what is justice essay

Essays About Justice: Top 5 Examples and 7 Prompts

Discover our guide with examples of essays about justice and prompts for your essay writing and discuss vital matters relating to a person’s or nation’s welfare. 

Justice, in general, refers to the notion that individuals get what they deserve. It includes fundamental moral values ​​in law and politics and is considered an act of fairness, equality, and honesty. Four types of justice deal with how victims can solicit a verdict. They are procedural, distributive, retributive, and restorative. There are many pieces with justice as the subject. It’s because justice is a broad subject encompassing many human values.

5 Essay Examples

1. juvenile justice system of usa essay by anonymous on ivypanda.com, 2. wrongful convictions in criminal justice system by anonymous on gradesfixer.com, 3. racial profiling within the criminal justice system by anonymous on papersowl.com, 4. criminal justice: the ban-the-box law by anonymous on ivypanda.com, 5. the special needs of the criminal justice on mental illness cases by anonymous on gradesfixer.com, 1. what is justice, 2. is justice only for the rich and powerful, 3. the importance of justice, 4. the justice system in mainstream media, 5. justice: then vs. now, 6. justice system around the world, 7. obstructions to justice.

“No doubt, familiarity about the nature of juvenile crimes and how juvenile justice structures function across the world will offer an insight to policy makers, social scientists and for gullible citizens. Thus, a comparative analysis will throw light on how well or how poorly one nation is exercising relative to other nations.”

The essay delves into the justice system process for teenagers who are 18 years and below who commit wrongful acts. Most teenagers involved in juvenile crimes do not have a strong foundation or parental support. The author also talks about the treatments, boot camps, and retreat houses available for teenagers serving in juvenile prisons.

The ever-increasing number of juvenile crimes in the world reflects the mismanagement and lack of juvenile courts, sentencing programs, rehabilitation, and age-appropriate treatment. The writer believes that if mistrials remain in the juvenile system, the problem will continue. They suggest that the government must initiate more system reforms and provide juvenile offenders with proper ethical education.

“The justice system is composed of various legal groups and actors, making a miscarriage possible at any stage of the legal process, or at the hands of any legal actor. Eyewitness error, police misconduct, or falsification of evidence are examples of factors that may lead to a wrongful conviction.”

In this essay, the author uses various citations that show the justice system’s flaws in the process and criteria of its rulings. It further discusses the different instances of unfair judgments and mentions that at least 1% of all convicts serving prison time were wrongfully accused. 

The writer believes that changing the way of addressing different cases and ensuring that all legal professionals do their assigned duties will result in fair justice. You might also be interested in these essays about choice .

“Here in the 21st century, we don’t exactly have ‘Black Codes’ we have what is known as Racial Profiling. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) defines racial profiling as ‘the discriminatory practice by law enforcement officials of targeting individuals for suspicion of crime based on the individual’s race ethnicity, religion or national origin.’”

This essay investigates the involvement of race in the criminal justice system, whether they are victims or perpetrators. The author claims that some law enforcement officers mistreat and misjudge people because of their race and presents various cases as evidence of these discriminatory actions. One example is the case of an unarmed black teenager, Jordan Edwards , who was shot because former officer Roy Oliver thought his partner was in danger.

Unfortunately, law enforcement officials use their power and position in society to deny any act of racial profiling, rendering the said law useless. The author declares that while their paper may not prove racial bias in the criminal justice system, they can prove that a person’s color plays a role and can cause harm.

“I think the Ban-the-Box law is the best way of creating employment opportunities for ex-convicts without discrimination. Criminal offenses vary in the degree of the crime, making it unfair to treat all ex-convicts the same. Moreover, some felons learn from their mistakes during detention and parole, creating a better and law-abiding citizen with the ability to work faithfully.”

The essay explains how ex-convicts or current convicts are consistently discriminated against. This discrimination affects their lives even after serving their sentence, especially in their rights to vote and work. 

Regarding job hunting, the author believes the Ban-the-Box law will effectively create more employment opportunities. The law allows employers to see an ex-convict’s skills rather than just their record.  The essay concludes with a reminder that everyone is entitled to a civil right to vote, while private enterprises are free to run background checks. 

“Case management focuses on incorporating key elements that focus on improving the wellbeing of individuals that are being assessed. Mental illness within the criminal justice system is treated as a sensitive issue that requires urgent intervention in order to ensure that an inmate is able to recover.”

This essay pries into one of the most delicate areas of ruling in the justice system, which is leading mentally ill convicts. Offenders who were deemed mentally ill should be able to receive particular treatments for their health while serving time. 

The author mentions that every country must be able to provide mental health services for the inmates to prevent conflicts inside the prison. In conclusion, they suggest that reviewing and prioritizing policies related to mental illness is the best solution to the issue.

Are you interested in writing about mental illnesses? Check out our guide on how to write essays about depression.

7 Prompts for Essays About Justice

Justice is a vast subject, and its literal meaning is the quality of being just. This process often occurs when someone who has broken the law gets what they should, whether freedom or punishment. Research and discuss everything there is to know about justice so your readers can fully understand it. Include a brief history of its origins, types, and uses.

Several situations prove that justice is only for the rich. One of the main reasons is the expensive court fees. Research why victims settle outside the court or just let their abusers get away with crimes.

Include data that proves justice is a luxury where the only ones who can ask for equal treatment are those with resources—present situations or well-known cases to support your statements. On the other hand, you can also provide counter-arguments such as government programs that help financially-challenged individuals.

Every citizen has the right to be protected and treated fairly in court. Explain the importance of justice to a person, society, and government. Then, add actual cases of how justice is applied to encourage reform or chaos. Include relevant cases that demonstrate how justice impacts lives and legal changes, such as the case of Emmett Till .

Talk about how justice is usually depicted on screen and how it affects people’s expectations of how the justice system works. Popular television shows such as Suits and Law and Order are examples of the justice system being portrayed in the media. Research these examples and share your opinion on whether movies or television portray the justice system accurately or not.

In this essay, research how justice worldwide has changed. This can include looking at legal systems, human rights, and humanity’s ever-changing opinions. For instance, child labor was considered normal before but is viewed as an injustice today. List significant changes in justice and briefly explain why they have changed over time. You might also be interested in these essays about violence .

Countries have different ways of instilling justice within their societies. For this prompt, research and discuss the countries you think have the best and worst legal systems. Then, point out how these differences affect the country’s crime rates and quality of life for its citizens.

Examine why people tend to take justice into their hands, disobey legal rules, or give up altogether. It can be because seeking justice is an arduous process resulting in emotional and financial burdens. Often, this occurs when a person feels their government is not providing the support they need. Take a look at this social issue, and discuss it in your essay for a strong argumentative. 

If you are interested in learning more, check out our essay writing tips !

1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’

Author:  Ben Davies Category:  Social and Political Philosophy , Ethics Word Count: 999

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Some people are multi-billionaires; others die because they are too poor to afford food or medications. In many countries, people are denied rights to free speech, to participate in political life, or to pursue a career, because of their gender, religion, race or other factors, while their fellow citizens enjoy these rights. In many societies, what best predicts your future income, or whether you will attend college, is your parents’ income.

To many, these facts seem unjust . Others disagree: even if these facts are regrettable , they aren’t issues of justice. [1] A successful theory of justice must explain why clear injustices are unjust and help us resolve current disputes. [2] John Rawls (1921-2002) was a Harvard philosopher best known for his A Theory of Justice (1971), which attempted to define a just society. Nearly every contemporary scholarly discussion of justice references A Theory of Justice . This essay reviews its main themes. [3]

1. The ‘Original Position’ and ‘Veil of Ignorance’

Reasonable people often disagree about how to live, but we need to structure society in a way that reasonable members of that society can accept. [4] Citizens could try to collectively agree on basic rules. We needn’t decide every detail: we might only worry about rules concerning major political and social institutions, like the legal system and economy, which form the ‘basic structure’ of society.

A collective agreement on the basic structure of society is an attractive ideal. But some people are more powerful than others: some may be wealthier, or part of a social majority. If people can dominate negotiations because of qualities that are, as Rawls puts it, morally arbitrary , that is wrong. People don’t earn these advantages: they get them by luck. For anyone to use these unearned advantages to their own benefit is unfair, and the source of many injustices.

This inspires Rawls’ central claim that we should conceive of justice ‘as fairness.’ To identify fairness, Rawls develops two important concepts: the original position and the veil of ignorance.

The original position is a hypothetical situation: Rawls asks what social rules and institutions people would agree to, not in an actual discussion, but under fair conditions, [5] where nobody knows whether they are advantaged by luck. Fairness is achieved through the veil of ignorance , an imagined device where the people choosing the basic structure of society (‘deliberators’) have morally arbitrary features hidden from them: since they have no knowledge of these features, any decision they make can’t be biased in their own favor.

Deliberators aren’t ignorant about everything though. They know they are self-interested, i.e., want as much as possible of what Rawls calls primary goods (things we want, no matter what our ideal life looks like). They are also motivated by a minimal ‘sense of justice’: they will abide by rules that seem fair, if others do too. They also know basic facts about science and human nature. [6]  

2. Rawls’s Principles of Justice

Rawls thinks a just society will conform to rules that everyone would agree to in the original position. Since they are deliberating behind the veil of ignorance, people don’t know their personal circumstances, or even their view of the good life. This affects the kinds of outcomes they will endorse: e.g., it would be irrational for deliberators to agree to a society where only Christians have property rights since if, when the veil is ‘lifted,’ they turn out not to be Christian, that will negatively affect their life prospects. Similarly, deliberators presumably won’t choose a society with racist, sexist, or other unfairly discriminatory practices, since beyond the veil, they might end up on the wrong side of these policies. [7]

This gives rise to Rawls’ first principle of justice:

all people have equal claims to as much freedom as is consistent with everyone else having the same level of freedom. [8]

Rawls further claims that, because their ignorance includes an ignorance of probabilities, deliberators would be extremely cautious , and apply what he calls a ‘maximin’ principle: they will aim to ensure that the worst possible position they could end up in is as good as possible in terms of primary goods.

If we imagine ourselves as deliberators, we might be tempted by the idea of total equality in primary goods. This ensures, at least, that nobody will be better off than you for arbitrary reasons. However, some inequality might be useful: the possibility of earning more might incentivize people to work harder, growing the economy and so increasing the total amount of available wealth.

This isn’t a wholehearted endorsement of capitalism, as Rawls’ second principle , which addresses social and economic inequalities, makes clear. The second principle has two parts:

First, people in the original position will tolerate inequalities only if the jobs that pay more aren’t assigned unfairly. This gives us the ideal of fair equality of opportunity : inequalities are allowed only if they arise through jobs that equally talented people have equal opportunity to get. This requires, for instance, that young people receive roughly equal educational opportunities; otherwise, a talented individual might be held back by a lack of basic knowledge, either about their own talents, or about the world.

Second, since their reasoning is governed by the ‘maximin’ principle, deliberators will only tolerate inequalities that benefit the worst off: [9] since, as far as they know, they might be the worst off, this maximizes the quality of their worst possible outcome. This is called the difference principle .

These principles are ordered, which tells us what to do if they clash: equal liberty is most important, then fair opportunity , and finally the difference principle . So, neither freedoms nor opportunity are governed by the difference principle. [10]

3. Conclusion

We can now see how Rawls’ theory might evaluate the issues raised earlier. At least within specific societies, each seems to violate his basic principles of justice, and so would be condemned as unjust. So, even if we ultimately reject Rawls’ approach, it at least seems to offer intuitively correct answers in several important cases, and for plausible reasons.  

[1] For instance, some think that if someone’s money is fairly earned, it is not unjust that she does what she wants with it, such as spending it to increase her children’s opportunities (e.g., Nozick, 1974; Narveson, 2001). Others will say that there are no genuine ‘rights’, and a society should permit or restrict various activities depending on what will promote the ‘common good’: this charge has been made with considerable force against utilitarianism, though it is not one that all utilitarians accept (see Glover (1990), Section 3).

[2] Rawls’ basic view has been importantly extended to several areas which he either did not explicitly comment on: e.g., Daniels’ (2007) extension of the view to healthcare justice, and Rowlands’ (1997) extension to animal rights; or in ways with which he would have himself explicitly disagreed: compare Beitz’s (1979) ‘Rawlsian’ approach to global justice with Rawls’ (1999a) own published views.

[3] A Theory of Justice is a work of considerable length and detail, and this essay omits many elements of interest. For instance, this essay does not review Rawls’ discussion of his intellectual debt to the work of Immanuel Kant, e.g., in his criticism of utilitarian theory as failing to respect the ‘separateness of persons’ (191), and his reliance on the idea of grounding justice in a contract that is understood not as a historical event, but as a theoretical constraint (see Kant, 1793). 

In the discussion below, Rawls’ discussion of qualities that are “morally arbitrary” is found in Rawls (1971, 72-75) and the development of the original position and the veil of ignorance is found in Rawls (1971, 120).

[4] A Theory of Justice focuses on ‘domestic’ justice, i.e., justice within a particular society. Rawls (1999a) addresses the distinct question of global or international justice. Rawls suggests that justice at the global level exists between peoples (groups bound by, e.g. a common culture, language, or history) not individuals, since there is no common global structure equivalent to the ‘basic structure’ of a society. While international justice is also developed by reference to a veil of ignorance, the deliberators are representatives of societies. As such, Rawls believes that their concerns would be very different, including a strong emphasis on respect for national sovereignty, with exceptions only in cases of severe human rights violations. In addition, so long as all peoples or nations have institutions that enable their members to live decent lives, any remaining inequality is not morally troubling. As outlined below, this is in stark contrast to his theory of domestic justice.

[5] Rawls’ view is therefore a ‘hypothetical contract’ theory (i.e. it rests on what would be agreed under certain idealized assumptions), as opposed to the ‘actual contract’ view (e.g. Gauthier, 1986; Gilbert, 2006).

[6] One further condition that deliberators know, which Rawls borrows from David Hume (1738: Book 3, Part 2, Section 2), is that they exist in a condition of ‘moderate scarcity’, which according to both authors is a ‘circumstance’ of justice. The basic idea is that justice is only necessary where there are potential conflicts (i.e., when we do not have an abundance of goods), but if there is not enough even to meet everyone’s basic needs (i.e., ‘extreme scarcity’), those who lose out cannot be expected to abide by the rules. So society – and with it our system of justice – will break down.

[7] In fact, though, Rawls’ is remarkably silent on racial injustice, and there has been considerable debate about whether his system of thought has the space to properly address such issues. See e.g., Mills (2009); Shelby (2013). Related critiques have also been made with respect to other forms of injustice, such as gender-related injustice (e.g. Okin, 1989) and injustice against people with disabilities (e.g. Sen (1980); Nussbaum (2006)).

[8] This was later revised to a weaker requirement: that people have access to a “fully adequate” set of basic rights and liberties (2001: 42-3): these rights cannot be overridden by appeals to the common good.

