe corruption 'in entire government'. Retrieved from Rappler: https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-orders-doj-investigate-corruption-entire-philippine-government

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Uy, J. R., Santos, T. G., & Nonato, V. F. (2017, October 11). House impeaches Comelec chief after he said he was resigning. Inquirer.Net, p. not applicable. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/937198/house-votes-to-impeach-bautista

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Combating electoral corruption and violence in the Philippines

Jump to a section.

The initiative

The challenge

The public impact

• Stakeholder engagement Good
• Political commitment Good
• Public confidence Good
• Clarity of objectives Good
• Strength of evidence Good
• Feasibility Strong
• Management Strong
• Measurement Fair
• Alignment Strong

Bibliography

Jose A.R. Melo, a former associate justice of the Supreme Court, joined the Philippines Commission on Elections (Comelec) in 2008. At the time, “he pledged publicly ... to ‘conduct the elections to such an extent that the results of the next presidential election will not be questioned'.” [4]

After the initial review in late 2009, Comelec set up a technical working group to draft new electoral rules and amend existing ones. The overall aim of the revised rulebook was

• To reduce deaths and incidents during election time.
• To safeguard the election process and formulate laws to reduce the use of firearms in the Philippines.

The Comelec working group published resolutions to the effect that:

• Called for a total gun ban and restrictions on the number of security personnel a candidate could employ. Private citizens were not allowed to carry firearms, and all previously issued permits to carry guns were suspended during five months of the election campaign.
• All candidates for mayor, governor, congressman, senator and president could use only national police personnel as guards.
• Governed the conduct of checkpoints throughout the country.

“Comelec, the national police and the army agreed to create and operate a network of command posts, known as Joint Security Control Centres (JSCCs), that would coordinate all election-related security efforts.” [5]

The regional JSCC deployed the armed forces to polling stations where there might be violence, such as confrontations with rebel groups of  communist guerrillas,

Presidential elections in the Philippines have often involved significant levels of violence. “The familial nature of Philippine politics was one of several factors that fuelled fierce rivalries and … persistent violence during each electoral cycle.” [1] Many politicians created their own private armies by organising and arming their supporters in order to protect themselves or engage in violence. “Political violence is a recurring problem in the country, fuelled by lax enforcement of laws and entrenched political ‘dynasties', some of whom have their own private armies.” [2]

In 2005, the Philippines National Bureau of Investigation, a unit of the Department of Justice, “released wiretapped phone conversations that suggested illegal agreement between an election commissioner, Virgilio Garcillano, and the then president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo”. [3] In 2007, the electoral commission's chairman, Benjamin Abelos, resigned amid accusations of a corrupt use of political influence. There was clearly a need for the electoral process to be reformed and freed from violence and corruption.

During the 2010 presidential election campaign, officials reported 45 deaths and 67 election-related violent incidents, as compared with 295 deaths and 152 election-related violent incidents during the 2004 election campaign. “Despite high security, voting was marred by the deaths of at least 12 people in political violence. The deaths came after a bloody campaign period in which more than 30 people died. … In the latest reported violence, the AFP news agency said communist insurgents had ambushed an election convoy in the south of the country, killing six people and wounding 12.” [6]

The level of violence was still extremely serious, but had shown a relative decline since the previous presidential election campaign. According to Comelec, the checkpoints set up during the election period led to the arrests of 2,424 individuals and the discovery of 2,113 firearms.

There were also a significant number of deaths in the May 2016 elections.

Stakeholder engagement

Political commitment

Public confidence

A survey was conducted in 2010 to assess public confidence in the initiative to safeguard the election. Three-quarters of respondents were satisfied in the conduct of elections. Social Weather Stations, the polling organisation, reported that 75% of respondents in its survey were satisfied with the general conduct of the elections in 2010. The poll indicated that Melo had made significant progress towards his goal of restoring trust and credibility in the electoral process.

Moreover, the polling group said that:

“74% of respondents were satisfied with the ‘terms of the peace and order situation' during the 2010 elections.

84% were satisfied with the performance of the national police during the elections.

82% were satisfied with the armed forces' performance." [8]

Clarity of objectives

Strength of evidence

Feasibility

Several concerns and problems that arose from the existing regulations were addressed and evaluated for a better formulation of policy.

For example, it was found that there was a lack of reliable data on firearms, which meant that it would be difficult to set targets and measure results. Although Comelec had instituted a gun ban for previous elections, the ban had allowed individuals to apply for exemptions that were routinely approved. This exception was withdrawn during election campaigns. Comelec commissioners also found few rules relating to the management of JSCCs, a gap which they then filled.

Melo was a former associate justice of the Supreme Court before taking on the role of chairman of Comelec and was therefore an experienced lawyer. He set up a technical working group consisting of experienced staff: a senior official from the armed forces, a general from the national police, and three senior Comelec officers. There was a clear organisational structure and roles and responsibilities were clearly defined.

“To standardise training, the working group required that all protective agents undergo a 10-day “VIP training course.” [9] A team of trainers from the national police headquarters in Manila travelled to each region and conducted training at regional police offices.”

Measurement

Comelec, armed forces and national police collaborated successfully to carry out the programme to enhance security during the elections. The armed forces provided additional personnel for checkpoint duty because the national police were already thinly stretched.

There was also strong coordination between regional and municipal JSCCs. Regional and municipal JSCCs jointly decided on the number and location of checkpoints needed to enforce the election rules. For example, in Iloilo, city election chief, G. Bert Arbis, worked with the heads of the armed forces and national police to formulate a plan for the city's checkpoints.

NGO's, too, partnered effectively with Comelec to control the abuse by monitoring the conduct of the election campaign.