[9] However, the ‘worst off’ here are to be understood only in reference to “social and economic inequalities” (Rawls, 1999b: 53). Inequalities of ‘natural’ goods (which includes health) are not included because they are not things we can directly redistribute between people, unlike social goods such as money and opportunity.

[10] However, there is some apparent inconsistency across Rawls’ work here. Later (2001: 266), he seems to suggest that some inequalities of opportunity are inevitable, and that they must therefore be turned to the benefit of those with the least opportunity: this view looks remarkably like a difference principle for opportunity.

Daniels, Norman (2007), Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly Cambridge University Press

Gauthier, David (1986) Morals by Agreement Oxford University Press

Gilbert, Margaret (2006) ‘ Reconsidering Actual Contract Theory ’ in A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society . Oxford University Press. 215-238

Glover, Jonathan (1990) Utilitarianism and its Critics Macmillan Publishing

Hume, David (1738) A Treatise of Human Nature

Mills, Charles (2009) ‘ Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls ’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2009): 161-184

Moller Okin, Susan (1989) Justice, Gender and the Family New York: Basic Books

Narveson, Jan (2001) The Libertarian Idea Broadview Press

Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia Wiley-Blackwell

Nussbaum, Martha, (2006), Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Rawls, John (1999a) The Law of Peoples Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Rawls, John (1999b) A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Rawls, John (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement Erin Kelly ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Rowlands, Mark (1997) ‘ Contractarianism and Animal Rights ’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (3):235–247

Shelby, Tommie (2013) ‘ Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills ’ Critical Philosophy of Race 1(2): 145-162.

Sen, Amartya, (1980), ‘ Equality of What? ’ in Tanner Lectures on Human Values , S. MacMurrin (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

For Further Reading

Beitz, Charles (1979) ‘ Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics ’  International Organization , 33: 405–424.

Harsanyi, John (1975) ‘ Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’ Theory ’ America Political Science Review 69(2): 594-606

Kant, Immanuel (1793) ‘ On the common saying: this may be true in theory but it does not apply in practice ’ in Kant’s Political Writings (1970), edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge University Press (61-93)

Rawls, John (2002) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls edited by Samuel Freeman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Rawls, John (2005) Political Liberalism : Expanded Edition Columbia University Press

Sandel, Michael (1998) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Sen, Amartya (1992) Inequality Re-examined Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Taylor, Charles (1985). ‘ The nature and scope of distributive justice ’ in  Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 289-317

Wenar, Leif, (2017) ‘ John Rawls ’,  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

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About the Author

Ben completed his PhD in Philosophy at King’s College London in 2015. He is currently a Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. His research is mostly in the ethics and politics of health care, including resource allocation, professional ethics, discrimination, and democracy. He also has interests in animal ethics; death; and well-being. sites.google.com/view/ben-davies-philosophy

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Justice as a Virtue

The notion of justice as a virtue began in reference to a trait of individuals, and to some extent remains so, even if today we often conceive the justice of individuals as having some (grounding) reference to social justice. But from the start, the focus on justice as a virtue faced pressures to diffuse, in two different ways.

First, “justice as a virtue” is ambiguous as between individual and social applications. Rawls and others regard justice as “the first virtue of social institutions” (1971, p. 3), but Rawls is not the first to think of justice as a virtue of social institutions or societies — Plato was there long before him. However, justice as a virtue of societies, polities, and their institutions is addressed elsewhere , so the focus in this essay will be on justice as a virtue in individuals. That said, individuals typically live as members of political communities, so the societal dimension of justice as a virtue will never be long out of view (Woodruff 2018).

Second, from the start the effort to analyze the virtue of justice has led to attempts to formalize the requirements (or norms) of justice, and at times the latter project has threatened to swallow the first in ways that make thinking of a virtue of justice gratuitous or otiose. We might be tempted to think that the virtue of justice consists simply in compliance with the norms of justice our theory specifies: a just person will be one who complies with the norms of justice, whether those are narrowly interpersonal or more broadly social or political in scope. In this way the virtue becomes subsidiary to norms of justice independently specified (Anderson 2010, p. 2; LeBar 2014). Doing so threatens to lose the force that the notion of virtue had in the earliest thinking about justice.

A further complication is that even the idea of justice as a virtue of individuals seems ambiguous in regard to scope. Plato in the Republic treats justice as an overarching virtue of both individuals and societies, so that almost every issue he (or we) would regard as ethical comes in under the notion of justice. But in later usages justice covers only part of individual morality, and we don’t readily think of someone as unjust if they lie or neglect their children — other epithets more readily spring to mind. Individual justice first and most readily regards moral issues having to do with distributions of goods or property. It is, we say, unjust for someone to steal from people or not to give them what he owes them, and it is also unjust if someone called upon to distribute something good (or bad or both) among members of a group uses an arbitrary or unjustified basis for making the distribution. Discussion of justice as an individual virtue often centers on questions, therefore, about property and other distributable goods, though the broader sense broached by Plato never entirely disappears. Still there is disagreement over whether the broader distributive questions associated with political morality have subordinated or obscured the earlier Greek concerns with justice as a virtue of individual character (Hursthouse 1999, pp. 5–6; Coope 2007; Lu 2017).

1.1 Ancient

1.2 medieval and modern, 2. social psychology and justice, 3. justice as a virtue of societies.

• 4. Justice and other Virtues

5. Recent Developments

6. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

Philosophical discussion of justice begins with Plato, who treats the topic in a variety of dialogues, most substantially in Republic . There Plato offers the first sustained discussion of the nature of justice ( dikaiosune ) and its relation to happiness, as a departure from three alternatives receiving varying degrees of attention. First, there is a traditionalist conception of justice (speaking the truth and paying your debts). Second, Plato has Socrates rebut the Sophist conception of justice which built on a distinction between nature ( phusis ) and convention ( nomos ) As Plato has this conception articulated by Thrasymachus in Book I, justice is simply the “advantage of the stronger,” not tracking anything like the sort of value attributed to it by traditionalists. Finally, Plato has Socrates confront a conventionalist conception of justice that anticipates modern contractarian views, in which justice — forbearing preying on others in exchange for not being preyed on by them — is a “second-best alternative,” not as good as being able to prey at will upon others, but better than being the prey of others. These last two challenges give rise to the central question of the book: to whose advantage is justice? Would we really be better off being unjust if we could get away with it? Plato’s negative answer to that question is the project of the balance of the work.

Plato’s method involves the provocative idea that justice in the city ( polis ) is the same thing as justice in the individual, just “writ large.” There are good reasons to worry about that assumption (Williams 1973; Keyt 2006). But in Plato’s sociology of the city, there are three classes engaged in a kind of division of labor. There is a guardian class which rules, a class of “auxiliaries” that provide the force behind the ruling, and the class of merchants that produce to satisfy the needs and desires of the city. Similarly, the psyche of the individual has three parts: a reasoning part to rule, a “spirited” part to support the rule of reason, and an appetitive part. Plato finds justice in the city to consist in each part “having and doing its own,” and since the smaller is just like the larger, justice in the individual consists in each part of the psyche doing its own work. (This grounds the idea, later enshrined by Justinian, that justice is “giving every man his due;” Justinian I.i). Further, Plato argues, justice is a master virtue in a sense, because in both the city and the psyche, if each part is doing its own job, both city and psyche will also have wisdom, courage, and moderation or self-discipline. This conception of justice sustains the contrast with the conventionalist view advocated by the Sophists. On the other hand, at least initially it leaves it an open question whether the just individual refrains from such socially proscribed actions as lying, killing, and stealing. Plato eventually seeks to show that someone with a healthy, harmonious soul wouldn’t lie, kill, or steal, but it is not clear that argument succeeds, nor, if it does, that that is the right understanding of why we ought not to lie, kill, or steal (Sachs 1963; LeBar 2013, ch. XII).

Plato gives a somewhat different treatment of justice in Crito , in which Socrates’ eponymous friend attempts to persuade Socrates to accept his (Crito’s) offer to bribe a way out of the death sentence Socrates is waiting to have executed. Here Plato’s arguments first associate the just life with the good life, thus the life Socrates has most reason to live. And justice, he then argues, requires not only not inflicting wrong or injury on others, even in response to wrongs from them, but fulfilling one’s agreements, and — in particular — abiding by one’s (tacit or explicit) agreement to abide by the laws of the city unless one can persuade it to change them. Of course, justice cannot require one to abide by laws that require one to act unjustly, as Socrates’ own case (as characterized in Apology ) shows (Kraut 1984).

It is worth noting (as Johnston 2011 observes) that even if Plato’s is the first philosophical discussion of justice, a concern with what an individual is due as a matter of justice is a driving issue in Homer’s Iliad , though there is no counterpart concern there with justice as a property of a society or tribe. So even Plato’s philosophical concerns are building on well-established questions about what justice requires of us in our treatment of one another.

Aristotle does not see the virtue of justice in quite the comprehensive sense Plato does; he treats it as a virtue of character (in the entirety of one of the ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics , also common to the Eudemian Ethics ), and as a virtue of constitutions and political arrangements (in Politics ). The question naturally arises as to the relation between these forms of justice. Aristotle seems to think they are closely related, without being synonymous applications of the same concept. As the latter is a conception of political justice, we will focus here on the former. Justice as a personal virtue follows Aristotle’s model for virtues of character, in which the virtue lies as an intermediate or mean between vices of excess and defect ( Nicomachean Ethics V). While he grants that there is a “general” sense of justice in which justice is coincident with complete virtue, there is a “particular” sense in which it is concerned with not overreaching ( pleonexia ). It is not clear, however, exactly how Aristotle understands this arrangement, or the nature of the vices of excess and defect which this “particular” justice is to counteract. One very plausible reading has it that justice is opposed to a desire for maldistribution of “goods of fortune” such as money, fame, or honor (Williams 1980; Curzer 1995). On another it is opposed to an insufficient attention to others’ rights (Foot 1988, p. 9). On still another it focuses on the goods of others, or common goods (O’Connor 1988; Miller 1995).

These issues remain open in part because Aristotle seems most interested in establishing a conception of the formal structure of “particular” justice, which seems to reflect a conception of desert. He distinguishes between justice in distribution and justice in rectification. The former, he claims, adheres to a kind of proportionality, in which what each deserves is proportional to the relationship between the contributions. If A contributes twice as much as B (of whatever the metric of merit is relevant in some particular case), then A’s return ought also to be twice B’s. This conception of distributive justice obviously lends itself to “goods of fortune” — and to some goods, like wealth, more obviously than others — but it need not in principle be confined to such goods, although the examples Aristotle provides suggest such applications. Similarly, justice in rectification involves a sort of “arithmetical proportion.” If C defrauds D by amount X, then justice requires depriving C of X and restoring X to D, as a matter of reestablishing a kind of equality between them. These structural devices are elegant and attractive, but they leave open a number of questions (LeBar, forthcoming). First, as indicated, to what are we to suppose they apply? Second, in what way do they figure into the nature of the person who is just in the particular sense? (That is, how are they related to justice as a virtue?) Does a model of particular justice as a virtue fit the general model of virtue as a mean, and if so, what sort of mean is it? Aristotle seems torn between a conception of justice as a virtue in his distinctive understanding of what a virtue is — with a requirement that one have all the virtues to have any ( Nicomachean Ethics VI.13), and rooted in the doctrine of the mean — and justice as having the form of a formal normative structure, to which the virtue threatens to become subsidiary. All this is to leave aside questions of the relation between this “particular” sense of justice and political justice, and the role of the virtue of justice in the individual as it contributes to justice in the polis.

Epicurus’ conception of the role of justice was more central to his eudaimonism perhaps than its counterpart in Plato and Aristotle, but that reflects in part his distinctive understanding of eudaimonia , or happiness. For Epicurus this consisted in ataraxia — tranquility, or freedom from disturbance. Given that the good life is the life without disturbance, justice plays a key instrumental role. One might, Epicurus thinks, withdraw entirely from human society to avoid disturbance, but the alternative is to live socially under terms which secure the avoidance of disturbance. This is the structure of the ideal Epicurean community, in which each forbears aggression (Armstrong 1997, Thrasher 2013). Justice is a matter of keeping agreements generally, and in particular the agreement not to harm or transgress social norms.

In this way Epicurus offers a conception of the virtue of justice that harmonizes both its personal and its political dimensions. The personal virtue consists in the motivation to abide by a contract not to aggress or harm others. The political virtue inheres in a polity in which such norms regulate the conduct of its citizens, and these two dimensions of justice as a virtue reinforce each other.

The other great ethical tradition of antiquity (Stoicism) had remarkably little to say about justice (Annas 1993, p. 311), so we pass on to the medieval and modern periods.

The legacy of the ancients — Aristotle in particular — continued into the medieval period, notably in the work of Thomas Aquinas, who appropriated much of Aristotle’s philosophy while setting it into a Christian theological framework. As in Aristotle, virtue and virtues are prominent parts of his ethical theory. And, like Aristotle justice is an important virtue, though for Aquinas it less important than the virtue of charity, a Christian virtue that did not appear among the virtues recognized by Aristotle. There are other elements of his account that situate it in an interesting way in the transition from ancient eudaimonist accounts of virtue, to virtue as it appears in the modern era, before it recedes from prominence in ethical theory.

But to the extent Christian writers allied themselves with Plato and Aristotle, they were downplaying another central element in Christian thought and morality, the emphasis on agapic love. Such love seems to be a matter of motivationally active feeling rather than of being rational, and some writers on morality (eventually) allowed this side of Christianity to have a major influence on what they had to say about virtue.

Significant elements of the Aristotelian account of justice reappear in Aquinas’. First, justice is first and foremost a virtue of character rather than institutions, although Aquinas draws a distinction among such virtues not found in Aristotle. For Aquinas, justice as a virtue is a matter of perfection of the will, rather than the passions (ST II-II 58.4). Aquinas offers no account of justice as a virtue of societies or institutions, though he interprets the “general” sense of justice he borrows from Aristotle as being a matter of individual willing and action for the common good. “Particular” justice, which as in Aristotle’s account is most of his focus, has to do with relationships -- in particular but not limited to exchange -- between individuals as individuals (ST II-II 58.8).

Second, Aquinas grounds the norms for these exchanges in the ancient formula of Justinian, which hearkens back to Plato: justice is giving each his own. But his interpretation of this formula situates him astride a deep but subtle divide between ancient and modern thought. To some extent this effect is an upshot of his inheriting not only the Greek eudaimonist tradition, but also a Roman jurisprudential tradition in which notions like standing and right as claim (rather than, say, fairness) had begun to emerge (Porter 2016, p. 143). As a result, Aquinas’ synergistic account has some novel complications.

One major complication, relative to the ancient accounts, is that what is ours by right is a recognition of a kind of status, as an effect of the order among people ordained by God ( ST I-II 100.8). As Jean Porter points out, this establishes a normative standard for justice that does not grow out of the agent’s own perfection or eudaimonia (Porter 2016, p. 157). There are two significant follow-on implications.

First, the fabric of the eudaimonist approach to practical reasoning and life — inherited from the Greeks — begins to fray. For better or worse, on the Greek eudaimonist views (including here Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus) our reasons for action arise from our interest in a happy life. If the reason-giving nature of others arises from a different source, as this reading of Aquinas suggests, then practical reason seems to have a duality of ultimate sources, with the complications that kind of duality brings.

Second, this is the first step in the diminution of the theoretical significance of the virtues — a process that will not begin to be reversed until the middle of the 20th century. On Aristotle’s view, for example, the virtuous person sees reasons for acting that the non-virtuous do not (and that arguably are not there to be seen absent the effects of virtue — LeBar 2013; Berryman 2019). Virtue is no longer the normative epicenter of the theory, as it was for the Greeks. To the extent that this aspect of Aquinas’s view has virtue responsive to value or reasons that is accounted for in some way other than the work of virtue, it is the leading edge of process that will result in a much-reduced role for virtue in later ethical accounts

Hume is an excellent exemplar of this point, in both the Treatise and the Enquiries . Virtue, Hume maintains, is a matter of “some quality or character,” produced in one by “durable principles of the mind” ( T III.iii.I, p. 575). We deem such qualities virtues not, as on the ancient Greek view, because they conduce to the happiness of the person who has them, but because they have a “tendency to the good of mankind” or society. ( T III.iii.I). This service renders them pleasing to our “moral tastes:” our approbation, Hume tells us, has its source in “view of a character, which is naturally fitted to be useful to others, or to the person himself, or which is agreeable to others, or to the person himself” ( T III.iii.I, 591). We can think of that as the criterion some quality of character must have to be deemed a virtue. In consequence, what counts as virtuous is an upshot of, and not the source of, the normative foundations of this view.

By Hume’s time the content of justice as a virtue has shifted as well. In Hume’s treatment, the focus of justice is property — relations of “mine and thine.” It is a “cautious, jealous” virtue in the sense that it is focused on the sorts of exclusionary powers that are characteristic of property rules and relations. We may always be aspiring for more but justice aims at the preservation and security of what one has already ( E III.1, p. 184). So the virtue of justice, as Hume thinks of it, will in the main consist of a quality in one which disposes one to observe and uphold these rules.

What Hume wants to show is, first, that we can have such a disposition or quality (that is, that it is possible for us to have a quality or character to observe the rules of justice), and, second, that such a quality would count as a virtue, given his criteria. His approach to these questions in the Treatise is framed by a problem he has set up himself. To appreciate that problem, we have to step back to Hume’s broader view about moral motivation. Hume had argued that moral principles “are not conclusions of our reason” ( T III.i.I); instead, they are “more properly felt than judg’d of” ( T III.i.II). Morality, and virtue, is a matter of sentiments or passions. Why? Hume marshals a number of arguments to this effect which are not relevant to our purposes. The basic reason is that the functional roles of reason and the passions are markedly different, in Hume’s view. The task of reason is to discover truth or falsehood, in “relations of ideas” or “matters of facts” ( T III.i.I); as such, it utterly lacks the capacity to move us to action. Only the passions can do that ( T II.iii.III). The passions, on the other hand, have no representational content whatsoever; they are “original existences” ( T II.iii.III; III.i.I). Virtue is paradigmatically a practical matter: it is a property of what we do, and to act we must be motivated. That means any successful account of virtue must find it in our passions, not in any aspect of our reason ( T III.i.I). So far so good.

However, when we come to justice, we look in vain for a passion that can supply motive power for us to act justly. If anything, our natural motives move us away from justice ( T III.ii.II). Self-love requires “correcting and restraining” ( T III.ii.I). And only a passion can do that. But which? Hume himself dismisses the possibilities of public or private beneficence or universal love. In the end he concludes that there is no natural passion to explain it. Instead, it is in a certain crucial sense artificial ( T III.ii.VI). Under certain conditions, given that we are sensible of the advantages of living in human society, our self-love or self-interest may be given an “alteration of its direction,” and induce us to respect the rules of justice. These Hume thinks of primarily as involving honesty and “particular” property rules ( T III.ii.II). That “alteration” needs explanation.

Two facts about the conditions in which we act — one about us, one about our environment — set this alteration in motion. First, Hume maintains, we are limited in our generosity or benevolence. And second, we live in conditions of scarcity ( T III.ii.II). We have to work to make a go of it, and we cannot count on others to do so for us. We need control of our world to meet our needs, but we are vulnerable to the selfishness and predation of others.

The solution, Hume argues, is that we naturally fall into a “convention” by which we observe that rules of property — the observance of which is key to the virtue of justice — is good for all of us. This convention is no formal agreement; Hume argues that it cannot be something like the product of promise or compact ( T III.ii.II). Instead, “it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it” ( T III.ii.II, p. 490). Much as two men pulling the oars in a boat together need no explicit agreement to find they prosper by such an arrangement, so do we generally. (Wilson 2018 explores support for Hume’s hypothesis through work in experimental economics.) So in the end it is self-interest that drives us to comply with the requirements of justice, though Hume adds that sympathy with the public interest induces our endorsement of it once justice has become established. This endorsement, however, is reserved for a scheme of property rules taken generally; as Hume observes, individual instances of compliance may frequently be “contrary to public interest,” though such compliance is still required of us. Hume believes the benefit of the system overall, both to society and to individual, requires that rules not admit of exceptions ( T III.ii.II, E Appendix III, §256). Self-interest accounts for the possibility of our being motivated to act as the virtue of justice requires, and both the utility and the agreeableness, both to ourselves and others, of a resulting social order with respected property rules, leads to our approbation of that motivation as a virtue.

In fact, this point — that “public utility is the sole origin of justice” — is the point of Hume’s discussion of justice in the Enquiries (III.I, ¶145). Scarcity imposes a need for us to distinguish mine from thine, and we have not sufficient generosity in our natures to do without property rules (as we might, say, in our families). And once again Hume argues that our recognition of the utility and necessity of justice provides “entire command over our sentiments” ( E III.II, ¶163).As David Johnston observes (Johnston 2011, p. 138), Hume’s understanding of the value of justice as instrumental in the promotion of utility marks a sharp shift from earlier understandings which invoked various forms of reciprocity in understanding that value.

Such a sentimentalist account of justice is also found in Adam Smith; in fact, a focus on the sentiments almost completely swamps concern for virtue. Our judgments of virtue and vice, he says, are compounded by consideration of two different “relations” in a sentiment: “the cause or object which excites or causes it, and … the end which it proposes” (TMS II.i.introduction). His focus on those two “relations” obviates any independent discussion of virtue per se. He does however explicitly countenance a virtue of justice, developed in contrast with the virtue of beneficence. In Smith, even more clearly than in Hume, one can see that this virtue consists in conformity to “rules” or “laws” of justice that appear to exist antecedently to the realization of the virtue itself, unlike ancient accounts. Smith indicates that justice merits resentment when absent, that it may be “extorted by force,” and that in the main it requires forbearing from harming others.. Smith calls justice a “negative virtue” in this respect: often all it requires is that we sit still and do nothing (Smith 1759, II.ii.I.5, 9). It is essential to the subsistence of society, Smith tells us (Smith 1759, II.ii.3.3-4), but — in contrast to Hume — is not reducible in its motivational basis to regard for society. Instead, our just concern for “multitudes” is compounded of our concern for individuals, which arises from “fellow-feeling,” which is yet short of “love, esteem, and affection” (Smith 1759, II.ii.3.7).

In Kant, finally, along with a movement away from sentimentalism we see the completion of the distinction between justice as a virtue and justice as a norm to which a virtue may or may not correspond. While Kant has a theory (or “doctrine”) of virtue, he distinguishes that theory precisely against a counterpoised theory of justice. The two are complementary elements in the “metaphysics of morals.” Moreover, the doctrine of justice itself has two parts, roughly corresponding to the distinction present since Plato’s work, between the role of justice in the individual and the role of justice in the state. Kant calls these “private right” and “public right,” respectively. But right in either case is not how Kant at least conceives of virtue; instead, right is a “condition” that can obtain between the moral agents comprising a moral or legal community, in virtue of their principles of choice in acting (Kant 1797). Little remains here of the notion of justice as a virtue of individuals as it began with the ancient Greeks.

20th-century developmental psychology drew deeply on the Kantian legacy. Piaget (1932/1948) treated moral development as principally involving increasing cognitive sophistication. More particularly, Piaget saw that sophistication as a matter of taking more and more general or universal views of moral issues, and endorsed the Kantian and rationalist idea that morality rests on and can be justified in terms of considerations of justice. Piaget saw a “law of evolution” in moral development, from an understanding of rules (including moral rules) as being “heteronomous” impositions of authority, to which one is objectively responsible, to a grounding in mutual respect, accompanied by subjective responsibility to others (Piaget 1932/1948, p. 225). This transition is fostered through social interaction, and attention to norms of equality and reciprocity replace those of mere obedience.

Educational psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg was inspired by Piaget to propose a conception of moral development that postulated six stages of human moral development. In his earliest work, Kohlberg identified the highest stage of such development with a concern for justice and human rights based on universal principles. Concern for relationships and for individual human well-being was embedded in a framework of conformity to social norms, at lower stages of the process. Moreover, he saw the ordering of the different stages in Piagetian fashion as basically reflecting differences in rational understanding: those whose moral thinking involved the invoking of universal principles of justice and rights were thought to show a more advanced cognitive development than those whose moral thought appeals primarily to the importance of relationships and of human well-being or suffering. The paradigm of moral development involves judgments that are “reversible,” in the sense that each party to the issue can accept the correct judgment by reversing his or her perspective and taking up the viewpoint of the other (Kohlberg 1981). The sophisticated moral reasoner will engage in a process of “moral musical chairs,” taking up the positions of the parties to the conflict successively. It is, on this version of Kohlberg’s thought, that formal feature of the deliberative process that is characteristic of greatest moral development. As his research and thought progressed, however, Kohlberg increasingly acknowledged that these formal features were less characteristic of overall moral development and thought than of the deployment of specifically justice-based concepts. In fact, Kohlberg was impressed by the work of Rawls, and thought that the nature of Rawls’ “original position of equality” exemplified the kind of reversibility that is paradigmatic of the highest form of moral thought (Kohlberg 1981, p. 204). However, his approach treats utilitarianism as less cognitively advanced (more primitive) than rationalist views like Kant’s, and utilitarians (like R.M. Hare) naturally called into question the objectivity and intellectual fairness of Kohlberg’s account.

More significantly, perhaps, the evidence for Kohlberg’s stage sequence was drawn from studies of boys, and when one applies the sequence to the study of young girls, it turns out that girls on average end up at a less advanced stage of moral development than boys do. In her 1982 book In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development , Carol Gilligan responded to Kohlberg’s views by questioning whether a theory of moral development based solely on a sample of males could reasonably be used to draw conclusions about the inferior moral development of women. Gilligan argued that her own studies of women’s development indicated that the moral development of girls and women proceeds and ends in a different fashion from that of boys and men, but that that proves nothing about inferiority or superiority: it is merely a fact of difference. In particular, Gilligan claimed that women tend to think morally in terms of connection to others (relationships) and in terms of caring about (responsibility for) those with whom they are connected; men, by contrast and in line with Kohlberg’s studies, tend to think more in terms of general principles of justice and of individual rights against (or individual autonomy from) other people. But Jean Hampton, among others, responded that Gilligan’s critique was itself a distortion, and that concerns for justice and individual rights are as significant for and in the moral lives of women as for men (Hampton 1993).

In recent years, a variety of social sciences have intensified investigation into aspects of our natures that are plausibly important for a virtue of justice. For example, Widlok 2018 surveys cross-cultural anthropological work examining the development of “ethical skill” in rightful and just sharing practices.

For a variety of reasons, many ethical thinkers have thought that justice cannot be based in sentiment but requires a more intellectually constructive rational(ist) basis, and in recent times this view of the matter seems to have been held, most influentially, by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice . Rawls makes clear his belief in the inadequacy of benevolence or sympathetic human sentiment in formulating an adequate conception of social justice. He says in particular that sentiment leaves unanswered or indeterminate various important issues of justice that a good theory of justice ought to be able to resolve.

Rawls’s positive view of justice is concerned primarily with the justice of institutions or (what he calls) the “basic structure” of society: justice as an individual virtue is derivative from justice as a social virtue defined via certain principles of justice. The principles, famously, are derived from an “original position” in which (very roughly) rational contractors under a “veil of ignorance” decide how they wish to commit themselves to being governed in their actual lives. Rawls deliberately invokes Kantian rationalism (or anti-sentimentalism) in explaining the intellectual or theoretical motivation behind his construction, and the two principles of justice that he argues would be agreed upon under the contractual conditions he specifies represent a kind of egalitarian political liberalism. Roughly, those principles stress (equality of) basic liberties and opportunities for self-advancement over considerations of social welfare, and the distribution of opportunities and goods in society is then supposed to work to the advantage of all (especially the worst-off members of society). He also says that the idea of what people distributively deserve or merit is derivative from social justice rather than (as with Aristotle and/or much common-sense thinking) providing the basis for thinking about social justice.

According to Rawls, individual justice is theoretically derivative from social justice because the just individual is to be understood as someone with an effective or “regulative” desire to comply with the principles of justice. However, it is not merely social justice that Rawls understands in (predominantly) rationalist fashion. When he explains how individuals (within a just society) develop a sense and/or the virtue of justice, he invokes the work of Piaget. Rawls lays more stress than Piaget does on the role our affective nature (sympathy and the desire for self-mastery) plays in the acquisition of moral virtue. But, like Piaget, he stresses the need for a sufficiently general appreciation and rational understanding of social relations as the grounding basis of a sense of duty or of justice and he explicitly classifies his account of moral development as falling within the “rationalist tradition.”

4. Justice and Other Virtues

Few would doubt that justice is a virtue of character. But there are other moral virtues. How is justice related to them? Is it more important? Even in Republic , in which Plato makes justice a “master virtue” of sorts, there are other virtues (wisdom, courage, and self-discipline), and elsewhere (notably Gorgias ) Plato makes self-discipline ( sophrosune ) the “master virtue,” so it is not clear that justice has any sort of priority over these other virtues. Likewise, though the texts we have show Aristotle devoting more space to justice, it is not clear that the particular form of the virtue of justice has any sort of pre-eminence. On the other hand, Cicero claims that justice is the “crowning glory” of the virtues ( De Officiis I.7). If we take virtue of character to have the moral centrality the ancients (perhaps in contrast to the moderns), how much importance should we accord to justice among the virtues?

Aquinas cites Cicero as a target in developing a sophisticated view of the relationships among the virtues ( ST II-II 58.12). On Aquinas’ view, Cicero is half right, for Aquinas distinguishes between virtues as responsive to appetites of our animal nature (moral virtues) and as responsive to appetites of our intellect (virtues of the will). He takes it that justice is preeminent over the moral virtues because it inheres in the rational part of the soul, and because its object is more noble (the good of others, or the common good, rather than the individual good). On that point he can agree with Cicero. However, these virtues themselves are not as excellent as the theological virtues, of which the greatest is love (or charity -- caritas; ST II-II 23.6). There are several arguments for this claim but it is grounded in Paul’s admonition to the Corinthians, that love is the greatest among the virtues of faith and hope (1 Corinthians 13:13).