To raise citizens' awareness of its resolutions, Comelec advertised in two national newspapers and published the full text of the resolutions.

Aquino closes in on Philippines election victory, 11 May 2010, BBC News

Seven people shot dead as polls open in the Philippines, Agence France-Presse , 9 MAY 2016, via The Daily Telegraph

Michael Scharff, 2011,ENHANCING SECURITY TO RESTORE CREDIBILITY:

SAFEGUARDING ELECTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, 2008 - 2010, Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University ,  http://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/

The Public Impact Fundamentals - A framework for successful policy

This case study has been assessed using the Public Impact Fundamentals, a simple framework and practical tool to help you assess your public policies and ensure the three fundamentals - Legitimacy, Policy and Action are embedded in them.

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Corruption and dynasties as nation’s ills

Zoilo ‘bingo’ dejaresco iii.

• September 4, 2024
• 4 minute read

Corruption and political dynasties were tagged by the reformist group named ANIM (Alyansa ng Nagkakaisang Mamayan)—composed of six sectors that was launched at the historic Club Filipino recently—as two of the most pervading sources of the nation’s woes. (The third one cited was “electoral fraud”)

Despite its robust natural resources and the so-called high GDP (gross domestic product) growth rates, the Philippines still has one of the lowest per capita incomes and the worst disparity between the “haves and the have-nots” within the Asean. The Philippines’ $3,859 per capita income as of 2023, per World Bank statistics, is a poor 7th among 10 Asean members.

The group proponents averred that action must be taken against these ills for the “survival of the nation.”

Former deputy Ombudsman Cyril Ramos once said that at least 20 percent of the national budget goes into the pockets of corrupt government officials and their private sector collaborators. Or theoretically P1.153 trillion of the 2024 budget of P5.678 trillion, a staggering amount.

Baguio City Mayor Benjie Magalong of the Mayors for Good Governance, who insisted he is not running for higher office, confirms official corruption has worsened from Cory’s time of 10 percent to 25 percent to 40 percent today going to public sector grafters. In the meantime, our national debt had grown from a pre-pandemic level of P5.7 trillion to a projected staggering P17 trillion by next year.

The mayors’ group is just a small step since only about 200 of the over 1,000 mayors in the country signed up for the reformist group—the rest perhaps forthright enough to implicitly say they cannot preach against what they are doing.

Magalong computed why sometimes the total project value left after all the crooked deals and administrative slippages is only 15 percent to 30 percent of the total project cost. Can you imagine that? He itemizes the following as leaks: (30 percent) politician’s, (7 percent) VAT, (1 percent) inspection fees, (12 percent) agency share, BACollection (2 percent), and contingency (3 percent), leaving 55 percent for the project. After deducting the 45 percent contractor margins, only 15 percent to 30 percent is left.

Greedy politicians, he says, also pose as suppliers or contractors themselves (under the guise of friends and kin) and, therefore, corner 60 percent of the project. Would you still wonder why our infrastructure is one of the worst, our education system in the pits, and 16 percent of Filipinos still live below the poverty line?

The former major general of the PNP also lamented the fact that corruption leakages in the budget contribute to the rise in the national budget from P15.9 trillion before the pandemic to about an estimated P17 trillion next year—a burden to be paid by the present and future generations.

Caritas (the social arm of the CBCP) President Bishop Colin Bagaforo, at the same launch, slammed that people who “make use of their power for personal gain are robbing the people not just of resources, but also of their dignity and future.”

Political dynasties

The 1987 Constitution mandates the prohibition of political dynasties to be enabled by a law. To this date, no such anti-dynasty bill has been filed. Why?

Atty. Alexander Lacson, book author and civil society leader, said that based on the Ateneo de Manila study, 73.1 percent of the country’s congressmen belong to political dynasties—that’s why we cannot expect them to legislate against their own interests. The Senate has not been an exception.

The Ateneo study also bared that 78 percent of provincial officials and 56.2 percent of cities and town mayors emanated from political dynastic classes. (Good dynasties should not feel alluded to here).

But the bad dynasties (in the majority) are the “biggest obstacles to progress,” per Lacson. He said they are responsible for poor infrastructure, corrupting Comelec officials, LGUs, judges, and voters, and even sometimes trying to maliciously influence the clergy (those vulnerable) with their tainted donations.

In his opinion, Bishop Bagaforo believes that once an anti-dynasty bill is passed, “this will stop 50 percent of the corruption that we face today.”

A group of UP lawyers recently petitioned the Supreme Court to press Congress to pass a bill mandated in the 1987 constitution against dynasties—but have been simultaneously opposed by some congressmen. In an act of redemption that might erase all his comical failings, Senator Robinhood Padilla has filed a Senate bill for this purpose. Whether this will gain traction is another matter.

Lacson said it was time to use the People’s Initiative to go for the anti-dynasty law—requiring only 3 percent of the voters per district and 10 percent nationwide to pass the law. He believes this can be done with the backing of all the churches, lawyers, conscientized citizenry and even losing candidates who lost due to the presence of political dynasties. It’s people power at its best, Lacson said.

The task of ANIM will be formidable as they endeavor to determine whether their analysis of the fundamental issues facing the nation aligns with the sentiments of the general public. Only then can it have the critical force and moral ascendancy to marshal a united front for genuine, long-lasting reforms.

Bingo Dejaresco, a former banker, is a financial consultant, media practitioner, and author. He is a Life and Media member of Finex. His views here, however, are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of Finex. [email protected]

A lifetime member and chairman of the Professional Development and Broadcast Media of Finex

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Home / Essay Samples / Social Issues / Corruption / The Cause And Impact Of Corruption On The Philippines

The Cause And Impact Of Corruption On The Philippines

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