In recent decades there have been secular challenges to the primacy of justice among virtues. Recall that Carol Gilligan had argued for a “different voice” for women in coming to grips with moral problems. Instead of a rights-based understanding of morality that gave special consideration to the individual, women saw relationships between people as primary (Gilligan 1983, pp. 19, 29). Kohlberg had offered a thought experiment about a man (“Heinz”) tempted to steal a life-saving drug to save his sick wife (Kohlberg 1981, p. 12). Whereas boys are more likely to think of Heinz’ dilemma in terms of what is the right thing to do, girls, Gilligan argues, see the world as “a world of relationships and psychological truths where an awareness of the connection between people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another” (Gillian 1983, p. 30). Gilligan carefully frames this contrast as one between voices, not a matter of ranking of dispositions or virtues, but her work can and did provide a basis for making that sort of assessment between virtues, one on which (as in Aquinas’ case) love and care for others turns out to be more important than considerations of justice.

In some ways, Nel Nodding’s pioneering work in laying out an “ethic of care” takes such a step. Following Gilligan, she sees much ethical theory as missing a feminine voice, one which grounds moral concern for the concrete other in caring for them and their needs, and thus as relational rather than individualistic (Noddings 1983, 1999). Yet some caution is required before seeing her as taking up something like a Thomistic stance on the priority of love over justice. For one thing, to a significant degree she wants to emphasize the importance of the concrete and particular as opposed to the abstract and general (or the reliance on universal principles) in thinking and acting morally. But that is an emphasis which animates some particularistic forms of virtue ethics, and does not distinguish justice from love or other virtues. Moreover, where she explicitly argues that care “‘picks up’ where justice leaves off” (Noddings 1999, p. 12), she is thinking of justice as a property of institutions (e.g. Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness), and institutional implementations of those theories, not a virtue of character. She is clearly concerned about the limits of “rights-talk,” but that at least historically has not been a prominent part in thinking about justice as a virtue of character. Thus she does not clearly take a side in this matter.

Like Noddings, Virginia Held frames much of the point of the ethics of care against a historical theoretical backdrop of attention to justice (Held 1995, 2004, 2006). To some extent, like Noddings, for Held the relevant notion of justice is not a virtue of character but a concern with fairness, equality, and individual rights, or perhaps more generally impartial universal principles (Held 2004, p. 144; 2006, p. 14). In fact, Held more clearly poses an ethics of care as an alternative to virtue ethics (Held 2004, 143; 2006, 14). This is for two reasons. First, virtue ethical theories focus on dispositions and traits of individuals, whereas an ethics of care focuses on relations between individuals. Second, an ethics of care sees people as partially constituted by their relations with others, as opposed to the individualism characteristic of virtue ethics. Held does not think an ethics of care can do without a concern for justice as a value, however (Held 1995, 129). More generally, she believes, caring provides a “wider network” within which concerns for justice and virtue (as well as utility) should be fitted (2004, 147; 2006, 72). Margaret McLaren (2001), on the other hand, responds on the basis of commonalities between care ethics and virtue ethics that care ethics actually is most attractive when situated as an ethics of virtue. Marilyn Friedman (1987) similarly seems accepting of the general framework of virtue ethics, and of crucial places for virtues of both caring and justice within such a framework, responsive to different degrees and in different ways to gender differences she believes actually do hold, though not falling along a caring/justice fault line.

Michael Slote also accepts care ethics as well-situated as a virtue ethical theory, but argues for the necessity of conceiving such a theory as “agent-based” -- holding that motivation or motives are “the ultimate bases for evaluation of action, institutions, laws, and societies” (Slote 1998, p. 173). As he has developed his view, empathic motivation has come to take an increasing role (Slote 2010, p. 124). As with Noddings and Held, for Slote the relevant questions about justice are about forms of social organization, the allocation of rights, and so on. If there is a vestige of the Platonic/Justinian model of justice as a virtue, it would appear to figure in only as a rationale for the shape of some social policies reflecting e.g. social (or perhaps global) distributive justice. But empathy is the focal normative concern throughout. The justice of a society constitutively depends on the motives of the individuals who make it up (Slote 1998, p. 187; 2010, p. 128). If the relevant motives are caring or empathic ones, then Slote’s analysis would seem to collapse the distinction between caring and justice as virtues of individual character (or motivation). That is, individuals would count as just exactly to the degree that their motivations are empathic, and they thus contribute to the laws, policies, institutions, and so on in ways that are reflective of similar motivations across society. But that is just to say that they are caring motivations as well.

A somewhat different feminist critique of a focus on a virtue of justice comes from Robin Dillon. Like Slote, her concern is more with social institutions, structures, and hierarchies than with traits of character, and in fact these priorities lead her to be critical of virtue ethical theories which, she believes, cannot ask the right questions about virtues and vices (Dillon 2012, p. 86). However, she does accept the point that character traits matter, though she believes attending to the vices that allow and support social structures that allow for oppression and domination is more pertinent to feminist moral philosophy.

Lisa Tessman, on the other hand, accepts the basic framework of Aristotelian thinking about virtues of character, and with it the virtue of justice (Tessman 2005). However, she argues that oppressive social conditions can interfere in ways Aristotle did not anticipate with the formation of virtues of character and consequently (given Aristotle’s framework) with prospects for happiness (eudaimonia). One point of amendment, then, to Aristotelian thought is to recognize that oppressive social conditions may make other traits — traits that are important for liberatory struggle — into virtues. Another, congruent with other lines of feminist critique, is that Aristotle is insufficiently appreciative of the need for sensitivity to and response to suffering, so that something like the kind of supplementation recommended by care ethics is appropriate. A different model of response to the development of the virtue of justice specifically under non-ideal or unjust social conditions, one modeled on Kohlberg’s original architectonic understanding of the virtue, is defended by Jon Garthoff (Garthoff 2018).

Finally, in recent work Talbot Brewer has argued that a “revisionist” version of Aristotelian virtue ethics does a better job than competitors (including Kantian and contractualist theories) at recognizing the “irreplaceable value” of each human being (Brewer 2018). Brewer believes that a robust conception of the virtue of justice does important work for such a theory, not just focusing on distribution and allocation, but more generally establishing the space for virtuous recognition of ways that others can demand that we treat them (Brewer 2018, p. 25). Still, Brewer invokes Aquinas to argue that such justice is not enough, that that what is required is a recognition of a virtue of love to unify and perfect the other virtues of character.

While Rawls’ work has sparked an explosion of work in distributive justice and social justice more generally, in recent years a variety of strategies to return to a focus on justice as a personal virtue has emerged. These strategies vary across both dimensions we have considered, taking with various degrees of seriousness the connection between institutional and personal forms of justice, and focusing on the latter as a virtue, among (and like) other virtues.

One such strategy is that of Jon Drydyk, who builds on the “capability approach” to human welfare to make a case for a capabilities-based account of the justice of individual agents, in particular as against an “Aristotelian” approach that stresses justice as a matter of response to merit. Acting justly involves “striving to reduce and remove inequalities in people’s capabilities to function in ways that are elemental” to a truly human life (Drydyk 2012, pp. 31, 33). This is a “subsidiary” virtue account, in that we begin with a prior conception of the content of the requirements of justice, and conform the virtue to this conception. However, Drydyk emphasizes justice as a virtue of individuals, rather than institutions or societies. Drydyk’s strategy offers a counterpoint both to the Rawlsian way of thinking about just societies and to the ancient Greek way of thinking about justice as a virtue of individuals.

John Hacker-Wright argues that what is needed to replace a “legalistic” concern with moral status (as on modern liberal conceptions of justice) is instead an ethic of virtue with a different conception of the virtue of justice. Instead of a concern for the resolution of claims in something like reciprocal, contractual relations, Hacker-Wright’s conception of the virtue of justice is a matter of sensitivity to “vulnerability of value” in things, animate and otherwise. Thus, the threat of unjust — vicious -- wronging hangs not only over people who are sufficiently cognitively impaired so as not to perceive insults, but also corpses, animals, and even rare and valuable rock formations (p. 463). This counts as a sense of justice in that, on Hacker-Wright’s view it is not merely that we can act wrongly or viciously toward such entities, but (following Midgley 1983) that they can be wronged by us by our doing so. However, while Hacker-Wright claims that on a virtue ethic “The character of the agent is recognized as ineliminable in picking out facts as they figure in our moral deliberation,” this does not strictly speaking seem to be true, as prior to virtue there is value which it is up to the just or virtuous person to respond with sensitivity (Hacker-Wright 2007, pp. 461, 463, 464).

David Schmidtz and John Thrasher suggest rethinking the relationship between social justice and individual justice (Schmidtz and Thrasher 2014). Turning Plato’s account of justice in Republic on its head, they depict justice as a bridge between a virtue of the soul and of the polis : because we are essentially social, we need community, and justice is a matter of harmony with the community. On their view this is (largely) a matter of compliance with rules and institutions that enable people to live in harmony and flourish together.

An alternative proposal for thinking of the justice as a personal virtue ties it intimately to the experiences we have as emotional creatures. On this approach, instead of justice standing as distinct from “natural virtues” motivated by passions (as on Hume’s account), or needing to be replaced by sentimentally-driven attitudes such as care or compassion, justice is to be seen as a virtue largely constituted by emotion (Solomon 1994, Roberts 2010). The virtue amounts to a stable disposition of character to respond in the relevant ways to instances of injustice, perhaps consisting in those occasions in which one does not receive his or her due, and on the other hand to be disposed to a “will to give each his due” (Roberts 2010, p. 38). For Roberts, this is a will to realize “objective justice,” and as on other recent accounts, the virtue (and the passion) are theoretically subsidiary to this primary notion of “objective justice.”

There are also recent ventures in the spirit of the ancient Greek thinking about the individual virtue of justice. Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2005) argue for two interpersonal senses of justice (pp. 160-63). One is the familiar Aristotelian virtue. The second is a “metanormative” principle governing the institutions and legal frameworks in which individual agents (just and otherwise) live their lives and exercise their practical agency. The second of these senses of interpersonal justice does not draw its content from the exercise of virtue, but rather makes a place for it. The former does depend on virtue overall (including the exercise of practical wisdom) for its demands, but these are construed broadly in the traditional way of rendering to each his due. Bloomfield (2011) similarly suggests extending the Aristotelian virtue of justice, but in an inward direction, arguing that self-respect is necessary for happiness, and treating oneself fairly requires treating oneself fairly, as one treats others fairly, as a property of justice as individuals.

On the other hand, Wolterstorff (2008) argues that the eudaimonism of Greek thought prevents a proper appreciation for the nature and significance of justice and rights. Whether there is theoretical space remaining for a virtue of justice is not a question Wolterstorff considers, but he does believe there is no hope for an adequate grip on justice in an Aristotelian or Stoic framework.

Recent thinkers have grappled with the question of priority between formal principle and virtue that vexed Aristotle, and offered solutions that for the most part subordinate the virtue of justice to the prior notion of the justice of distributions, as Aristotle himself seems to have suggested. Bernard Williams claims explicitly that this is so (Williams 1980, p. 197), as does David Wiggins, in an attempt to bring a “pre-liberal,” Aristotelian conception of justice to bear on modern liberal conceptions, a la Kant and Rawls (Wiggins 2004). To do so, Wiggins distinguishes three senses of justice: (A) a matter of outcomes or states of affairs in which each gets what is due; (B) a disposition to promote justice (A); (C) a condition of the polis in virtue of which (A) is realized. Wiggins claims that the proper outcome of this collision of conceptions is one that recognizes a form of logical priority of justice (A) over justice (B) (p. 489). At the same time, against Williams he insists that the normative demands of justice (A) are “comprehensible” only within the perspective of a person with justice (B). And in fact he claims that a necessary condition on acts and outcomes satisfying the norms of justice (A) is that they be recognized to be so by those with the virtue of justice (B). Wiggins’ thinking here is not transparent, but perhaps the thought is that the logical point is purely formal: someone with justice (B) must, in act or judging justly, be responding to some norm which counts as justice (A). But, as merely formal, that tells us nothing about the substantive content of that norm. To get that, we have ineliminable need to refer to the judgment of the person with justice (B). That marks a way perhaps of restoring Aristotle’s focus on virtue in coming to understand the virtue of justice.

LeBar (2013, 2014) takes a similar tack in attempting to incorporate Kantian and post-Kantian insights into just demands on the treatment of others into an Aristotelian virtue framework. On his view, there is no way to specify the contents of the demands of justice, or to spell out its norms, independently of the wider possession and exercise of the virtues, including the virtue of practical wisdom. At the same time, what the virtuous and just person sees, in inhabiting a social world with equals in moral standing, are the norms which have become associated with the liberal conception: the standing to obligate others and hold them accountable, for example.

Finally, all of these are Western treatments of an individual virtue of justice. May Sim (Sim 2007, 2018) makes the case that there are informative parallels between the Confucian treatment of the virtues (in particular, yi) and the virtue of justice as adumbrated in Plato and Aristotle.

There are many different conceptions of the virtue of justice, and only some of them are distinctively virtue ethical. Many non-virtual ethical approaches put forward theories of virtue, and what distinguishes them from virtue ethics is that the given theory of virtue comes later in the order of explanation, rather than itself serving as the basis for understanding (all of) morality. This is especially the case with justice, where (as we have seen) it is naturally tempting to account for the norms of justice first and derive an account of the virtue in light of those norms. The question of the priority of norms of justice or the virtue of justice is likely to continue to generate exploration and debate, as is the question of how our lives as social and political animals contributes to understanding the virtue of justice. These vexed questions have inspired a profusion of views and no doubt will continue to do so.

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• Keyt, David, 2006, “Plato on Justice,” in A Companion to Plato , edited by H. Benson, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 341–55.
• Kohlberg, Lawrence, 1984, Essays in Moral Development (Volume 1: The Philosophy of Moral Development ), Harper and Row, 1981; Volume 2: The Psychology of Moral Development , San Francisco: Harper and Row.
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• Plato, Republic , translated and with intro by R.E. Allen, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
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Home — Essay Samples — Law, Crime & Punishment — Judiciary — Justice

Essays on Justice

Hook examples for justice essays, anecdotal hook.

Step into a courtroom, where the pursuit of justice unfolds before our eyes. As the gavel strikes and decisions are made, the impact of justice reverberates through society. Join me on a journey to explore the complexities and significance of justice.

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""Justice delayed is justice denied."" These words, attributed to William E. Gladstone, emphasize the importance of timely and fair justice. Let's delve into the profound implications of justice in our world.

Justice and Human Rights Hook

Justice and human rights are inextricably linked. Explore how the concept of justice intersects with the protection of fundamental human rights, shaping our understanding of justice on a global scale.

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Justice has evolved over centuries, often in response to historical events and societal changes. Delve into the historical context of justice, from ancient legal systems to pivotal moments in the fight for civil rights.

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Justice is a cornerstone of the legal system. Analyze the principles and mechanisms that underpin justice in legal proceedings, from the presumption of innocence to the role of juries in delivering verdicts.

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Justice extends beyond legal proceedings to issues of social justice and equity. Investigate how societies address inequality, discrimination, and the pursuit of a more just and equitable world.

Modern Challenges in Justice Hook

Justice remains a pressing concern in the modern world. Explore contemporary challenges and debates surrounding justice, including issues related to criminal justice reform, restorative justice, and access to justice.

Ida B. Wells: a Crusader for Justice

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Injustice in Treatment of Disabled People in Society

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Justice, in its broadest sense, is the principle that people receive that which they deserve, with the interpretation of what then constitutes "deserving" being impacted upon by numerous fields, with many differing viewpoints and perspectives, including the concepts of moral correctness based on ethics, rationality, law, religion, equity and fairness.

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justice , In philosophy , the concept of a proper proportion between a person’s deserts (what is merited) and the good and bad things that befall or are allotted to him or her. Aristotle ’s discussion of the virtue of justice has been the starting point for almost all Western accounts. For him, the key element of justice is treating like cases alike, an idea that has set later thinkers the task of working out which similarities (need, desert, talent) are relevant. Aristotle distinguishes between justice in the distribution of wealth or other goods (distributive justice) and justice in reparation, as, for example, in punishing someone for a wrong he has done (retributive justice). The notion of justice is also essential in that of the just state, a central concept in political philosophy . See also law .

Martin Luther King and Thomas Hobbes on the Subject of Justice Essay

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A number of countries including the United States have adopted the term “justice” in their constitutions, as well as other legal documents such as the pledge of allegiance (Plamenatz, Philp and Pelczynski 162). It must be recognized that although this word has been adopted by many countries, its definition and understanding is a subject of discussion for not just theologians and philosophers, but also law makers (Jackson 26). In an attempt to explicate this issue, the paper will use the arguments of Luther Martin King’s view and Hobbes’ to bring the issue into light. Their divergent views show that the idea of justice is still not clearly explained (Jackson 28). This paper discusses the subject of justice and specifically holds the view that justice is to follow one’s consciousness, and not to obey the unjust law.

Justice and the word “fairness” are used interchangeably cases in most. In any place or situation, people want to be treated in a just or fair way. They feel they deserve to be treated not just equally, but also impartially (Jackson 26). Given that they have a strong desire for fairness and equality, the guarantee of justice, in most cases, is a factor that defines a society that is good. Accordingly, for any leader, whether appointed or elected, to have support and legitimacy amongst his constituents, he must make sure that the laws or policies designed are not only just, but are also enforced in a just way.

Criminal activities as well as other kinds of social ills require a morally just punishment. Even though the specifics of each offense vary, ultimately real justice is“equal” to the wrongdoing committed (Jackson 27). Contrary to this, it will not be justice in any measure. In order to achieve equality or equal justice, universal laws are required. Certainly, universal laws do not just occur or emerge just like that. Universal laws, and as such equal or fair justice, come from God. These laws are just as everyone including the wrongdoer is also subjected to fair judgment.

Supporting this argument, Martin Luther King held the view that there exist two types of laws: laws that are just and those that are unjust (Jackson 25). In the view of Martin Luther King, people should only obey laws that are just. Accordingly, he argued that people have both a legal and a moral duty to comply with laws that are just. He also asserted that people have a moral duty to disobey laws that are unjust. He detested unjust laws terming them as ‘no laws in all respects’ (Jackson 27).

According to him, unjust laws were the laws set to be violated or broken. He adopted this definition of just and unjust law when discrimination between blacks and whites was the order of the day (Jackson 24). Having come face to face with discrimination, Martin Luther King saw that discrimination was not just derived or rooted in laws that were unjust, but from law makers and people who imposed such discriminative laws on minorities for compliance (Jackson 26). However, the groups that set laws never followed them thereby making them null and void or simply unjust. With this, King felt beyond reasonable doubt or recourse that people should never in any way conform or abide by laws that are unjust or laws that are segregating in nature.

However, respecting or disobeying unjust laws was to be done in a discipline way and not in violent ways (Jackson 26). According to him, for people to gain civil rights, they were to respect unjust laws in ways that do not cause harm to others. He also argued that the supreme courts as they were constituted were not the best ways or approaches to solving discrimination in society. King dealt with this issue when visiting Birmingham. He believed that for justice to be served there was need for direct action or negotiation. Particularly, he understood that direct actions that are peaceful seek to foster or appeal to parties that have previously failed to prosecute an issue to a conclusive end (Jackson 30).

In cases where segregation or unjust laws are upheld by courts like in the Birmingham case, King claimed that the only solution is direct actions that are not violent in nature (Jackson 27). In general, according to King, just laws elevate human personality and enhance his position in the society whilst unjust laws degrade human personality reducing people into mere subjects that serve the dominant or law enforcers.

The concept of justice espoused by Hobbes is set in his laws of nature. According to Hobbes, peace should be sought, and in case it cannot be achieved, they should use force to get it (Plamenatz, Philp and Pelczynski 154). Accordingly, he argues that people should only be willing to compromise their rights of nature to form social contracts, only if others are willing to do so. In other words, the basis for moral responsibility is in the willingness of people to compromise or transfer rights of nature between themselves (Plamenatz, Philp and Pelczynski 160).

In order to fully form the concept of justice, Hobbes indicates that a law is required to help or prevent people from turning against each other. The law states that people must always perform or execute their valid covenants (Plamenatz, Philp and Pelczynski 156). This in fact forms the definition justice according to Hobbes. Based on this, injustice according to Hobbes is the failure to perform covenants that are valid. In other words, according to Hobbes, justice or injustice are social constructs that are nonexistent in a state of nature.

From Hobbes perspective, there is no justice without agreement or covenant. For a valid covenant to exist there should be a reasonable cause for all parties privy to the covenant to trust each other (Plamenatz, Philp and Pelczynski 160). Without it, justice would have been frustrated automatically and therefore would become null and void. Another key prerequisite based on Hobbes view is that some sovereigns should not only enforce the covenants, but also determine and hand out punishments to those that fail to meet or fulfill their part of the bargain (Plamenatz, Philp and Pelczynski 158). In other words, the sovereign has the absolute right to making laws, passing judgments, declaring war, choosing counselors as well as determining punishments and rewards.

Upon putting the Hobbes idea of justice into perspective, I support his position. Hobbes seems to hold the view that place of humans in society or nature is characterized by disorder and that every person has absolute right to everything. Hobbes point of view is misleading in that the society does not in anyway require agreements or covenants as well as sovereigns to produce justice (Plamenatz, Philp and Pelczynski 159). Because, since they came into being, people have naturally worked together. In fact, justice is a relationship that exists amongst humans and is associated with an invariable cooperative seeking for mutual or shared interest. Depending on the political aspects of life, justice is an ideal to be sought for and can be sought with varying degrees of success. This therefore brings into perspective the idea of politics and equality.

Based on the fact that equality is a vital element of justice, a political system that best achieves justice is one that practices distributive justice. In other words, it allocates goods and wealth among its citizens equally (Plamenatz, Philp and Pelczynski 155). It should invest in local community spaces for various arts, libraries, sports associations, and political meeting halls without discrimination. However, this idea has not attracted the attention of people who hold the view that a good government or political system is one that has a controlled or limited responsibility in the economy.

In other words, nations that have welfare systems, though, are enforcing a form of distributive justice should be committed to providing or ensuring equality in terms of fundamental rights and well-being. As such, for them to be fully committed to provision of universal justice, such countries need to dismantle the nation-state system and create a worldwide institution that will be a parliament of the global commons to solve disputes, international environmental issues, and violations of basic human rights.

In conclusion, justice is all about fairness and equality. It is ones consciousness not to obey unjust laws. Justice is simply the awareness of what is ethical and drives to choose right over wrong. Justice creates a world that is humane, with spaces for common care and a world for people to coexist. Laws are just when they are meant to serve people without discrimination or without unfairness of any nature. However, whenever the laws are unjust, people should use nonviolent ways to reach an agreement with the law enforcers.

Works Cited

Jackson, Thomas. From civil rights to human rights: Martin Luther King and the struggle for economic justice. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. Print.

Plamenatz, John, Mark Philp and Zbigniew Pelczynski. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Print.

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IvyPanda. (2020, June 3). Martin Luther King and Thomas Hobbes on the Subject of Justice. https://ivypanda.com/essays/what-is-justice/

"Martin Luther King and Thomas Hobbes on the Subject of Justice." IvyPanda , 3 June 2020, ivypanda.com/essays/what-is-justice/.

IvyPanda . (2020) 'Martin Luther King and Thomas Hobbes on the Subject of Justice'. 3 June.

IvyPanda . 2020. "Martin Luther King and Thomas Hobbes on the Subject of Justice." June 3, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/what-is-justice/.

1. IvyPanda . "Martin Luther King and Thomas Hobbes on the Subject of Justice." June 3, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/what-is-justice/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Martin Luther King and Thomas Hobbes on the Subject of Justice." June 3, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/what-is-justice/.

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By Michelle Maiese

(Originally published July 2003, updated by Heidi Burgess June 2013 and again in April, 2017 and yet again in July, 2020.)  

Current Implications

You can tell by the number of times I have updated this essay, that the notion of "justice" keeps on coming up in the news. In the "Core Concepts" unit of our Conflict Fundamentals Massive Open Online Seminar (MOOS), we introduced the notion of "reconciliation" and examined John Paul Lederach's notion that reconciliation occurs through the meeting of 'peace, justice, truth, and mercy." But as becomes very clear in his exercise exploring these ideas, none of them are easy to understand.   More...

Justice Versus Fairness

In the context of conflict, the terms 'justice' and 'fairness' are often used interchangeably.

Taken in its broader sense, justice is action in accordance with the requirements of some law.[1] Some maintain that justice stems from God's will or command, while others believe that justice is inherent in nature itself. Still others believe that justice consists of rules common to all humanity that emerge out of some sort of consensus. This sort of justice is often thought of as something higher than a society's legal system. It is in those cases where an action seems to violate some universal rule of conduct that we are likely to call it "unjust."

In its narrower sense, justice is fairness. It is action that pays due regard to the proper interests, property, and safety of one's fellows.[2] While justice in the broader sense is often thought of as transcendental, justice as fairness is more context-bound. Parties concerned with fairness typically strive to work out something comfortable and adopt procedures that resemble rules of a game. They work to ensure that people receive their "fair share" of benefits and burdens and adhere to a system of "fair play."

The principles of justice and fairness can be thought of as rules of "fair play" for issues of social justice. Whether they turn out to be grounded in universal laws or ones that are more context-bound, these principles determine the way in which the various types of justice are carried out. For example, principles of distributive justice determine what counts as a "fair share" of particular good, while principles of retributive or restorative justice shape our response to activity that violates a society's rules of "fair play." Social justice requires both that the rules be fair, and also that people play by the rules.

People often frame justice issues in terms of fairness and invoke principles of justice and fairness to explain their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the organizations they are part of, as well as their state or government.[3] They want institutions to treat them fairly and to operate according to fair rules. What constitutes fair treatment and fair rules is often expressed by a variety of justice principles.

Deserts, Equity, Equality, and Need

The principles of equity, equality, and need are most relevant in the context of distributive justice , but might play a role in a variety of social justice issues.[4] These principles all appeal to the notion of desert, the idea that fair treatment is a matter of giving people what they deserve. In general, people deserve to be rewarded for their effort and productivity, punished for their transgressions, treated as equal persons, and have their basic needs met. However, because these principles may come into conflict, it is often difficult to achieve all of these goals simultaneously.

According to the principle of equity, a fair economic system is one that distributes goods to individuals in proportion to their input. While input typically comes in the form of productivity, ability or talent might also play a role. People who produce more or better products...either by working harder, or by being more talented, this argument goes, should be paid more for their efforts than should people who produce less. Note that this sort of distribution may not succeed in meeting the needs of all members of society.

In addition, the idea that justice requires the unequal treatment of unequals is in tension with the principle of equality. This principle of egalitarianism suggests that the fairest allocation is one that distributes benefits and burdens equally among all parties. If there are profits of $100,000, and 10 people in the company, the principle of equality would suggest that everyone would get $10,000. This principle, however, ignores differences in effort, talent, and productivity. Also, because people have different needs, an equal initial distribution may not result in an equal outcome.

A principle of need, on the other hand, proposes that we strive for an equal outcome in which all society or group members get what they need. Thus poor people would get more money, and richer people would get less. This principle is sometimes criticized because it does not recognize differences in productive contributions or distinguish between real needs and purported needs.

Some have suggested that equity, equality, and need are not principles adopted for their own sake, but rather ones endorsed to advance some social goal.[5] For example, while equity tends to foster productivity, principles of equality and need tend to stress the importance of positive interpersonal relationships and a sense of belonging among society members.

Impartiality, Consistency, Standing, and Trust

Principles of justice and fairness are also central to procedural , retributive, and restorative justice. Such principles are supposed to ensure procedures that generate unbiased, consistent, and reliable decisions. Here the focus is on carrying out set rules in a fair manner so that a just outcome might be reached. Fair procedures are central to the legitimacy of decisions reached and individuals' acceptance of those decisions.

To ensure fair procedures, both in the context of legal proceedings, as well as in negotiation and mediation, the third party carrying out those procedures must be impartial. This means they must make an honest, unbiased decision based on appropriate information.[6] For example, judges should be impartial, and facilitators should not exhibit any prejudice that gives one party unfair advantages. The rules themselves should also be impartial so that they do not favor some people over others from the outset. 

An unbiased, universally applied procedure, whether it serves to distribute wealth or deliver decisions, can ensure impartiality as well as consistency. The principle of consistency proposes that "the distinction of some versus others should reflect genuine aspects of personal identity rather than extraneous features of the differentiating mechanism itself."[7] In other words, the institutional mechanism in question should treat like cases alike and ensure a level playing field for all parties.

The principle of standing suggests that people value their membership in a group and that societal institutions and decision-making procedures should affirm their status as members.[8] For example, it might follow from this principle that all stakeholders should have a voice in the decision-making process. In particular, disadvantaged members of a group or society should be empowered and given an opportunity to be heard. When decision-making procedures treat people with respect and dignity, they feel affirmed. A central premise of restorative justice , for example, is that those directly affected by the offense should have a voice and representation in the decision-making process regarding the aftermath of the offense--be it punishment and/or restitution.

Related to issues of respect and dignity is the principle of trust. One measure of fairness is whether society members believe that authorities are concerned with their well being and needs. People's judgments of procedural fairness result from perceptions that they have been treated "honestly, openly, and with consideration."[9] If they believe that the authority took their viewpoints into account and tried to treat them fairly, they are more likely to support and engage in the broader social system.

What is So Important about the Principles of Justice

It may seem to be a simple matter of common sense that justice is central to any well-functioning society. However, the question of what justice is, exactly, and how it is achieved are more difficult matters. The principles of justice and fairness point to ideas of fair treatment and "fair play" that should govern all modes of exchange and interaction in a society. They serve as guidelines for carrying out justice.

Not surprisingly, each of the principles of justice and fairness can be applied in a variety of contexts. For example, the principle of desert applies not only to the distribution of wealth, but also to the distribution costs and of punishments. "Environmental justice" is a relatively new term that examines and challenges the social tendency to site noxious facilities (such as landfills or polluting industries) in poor areas, but not affluent areas.  An unjust distribution of punishments is suggested by the statistics that people of color are disproportionately represented in prisons and on death row. (In 2012, people of color made up about 30 percent of the United States’ population, but accounted for 60 percent of those imprisoned.) [10]  Likewise, the principles of impartiality and consistency might apply to both an economic system and a decision-making body. And the principle of need plays a central role in both distributive and restorative justice.

In addition, we can also understand conflict in terms of tension that arises between the different justice principles. Conflict about what is just might be expressed as conflict about which principle of justice should be applied in a given situation or how that principle should be implemented.[11]  The ways of thinking about justice can have conflicting implications, leading to disputes about fairness. For example, some believe that an equitable distribution is the most fair, while others insist that a society's assets should be allocated according to need. A conflict may thus arise surrounding whether to base an economic system on productivity (those who work hardest should earn the most), identity (the rich are "job makers" and thus should get richer) or social welfare (the poor need help more, so the rich should get taxed to help raise the income of the poor). Similarly, some believe that those who violate the rights of others should receive their just deserts (paying a fine or going to prison), while others believe that our focus should be on the needs of victims and offenders (which can be protected through a restorative justice system). 

When principles of justice operate ineffectively or not at all, confidence in and organization's or the society's institutions may be undermined. Citizens or group members may feel alienated and withdraw their commitment to those "unjust" institutions. Or, they may rebel or begin a revolution in order to create new institutions.  This was the essence of the "Arab Spring" uprisings that began in 2010 and continue today (2013); it is also the essence of uprisings that have occurred off and on (though with much less intensity and violence) in Europe over the same time period.  If justice principles are applied effectively, on the other hand, organizations and societies will tend to be more stable and its members will feel satisfied and secure.

You can tell by the number of times I have updated this essay, that the notion of "justice" keeps on coming up in the news. In the "Core Concepts" unit of our Conflict Fundamentals Massive Open Online Seminar (MOOS), we introduced the notion of "reconciliation" and examined John Paul Lederach's notion that reconciliation occurs through the meeting of 'peace, justice, truth, and mercy." But as becomes very clear in his exercise exploring these ideas, none of them are easy to understand.  Justice, perhaps, is the most difficult.  

Justice is often taken to mean "fairness." But fairness to whom? Determined by whom? In Western cultures, "justice" is usually seen as "just deserts"—or getting what you deserve. If you break a law, you should be punished.  If you work hard, you should be rewarded.  Eastern cultures are more likely to embrace the notion of restorative justice, or restoring order to relationships, rather than punishment for misdeeds.

Different understandings of the meaning of justice underlie a lot of the disagreements we see in the United States right now regarding topics such as immigration, taxes, and health care. In the summer of 2020, the focus is on race.  What is "fair?" "Who should get what, and why?"  "Who should pay for it?" "What should happen when people break the law (for instance, enter or stay in the US illegally)? What should happen when police break the law?  Who has a voice? Who doesn't?

Understanding the different definitions of justice is a start to sorting out what you think about these questions—and what is likely to create the outcomes you want and need.

-- Heidi Burgess. July, 2020.

Back to Essay Top

[1] James. W. Vice, "Neutrality, Justice, and Fairness," (Loyola University Chicago, 1997).

[2] Nicholas Rescher, Distributive Justice . (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1982), 5. < http://books.google.com/books?id=KCm4QgAACAAJ >. See also Rescher's Fairness: Theory & Practice of Distributive Justice (Transaction Publishers, 2002). < http://www.amazon.com/Fairness-Theory-Practice-Distributive-Justice/dp/0765801108 >.

[3] Tom R. Tyler and Maura A. Belliveau, "Tradeoffs in Justice Principles: Definitions of Fairness," in Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice , ed. Barbara B. Bunker and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1995), 291. < http://www.amazon.com/Conflict-Cooperation-Justice-Inspired-Deutsch/dp/0787900699 >.

[4] For a discussion of justice in a recent, global context, see: Chris Armstrong, Global Distributive Justice: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2012). < http://books.google.com/books?id=LJU0djAZ1osC >.

[5] Robert Folger, Blair H. Sheppard, and Robert T. Buttram, "Equity, Equality, and Need: Three Faces of Social Justice," in Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice , ed. Barbara B. Bunker and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1995), 262. < http://www.amazon.com/Conflict-Cooperation-Justice-Inspired-Deutsch/dp/0787900699 >.

[6] Folger, Sheppard, and Buttram, 272.

[7] Folger, Sheppard, and Buttram, 272.

[8] Folger, Sheppard, and Buttram, 273.

[9] Tyler and Belliveau, 297.

[10] Kerby, "The Top 10 Most Startling Facts About People of Color and Criminal Justice in the United States: A Look at the Racial Disparities Inherent in Our Nation’s Criminal-Justice System." Center for American Progress.  Published March 13, 2012.  Accessed June 4, 2013 at  http://bit.ly/PMeeAG.

[11] Morton Deutsch, "Justice and Conflict," in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice , ed. Morton Deutsch and Peter Coleman (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, Inc., 2000), 54. More recent edition (2011) available here .

Use the following to cite this article: Maiese, Michelle. "Principles of Justice and Fairness." Beyond Intractability . Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2003 < http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/principles-of-justice >.

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Justice is a complicated concept that at its core requires fairness.

Justice, for many people, refers to fairness. But while justice is important to almost everyone, it means different things to different groups.

For instance, social justice is the notion that everyone deserves equal economic, political, and social opportunities irrespective of race, gender, or religion. Distributive justice refers to the equitable allocation of assets in society. Environmental justice is the fair treatment of all people with regard to environmental burdens and benefits.

Restorative or corrective justice seeks to make whole those who have suffered unfairly. Retributive justice seeks to punish wrongdoers objectively and proportionately. And procedural justice refers to implementing legal decisions in accordance with fair and unbiased processes.

Justice is one of the most important moral values in the spheres of law and politics. Legal and political systems that maintain law and order are desirable, but they cannot accomplish either unless they also achieve justice.

Related Terms

Social Contract Theory

Social Contract Theory is the idea that society exists because of an implicitly agreed-to set of standards that provide moral and political rules of behavior.

Values are society’s shared beliefs about what is good or bad and how people should act.

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The Veil of Ignorance is a device for helping people more fairly envision a fair society by pretending that they are ignorant of their personal circumstances.

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Michael J. Sandel

Anne t. and robert m. bass professor of government, justice: what's the right thing to do.

"More than exhilarating; exciting in its ability to persuade this student/reader, time and again, that the principle now being invoked—on this page, in this chapter—is the one to deliver the sufficiently inclusive guide to the making of a decent life." (Vivian Gornick, Boston Review )

“Sandel explains theories of justice…with clarity and immediacy; the ideas of Aristotle, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Robert Nozick and John Rawls have rarely, if ever, been set out as accessibly…. In terms we can all understand, ‘Justice’ confronts us with the concepts that lurk, so often unacknowledged, beneath our conflicts.”  (Jonathan Rauch, New York Times )

“Sandel dazzles in this sweeping survey of hot topics…. Erudite, conversational and deeply humane, this is truly transformative reading.” ( Publishers Weekly , starred review)

“A spellbinding philosopher…. For Michael Sandel, justice is not a spectator sport…. He is calling for nothing less than a reinvigoration of citizenship.”  (Samuel Moyn, The Nation )

“Michael Sandel, perhaps the most prominent college professor in America…practices the best kind of academic populism, managing to simplify John Stuart Mill and John Rawls without being simplistic. But Sandel is best at what he calls bringing ‘moral clarity to the alternatives we confront as democratic citizens ’…. He ends up clarifying a basic political divide -- not between left and right, but between those who recognize nothing greater than individual rights and choices, and those who affirm a ‘politics of the common good,' rooted in moral beliefs that can't be ignored.”  (Michael Gerson, Washington Post)

" Justice , the new volume from superstar Harvard political philosopher Michael Sandel, showcases the thinking on public morality that has made him one of the most sought-after lecturers in the world." (Richard Reeves, Democracy )

“Hard cases may make bad law, but in Michael Sandel’s hands they produce some cool philosophy…. Justice is a timely plea for us to desist from political bickering and see if we can have a sensible discussion about what sort of society we really want to live in.”  (Jonathan Ree, The Observer (London))

“Every once in a while, a book comes along of such grace, power, and wit that it enthralls us with a yearning to know what justice is.  This is such a book.”  (Jeffrey Abramson, Texas Law Review )

“Using a compelling, entertaining mix of hypotheticals, news stories, episodes from history, pop-culture tidbits, literary examples, legal cases and teachings from the great philosophers—principally, Aristotle, Kant, Bentham, Mill and Rawls—Sandel takes on a variety of controversial issues—abortion, same-sex marriage, affirmative action—and forces us to confront our own assumptions, biases and lazy thought…. Sparkling commentary from the professor we all wish we had.”  ( Kirkus Reviews , starred review) 

“Michael Sandel is…one of the world's most interesting political philosophers. Politicians and commentators tend to ask two questions of policy: will it make voters better off, and will it affect their liberty? Sandel rightly points out the shallowness of that debate and adds a third criterion: how will it affect the common good?”  ( Guardian)

“Michael Sandel transforms moral philosophy by putting it at the heart of civic debate…. Sandel belongs to the tradition, dating back to ancient Greece, which sees moral philosophy as an outgrowth and refinement of civic debate. Like Aristotle, he seeks to systematize educated common sense, not to replace it with expert knowledge or abstract principles.  This accounts for one of the most striking and attractive features of Justice —its use of examples drawn from real legal and political controversies…. Sandel's insistence on the inescapably ethical character of political debate is enormously refreshing.”  (Edward Skidelsky, New Statesman)  

“His ability to find the broad issues at the heart of everyday concerns verges on the uncanny, and his lucid explanations of classic figures such as Mill, Kant, and Aristotle are worth the price of admission.”  (William A. Galston, Commonweal ) 

“A remarkable educational achievement…. Generations of students and educated citizens will be very well served by Sandel’s introductory overviews.”  (Amitai Etzioni, Hedgehog Review )

“Reading ‘Justice’ by Michael Sandel is an intoxicating invitation to take apart and examine how we arrive at our notions of right and wrong….This is enlivening stuff. Sandel is not looking to win an argument; he's looking at how a citizen might best engage the public realm.” (Karen R. Long, Cleveland Plain Dealer )

“Sandel is a champion of a politics of the common good. He wants us to think of ourselves as citizens, not just consumers or isolated choosers.  For him, justice demands that we ask what kind of people and society we want (or ought) to be.”  (John A. Coleman, America )

 “Michael Sandel, political philosopher and public intellectual, is a liberal, but not the annoying sort.  His aim is not to boss people around but to bring them around to the pleasures of thinking clearly about large questions of social policy.  Reading this lucid book is like taking his famous undergraduate course ‘Justice’ without the tiresome parts, such as term papers and exams.”  (George F. Will, syndicated columnist)

“ Justice is Sandel at his finest: no matter what your views are, his delightful style will draw you in, and he’ll then force you to rethink your assumptions and challenge you to question accepted ways of thinking. He calls us to a better way of doing politics, and a more enriching way of living our lives.”  (E. J. Dionne, syndicated columnist)

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• Market Reasoning as Moral Reasoning: Why Economists Should Re-engage with Political Philosophy
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What Is Justice?

Every society wrestles with the nature of justice, punishment, fairness, and order. The iconic image of a blindfolded woman wielding a set of scales – or sometimes a sword – has endured as a symbol around the world. Beyond a symbol, what is justice? This article covers the three main types of justice, what the earliest justice systems looked like, and the famous philosophers who developed theories of justice.

Justice refers to concepts of fairness, equality, moral behavior, lawfulness, and order. It seeks to answer questions like “What are people owed?” and “What makes a punishment just?” Everyone from philosophers to policymakers to humanitarians is interested in what justice means.

What are the three main types of justice?

Justice can be boiled down into three types: distributive, retributive, and restorative.

Distributive justice

Distributive justice is about the fair division of resources within a community. “Fair division” means everyone either gets or has access to the same services and physical goods. Why? The basis of distributive justice is that everyone is morally equal. Distributive justice affects areas like income, wealth, opportunities, jobs, welfare, and infrastructure. Principles of distributive justice include equity, need, and proportionality. While the basic definition of distributive justice is simple, how a society should fairly distribute resources is complex.

Retributive justice

Retributive justice, which can also be called criminal justice, focuses on how to punish crime. It’s based on the idea that when wrongdoing is committed, the wrongdoer should get a proportionate punishment. That doesn’t mean the wrongdoer should be subjected to exactly the same ordeal (i.e. if someone hits someone in the face, they don’t need to be hit back as their formal punishment), but it needs to be proportionate. Those who study retributive justice also tend to emphasize the need for indifference, meaning that justice shouldn’t be personal or based on revenge. While many justice systems include some kind of retributive justice , its effectiveness is debatable. Considering the flaws in many criminal justice systems, retributive justice can also end up harming innocent people or unfairly punishing certain groups over others.

Restorative justice

Restorative justice was developed in the 1970s, though many of its tenets come from Indigenous justice practices . Restorative justice focuses on helping victims of crimes, but it also wants to help offenders understand the harm they’ve caused. The goal is repair, not punishment. Engagement, accountability, cooperation, and community are all essential principles. Restorative justice practices have been used in many criminal justice cases, but they’ve also been adopted during conflicts involving families, schools, and workplaces. Unlike retributive justice, restorative justice doesn’t focus on what criminals deserve, but rather on what victims need to heal and what communities can do to prevent re-offending.

You can learn more about Justice in this course by Harvard University .

What were the world’s earliest justice systems?

Societies have changed drastically over the millennia. Justice systems are no exception, although all have dealt with concerns like property rights, murder, theft, marriage, and so on. Here are three examples of early justice systems:

Mesopotamia

The oldest law code from Mesopotamia – known as the Code of Urukagina – is referenced in other texts, but no copies exist today. We know more about the Code of Ur-Nammu (2100-2050 BCE), which is named after the ruler Ur-Nammu. The Code, which consists of 57 laws, establishes fines for all punishments except capital offenses, which are dealt with more harshly. The Code of Hammurabi , named after the first king of Babylon, is more famous than the earlier Ur-Nammu code. Through its 282 rules involving marriage, inheritances, crimes, punishment, violence, and more, Hammurabi’s code established a comprehensive legal code. Unlike Ur-Nammu’s code, Hammurabi’s tended to adopt an “eye for an eye” framework. This included harsh punishments like the cutting off of eyes, ears, tongues, and hands. It also said someone accused of a crime should be considered innocent until proven guilty. It’s believed that the Code of Hammurabi inspired other ancient justice systems.

What about a court system ? In Mesopotamian society, disputes between individuals could be settled privately, but if that wasn’t possible, they could go to court. There were no lawyers, however. A local council would hear a case, followed by a judge or a court. Local courts tended to deal with civil and criminal cases, such as theft and property issues. Only men served in the courts.

Ancient Egypt

Ancient Egyptian law was based on the concept of ma’at, which means harmony. Egyptians even had a goddess named Ma’at , who personified truth, justice, and harmony. She held the universe in balance. Without her, everything would descend into chaos, which to Egyptians was the same as injustice. Ma’at was also an important figure in the Afterlife. After a person died, they would travel to the Hall of Judgement where their heart was weighed on a scale against Ma’at’s feather of truth. If their heart was balanced, they could continue to the Afterlife. If it didn’t, the person ceased to exist.

Historians haven’t found an ancient Egyptian code like the Code of Ur-Nammu or Hammurabi, so specifics are unknown. We do know that religious principles governed Egyptian law , so the king, as a god on earth, served as society’s top judge. There were also local courts that dealt with village concerns. Land, water rights, and other property issues were common. Those accused of crimes were considered guilty until proven innocent, so if someone made a false accusation and was found out, punishments were harsh. In ancient Egyptian society, justice was about avoiding chaos, so anything that threatened harmony was met with severe consequences. Murder, tomb-robbing, and rape were punished with death or mutilation.

Ancient China

Confucius, who we’ll learn more about shortly, had a major impact on ancient China’s view of justice and law. Confucius and his disciples believed a harmonious society depended on five relationships . These were the relationships between a ruler and subject, a husband and wife, a father and son, an older and younger brother, and a friend and friend. When everyone worked on being a good person, cared for these relationships, and fulfilled their responsibilities, society wouldn’t even need strict laws or punishments.

The imperial Chinese code during the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE) rejected Confucius’ teachings in favor of Legalism, which taught that humans were naturally violent. To prevent humans from falling into their natural, evil state, Legalism taught that the government needed to take full control. Li Si, the counselor to the first emperor, created a harsh code following the unification of China. The emperor appointed district officials who served as judges and investigators. Those accused of crimes were guilty until proven innocent while trials didn’t have lawyers or juries. Punishments varied based on the crime, but many were harsh. Fines, hard labor, beatings, and banishment were doled out for minor violations. Serious crimes were punished with mutilations, castration, and death. When the Han Dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE) made Confucianism the state philosophy, China’s justice system softened.

How have philosophers defined justice?

The earliest justice systems didn’t come from thin air; many were deeply impacted by influential philosophers. Philosophy has continued to play a leading role in how society develops and deploys justice. As justice is one of history’s most discussed topics, it’s challenging to distill it to just a few figures. There are many other important thinkers not included in the following list, but the four here are a good starting point.

Confucius (551-479 BCE)

We’ve already discussed Confucius a little, but there are a few other things worth knowing about his views on justice and law . He based everything on the belief that humans were naturally good, which meant they understood the difference between right and wrong and were drawn to doing the right thing. They still needed guidance, however, but instead of specific laws, Confucius advocated for a code of ethics that included Five Constants and Four Virtues. These included Zhong (loyalty) and Yi (justice and righteousness). By following this code of ethics and maintaining a hierarchy of authority (sons obey fathers, younger brothers obey older brothers, and wives obey husbands), Confucius believed strict justice systems wouldn’t be necessary. In Confucius’ view, justice is about ethical behavior (which comes naturally to humans) and maintaining hierarchies.

Plato (428/7-348/7 BCE)

Plato built on his teacher Socrates’ ideas about justice and the belief that absolute truths exist. Because absolute truth exists, Plato believed justice couldn’t be subjective. Balance and control were essential, as well as a hierarchy. Plato’s vision of a “just” society had three classes: craftspeople, auxiliaries, and guardians. The guardians were in charge, but to achieve justice, all classes must embody certain virtues. Craftspeople should be temperate, auxiliaries should be courageous, and guardians should be wise. In Plato’s mind, only guardians – who were led by a philosopher king – could understand what justice looked like. Like Confucius, Plato’s concept of justice depends on groups staying in a hierarchy and living moral lives.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who is considered one of the modern West’s most influential figures, centered his ideas about justice on freedom . In his view, freedom is what gives human beings our dignity; it’s our only innate right. All laws must be created through the lens of freedom, bearing in mind that people don’t have the right to infringe on the freedom of others. For Kant, the only moral laws were laws that saw people as free, equal, and independent. What about crime and punishment? Kant believed in retributive justice and lex talonis, which is the theory that punishments need to inflict similar harm as the wrong done. If someone commits murder, death is the only equivalent punishment. Kant does also advocate for forgiveness, however, saying that repaying a wrong out of revenge or hatred is not virtuous. Kant devoted a good deal of his work to justice, applying his theories to private, private, and international law.

John Rawls (1921-2002)

In 1971, John Rawls published A Theory of Justice, which is one of the 20th century’s most important books. In this book, Rawls sought to define what a just society looks like. He performed a thought experiment where a group of people live behind “a veil of ignorance.” The veil hides the differences between the individuals, such as their social, economic, gendered, racial, and historical differences. With no outside influences, people wouldn’t try to benefit one group over another. Eventually, the group would settle on two principles. The first states that everyone has the same basic liberties that can’t be taken away, but that may be limited only if someone’s liberties are infringing on those of another person. Rawls’ second principle focuses on equality, including equal opportunities to hold private and public offices, as well as equal (or as close to equal as possible) wealth distribution. To be just, a society must reduce inequalities as best as it can. Rawls called his theory “justice as fairness.” His ideas have been very influential in academic discussions about social justice and human rights, as well as policy-making.

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About the author, emmaline soken-huberty.

Emmaline Soken-Huberty is a freelance writer based in Portland, Oregon. She started to become interested in human rights while attending college, eventually getting a concentration in human rights and humanitarianism. LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and climate change are of special concern to her. In her spare time, she can be found reading or enjoying Oregon’s natural beauty with her husband and dog.

Essay on Social Justice

Students are often asked to write an essay on Social Justice in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Social Justice

Understanding social justice.

Social justice is the fair treatment of all people in society. It’s about making sure everyone has equal opportunities, irrespective of their background or status.

Importance of Social Justice

Social justice is important because it promotes equality. It helps to reduce disparities in wealth, access to resources, and social privileges.

Role of Individuals

Every person can contribute to social justice. By treating others fairly, respecting diversity, and standing against discrimination, we can promote social justice.

In conclusion, social justice is vital for a balanced society. It ensures everyone has a fair chance to succeed in life.

250 Words Essay on Social Justice

Social justice, a multifaceted concept, is the fair distribution of opportunities, privileges, and resources within a society. It encompasses dimensions like economic parity, gender equality, environmental justice, and human rights. The core of social justice is the belief that everyone deserves equal economic, political, and social opportunities irrespective of race, gender, or religion.

The Importance of Social Justice

Social justice is pivotal in fostering a harmonious society. It ensures that everyone has access to the basic necessities of life and can exercise their rights without discrimination. It is the cornerstone of peace and stability in any society. Without social justice, the divide between different socio-economic classes widens, leading to social unrest.

Challenges to Social Justice

Despite its importance, achieving social justice is fraught with challenges. Systemic issues like discrimination, poverty, and lack of access to quality education and healthcare are significant roadblocks. These challenges are deeply ingrained in societal structures and require collective efforts to overcome.

The Role of Individuals in Promoting Social Justice

Every individual plays a crucial role in promoting social justice. Through conscious efforts like advocating for equal rights, supporting policies that promote equality, and standing against discrimination, individuals can contribute to building a just society.

In conclusion, social justice is a fundamental principle for peaceful coexistence within societies. Despite the challenges, each individual’s conscious effort can contribute significantly to achieving this noble goal. The journey towards social justice is long and arduous, but it is a path worth treading for the betterment of humanity.

500 Words Essay on Social Justice

Introduction to social justice, origins and evolution of social justice.

The concept of social justice emerged during the Industrial Revolution and subsequent civil revolutions as a counter to the vast disparities in wealth and social capital. It was a call for societal and structural changes, aiming to minimize socio-economic differences. The term was first used by Jesuit priest Luigi Taparelli in the mid-19th century, influenced by the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. Since then, the concept has evolved and expanded, encompassing issues like environmental justice, health equity, and human rights.

The Pillars of Social Justice

Social justice rests on four essential pillars: human rights, access, participation, and equity. Human rights are the fundamental rights and freedoms to which all individuals are entitled. Access involves equal opportunities in terms of resources, rights, goods, and services. Participation emphasizes the importance of all individuals contributing to and benefiting from economic, social, political, and cultural life. Equity ensures the fair distribution of resources and opportunities.

Social Justice in Today’s World

Despite the progress, numerous challenges to social justice persist. Systemic and structural discrimination, political disenfranchisement, economic inequality, and social stratification are just a few. Moreover, the rise of populism and nationalism worldwide has further complicated the fight for social justice, as these ideologies often thrive on division and inequality.

Promoting social justice requires collective action. Individuals can contribute by becoming more aware of the injustices around them, advocating for policies that promote equity, and standing up against discrimination. Education plays a crucial role in this process, as it can foster a deeper understanding of social justice issues and equip individuals with the tools to effect change.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

Apart from these, you can look at all the essays by clicking here .

Happy studying!

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Social Justice Is Not a Bad Word

The textbook “ Policing in the U.S. Past, Present, and Future ” takes a fresh look at contemporary policing issues. The book examines police topics while adding perspective and context and expanding the typical sound-bite explanations of interactions between the police and the community.

Written from a social justice perspective, this book addresses controversial issues in policing in a fair and balanced way with the intention of presenting detailed information. The text pulls no punches and focuses on levels of accountability and professional responsibility. This book will allow students to rethink traditional policing strategies and consider more efficient, user-friendly methods of providing unbiased police services in all communities. But why do so many people take offense to the term “social justice”? Let’s look at that term.

The term “ social justice ”  

It has increasingly become a badge of honor for activists to claim a social justice stance in their advocacy. Several scholars and policy makers have also cited social justice as a foundation for their views. Numerous educators have been teaching from a social justice lens to give alternatives to traditional ways of viewing the criminal justice system. Many people who feel that the traditional justice system has failed them have also touted the need for a social justice paradigm shift. But what exactly is social justice, and how does it work?  Regardless of how often this term is used, it is often unclear in any practical sense what it means when someone mentions the term social justice or how it influences policies, curriculum, and grass roots advocacy.

First, if we can agree on a working definition of the word “justice,” then we will have a good starting point. I offer the definition of justice being the ethical & philosophical idea that people should be treated fairly, properly, and reasonably by the law and the government agents that carry out the law. It’s worth noting that with justice comes accountability. Justice has many parts, but I will focus on two. The first part of justice deals with fair process. The fair process can be linked back to the 14 th amendment and equal protection under the law. This is the process of determining how fairly people are being treated by the CJ system (procedural justice). The second part deals with fair and adequate outcomes. Equality is the fundamental ideal … similarly situated people should receive similar outcomes (distributive justice).

The concept of social justice

Once we agree on the concepts of justice, then we can begin to look at the concept of social justice. The term social justice can be explained as the equal distribution of benefits and burdens throughout society. People are inherently absorbed in their own self-interest. Social exchange theory suggests that people are self-interested in their judgments and choices. Social justice tries to refocus the attention on rewards, punishment, and accountability equally across society. This is an ideal that most could agree with.

Social justice is as much about accountability as it is about equity. People need to be held accountable for their actions and no one is above the law. As the book “Policing in the U.S.: Past, Present, and Future” tries to give a critical framework to students who may go into policing, we also want them to become ethical decision makers in the field. This social justice perspective helps protect everyday people from those who would commit crimes or prey on them, and it helps the police better serve the community in procedurally just ways.

The concept of social justice also helps good police officers by not having them lumped in with the misdeeds of rogue officers. In many ways, social justice can be viewed in the same manner as body-worn cameras; it goes beyond what is alleged and helps people see the true story. Social justice is rooted in procedural justice and can be an instrument to help build bridges between the police and the communities that they serve. “ Policing in the U.S.: Past, Present, and Future ” teaches students that “social justice” is not a term to be feared or misunderstood. In fact, it is a term to be embraced in a search for true justice and equity as students embark on a career in policing in the U.S.

Interested in “Policing in the U.S.: Past, Present and Future” for your Criminal Justice course? Explore this comprehensive and timely first edition now.

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Asleep in the Deep (State)

By mark steyn.

Published August 26, 2024

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No, I'm not going to analyse the alleged "nominee"'s speech. This précis of what's going on is hard to beat :

Kamala got zero votes, has given zero press conferences, has given zero interviews, and had to stage buying a bag of Doritos. This is the most ridiculous, anti-democratic, laughable joke I've ever seen in politics.

If you treat this as "politics", you're part of the problem. And, given that American elections have degraded to the point where the opposition candidate is now being indicted, convicted and shot at, I find myself more interested in the disturbing abandonment by key US institutions of all remaining norms. For example:

As longtime readers and listeners and viewers well know, I never utter the words "Department of Justice" without prefacing it with the adjectives "dirty stinkin' rotten corrupt". If I were running for president, my platform would include a pledge to break it up: as currently constituted, its tentacles include the FBI (currently "investigating" the Trump near-assassination - yeah, sure) and the Bureau of Prisons (the fellows charged with ensuring that the security cameras aren't working and the guards are asleep when high-value prisoners get the urge to turn suicidal).

But what they call "Main Justice" is the core racket. As my friend Conrad Black, one of its victims, put it over a decade ago:

Those who do exercise their constitutional right to a defense receive three times as severe a sentence as those who plead guilty; 95 percent of cases are won by prosecutors, 90 percent of those without trial.

Those last two numbers have ticked up even higher in the years since, but that first one is important too: if you insist on your "constitutional" ( ha! ) right to a defence and it pans out as the ninetysomething stats suggest, you'll be gaoled for thirty years instead of ten. They'll punish you for having the temerity to insist on being tried and convicted according to due process.

In June, in the Northern District of California, something rather unusual happened: the defendants actually beat the rap. They were two British subjects - Mike Lynch and Stephen Chamberlain, respectively the founder and finance honcho of a UK company called Autonomy. In 2018 the dirty stinkin' rotten corrupt US Department of Justice had indicted the pair for "conspiracy" and "fraud" over the company's sale to Hewlett Packard - and, after some protracted Julian Assange-like extradition jousting, the two were put on a 'plane to America and placed under house arrest.

And then on June 6th a San Francisco jury found Lynch and Chamberlain not guilty of all charges . On July 28th, back in Britain, Mr Lynch gave his first interview about his ordeal :

Cleared UK tech tycoon feared he would die in US jail if convicted

Less than a month later, he is dead. To celebrate his acquittal, he took a party of friends and family (including his trial attorney Christopher Morvillo) on a Mediterranean cruise, and on Monday his luxury yacht sank off Sicily.

Must be pretty sad for his co-defendant, right?

Well, no. Because he's dead too. On Saturday Stephen Robinson went for his morning run in Cambridgeshire and, six miles into it, was hit by a car. He was pronounced dead on Monday - the same day Mike Lynch died.

In The Spectator , Conrad Black's former underling (and my former overling) Charles Moore writes:

Mike Lynch and I were due to have lunch next month. When we last communicated, he was buoyant after vindicating his innocence in the Californian courts. Now he is the victim of a horror out of classical myth, almost of Charybdis itself, and with him his dear daughter Hannah. How can his poor wife, Angela, who survived the shipwreck, bear such losses? Mike's yacht Bayesian was named after Thomas Bayes, the 18th-century Presbyterian minister whose theorem Mike admired. According to Wikipedia, the theorem 'gives a mathematical rule for inverting conditional probabilities, allowing us to find the probability of a cause given its effect'. What on earth is the probable cause of this brilliant man's fate, with its triumphs and its weird tragedy?

Charles is right. Charybdis, you'll recall (if anybody still does, given the state of western education), was a sea-monster who belched out giant whirlpools of water off the coast of Sicily. Which is precisely what happened to Lynch's yacht. Off the coast of Sicily. If you incline less mythologically and more scientifically, and you're pondering the Bayesian probabilities of what happened to the Bayesian, the headline of the BBC's not terribly helpful "explainer" will read a little ironic :

Bayesian sinking: The key questions for investigators

It was, per the Beeb's "experts", a "black swan" event. According to the lead invesigator in Italy, Salvo Cocina, "they were in the wrong place at the wrong time " - although he also noted that another vessel, the Sir Robert Baden Powell, was in the same place at the same time, and emerged unscathed. As Steyn Clubber Nigel Sherratt comments:

The loss of 'Bayesian' is indeed a mystery. A waterspout off Sicily should be no real danger to a 184 foot fully crewed, well founded and managed modern yacht at anchor. It's hardly Sir Robin alone on Suhaili against the Southern Ocean. 'Sir Robert Baden Powell' a smaller (albeit still 138 foot) gaff topsail schooner anchored nearby came through with no problems and helped with rescue efforts. Superstitious sailors might think that naming a yacht 'Bayesian' was tempting fate...

Meanwhile, back in Cambridgeshire, with the English constabulary's usual flair for le mot non-juste , Stephen Chamberlain's demise was characterised as follows :

Death of tycoon's ex-partner not 'untoward' - police

"Untoward", huh? It is a somewhat flexible word, and my dictionaries to hand define it variously as unseemly, unexpected, unfortunate, improper and/or inconvenient. Indeed, the death of Mr Chamberlain is not "inconvenient", although it seems odd that the Cambridgeshire constabulary would announce it as such in public. Between 2013 and 2022, thirty-eight pedestrians died on the county's roads, which is under four per year - and none in this particular neck of the woods.

So the US Department of Justice lost the case, but two months later, and on the same day, both defendants are dead anyway, along with one of their victorious lawyers. "In the course of forty-eight hours, I can't process what has happened," says their surviving attorney, Gary Lindberg , "but both of our clients, as well as Chris and his wife, are gone."

Mr Lynch was fifty-nine, Mr Chamberlain fifty-two. They fought the DOJ, and the DOJ won.

Striking - and way beyond any probabilities, Bayesian or otherwise.

Mark Steyn is an international bestselling author, a Top 41 recording artist, and a leading Canadian human rights activist. Among his books is "The Undocumented Mark Steyn: Don't Say You Weren't Warned". (Buy it at a 49% discount by clicking here or order in KINDLE edition at a 67% discount by clicking here . Sales help fund JWR )

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The False Narrative of Settler Colonialism

The rise of an academic theory and its obsession with Israel

O n October 7 , Hamas killed four times as many Israelis in a single day as had been killed in the previous 15 years of conflict. In the months since, protesters have rallied against Israel’s retaliatory invasion of Gaza, which has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians. But a new tone of excitement and enthusiasm could be heard among pro-Palestinian activists from the moment that news of the attacks arrived, well before the Israeli response began. Celebrations of Hamas’s exploits are familiar sights in Gaza and the West Bank, Cairo and Damascus; this time, they spread to elite college campuses, where Gaza-solidarity encampments became ubiquitous this past spring. Why?

The answer is that, long before October 7, the Palestinian struggle against Israel had become widely understood by academic and progressive activists as the vanguard of a global battle against settler colonialism, a struggle also waged in the United States, Canada, Australia, and other countries created by European settlement. In these circles, Palestine was transformed into a standard reference point for every kind of social wrong, even those that seem to have no connection to the Middle East.

One of the most striking things about the ideology of settler colonialism is the central role played by Israel, which is often paired with the U.S. as the most important example of settler colonialism’s evils. Many Palestinian writers and activists have adopted this terminology. In his 2020 book, The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine , the historian Rashid Khalidi writes that the goal of Zionism was to create a “white European settler colony.” For the Palestinian intellectual Joseph Massad, Israel is a product of “European Jewish Settler-Colonialism,” and the “liberation” referred to in the name of the Palestine Liberation Organization is “liberation from Settler-Colonialism.”

Western activists and academics have leaned heavily on the idea. Opposition to building an oil pipeline under a Sioux reservation was like the Palestinian cause in that it “makes visible the continuum of systems of subjugation and expropriation across liberal democracies and settler-­colonial regimes.” When the city of Toronto evicted a homeless encampment from a park, it was like Palestine because both are examples of “ethnic cleansing” and “colonial ‘domicide,’ making Indigenous people homeless on their homelands.” Health problems among Native Americans can be understood in terms of Palestine, because the “hyper-­visible Palestine case …  provides a unique temporal lens for understanding settler colonial health determinants more broadly.” Pollution, too, can be understood through a Palestinian lens, according to the British organization Friends of the Earth, because Palestine demonstrates that “the world is an unequal place” where “marginalised and vulnerable people bear the brunt of injustice.”

Although Israel fails in obvious ways to fit the model of settler colonialism, it has become the standard reference point because it offers theorists and activists something that the United States does not: a plausible target. It is hard to imagine America or Canada being truly decolonized, with the descendants of the original settlers returning to the countries from which they came and Native peoples reclaiming the land. But armed struggle against Israel has been ongoing since it was founded, and Hamas and its allies still hope to abolish the Jewish state “between the river and the sea.” In the contemporary world, only in Israel can the fight against settler colonialism move from theory to practice.

T he concept of settler colonialism was developed in the 1990s by theorists in Australia, Canada, and the U.S., as a way of linking social evils in these countries today—such as climate change, patriarchy, and economic inequality—to their origin in colonial settlement. In the past decade, settler colonialism has become one of the most important concepts in the academic humanities, the subject of hundreds of books and thousands of papers, as well as college courses on topics such as U.S. history, public health, and gender studies.

Read: The curious rise of settler colonialism and Turtle Island

For the academic field of settler-colonial studies, the settlement process is characterized by European settlers discovering a land that they consider “terra nullius,” the legal property of no one; their insatiable hunger for expansion that fills an entire continent; and the destruction of Indigenous peoples and cultures. This model, drawn from the history of Anglophone colonies such as the U.S. and Australia, is regularly applied to the history of Israel even though it does not include any of these hallmarks.

When modern Zionist settlement in what is now Israel began in the 1880s, Palestine was a province of the Ottoman empire, and after World War I, it was ruled by the British under a mandate from the League of Nations. Far from being “no one’s land,” Jews could settle there only with the permission of an imperial government, and when that permission was withdrawn—­as it fatefully was in 1939, when the British sharply limited Jewish immigration on the eve of the Holocaust—they had no recourse. Far from expanding to fill a continent, as in North America and Australia, the state of Israel today is about the size of New Jersey. The language, culture, and religion of the Arab peoples remain overwhelmingly dominant: 76 years after Israel was founded, it is still the only Jewish country in the region, among 22 Arab countries, from Morocco to Iraq.

Most important, the Jewish state did not erase or replace the people already living in Palestine, though it did displace many of them. Here the comparison between European settlement in North America and Jewish settlement in Israel is especially inapt. In the decades after Europeans arrived in Massachusetts, the Native American population of New England declined from about 140,000 to 10,000, by one estimate . In the decades after 1948, the Arab population of historic Palestine more than quintupled, from about 1.4 million to about 7.4 million. The persistence of the conflict in Israel-Palestine is due precisely to the coexistence of two peoples in the same land—­as opposed to the classic sites of settler colonialism, where European settlers decimated Native peoples.

In the 21st century, the clearest examples of ongoing settler colonialism can probably be found in China. In 2023, the United Nations Human Rights office reported that the Chinese government had compelled nearly 1 million Tibetan children to attend residential schools “aimed at assimilating Tibetan people culturally, religiously and linguistically.” Forcing the next generation of Tibetans to speak Mandarin is part of a long-­term effort to Sinicize the region, which also includes encouraging Han Chinese to settle there and prohibiting public displays of traditional Buddhist faith.

China has mounted a similar campaign against the Uyghur people in the northwestern province of Xinjiang. Since 2017, more than 1 million Uyghur Muslims have been detained in what the Chinese government calls vocational training centers, which other countries describe as detention or reeducation camps. The government is also seeking to bring down Uyghur birth rates through mass sterilization and involuntary birth control.

These campaigns include every element of settler colonialism as defined by academic theorists. They aim to replace an existing people and culture with a new one imported from the imperial metropole, using techniques frequently described as genocidal in the context of North American history. Tibet’s residential schools are a tool of forced assimilation, like the ones established for Native American children in Canada and the United States in the 19th century. And some scholars of settler colonialism have drawn these parallels, acknowledging, in the words of the anthropologist Carole McGranahan, “that an imperial formation is as likely to be Chinese, communist, and of the twentieth or twenty-­first centuries as it is to be English, capitalist, and of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries.”

Yet Tibet and Xinjiang—­like India’s rule in Kashmir, and the Indonesian occupation of East Timor from 1975 to 1999—­occupy a tiny fraction of the space devoted to Israel-­Palestine on the mental map of settler-colonial studies. Some of the reasons for this are practical. The academic discipline mainly flourishes in English-­speaking countries, and its practitioners usually seem to be monolingual, making it necessary to focus on countries where sources are either written in English or easily available in translation. This rules out any place where a language barrier is heightened by strict government censorship, like China. Just as important, settler-colonial theorists tend to come from the fields of anthropology and sociology rather than history, area studies, and international relations, where they would be exposed to a wider range of examples of past and present conflict.

But the focus on Israel-­Palestine isn’t only a product of the discipline’s limitations. It is doctrinal. Academics and activists find adding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to other causes powerfully energizing, a way to give a local address to a struggle that can otherwise feel all too abstract. The price of collapsing together such different causes, however, is that it inhibits understanding of each individual cause. Any conflict that fails to fit the settler-colonial model must be made to fit.

I srael also fails to fit the model of settler colonialism in another key way: It defies the usual division between foreign colonizers and Indigenous people. In the discourse of settler colonialism, Indigenous peoples aren’t simply those who happen to occupy a territory before Europeans discovered it. Rather, indigeneity is a moral and spiritual status, associated with qualities such as authenticity, selflessness, and wisdom. These values stand as a reproof to settler ways of being, which are insatiably destructive. And the moral contrast between settler and indigene comes to overlap with other binaries—­white and nonwhite, exploiter and exploited, victor and victim.

Until recently, Palestinian leaders preferred to avoid the language of indigeneity, seeing the implicit comparison between themselves and Native Americans as defeatist. In an interview near the end of his life, in 2004, PLO Chair Yasser Arafat declared, “We are not Red Indians.” But today’s activists are more eager to embrace the Indigenous label and the moral valences that go with it, and some theorists have begun to recast Palestinian identity in ecological, spiritual, and aesthetic terms long associated with Native American identity. The American academic Steven Salaita has written that “Palestinian claims to life” are based in having “a culture indivisible from their surroundings, a language of freedom concordant to the beauty of the land.” Jamal Nabulsi of the University of Queensland writes that “Palestinian Indigenous sovereignty is in and of the land. It is grounded in an embodied connection to Palestine and articulated in Palestinian ways of being, knowing, and resisting on and for this land.”

This kind of language points to an aspect of the concept of indigeneity that is often tacitly overlooked in the Native American context: its irrationalism. The idea that different peoples have incommensurable ways of being and knowing, rooted in their relationship to a particular landscape, comes out of German Romantic nationalism. Originating in the early 19th century in the work of philosophers such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried Herder, it eventually degenerated into the blood-­and-­soil nationalism of Nazi ideologues such as Richard Walther Darré, who in 1930 hymned what might be called an embodied connection to Germany: “The German soul, with all its warmness, is rooted in its native landscape and has, in a sense, always grown out of it … Whoever takes the natural landscape away from the German soul, kills it.”

For Darré, this rootedness in the land meant that Germans could never thrive in cities, among the “rootless ways of thinking of the urbanite.” The rootless urbanite par excellence, for Nazi ideology, was of course the Jew. For Salaita, the exaltation of Palestinian indigeneity leads to the very same conclusion about “Zionists,” who usurp the land but can never be vitally rooted in it: “In their ruthless schema, land is neither pleasure nor sustenance. It is a commodity … Having been anointed Jewish, the land ceases to be dynamic. It is an ideological fabrication with fixed characteristics.”

In this way, anti-Zionism converges with older patterns of anti­-Semitic and anti­-Jewish thinking. It is true, of course, that criticism of Israel is not inherently anti-­Semitic. Virtually anything that an Israeli government does is likely to be harshly criticized by many Israeli Jews themselves. But it is also true that anti-­Semitism is not simply a matter of personal prejudice against Jews, existing on an entirely different plane from politics. The term anti­-Semitism was coined in Germany in the late 19th century because the old term, Jew hatred , sounded too instinctive and brutal to describe what was, in fact, a political ideology—­an account of the way the world works and how it should be changed.

Wilhelm Marr, the German writer who popularized the word, complained in his 1879 book, The Victory of Judaism Over Germanism , that “the Jewish spirit and Jewish consciousness have overpowered the world.” That spirit, for Marr, was materialism and selfishness, “profiteering and usury.” Anti-­Semitic political parties in Europe attacked “Semitism” in the same way that socialists attacked capitalism. The saying “Anti-­Semitism is the socialism of fools,” used by the German left at this time, recognized the structural similarity between these rival worldviews.

The identification of Jews with soulless materialism made sense to 19th-century Europeans because it translated one of the oldest doctrines of Christianity into the language of modern politics. The apostle Paul, a Jew who became a follower of Jesus, explained the difference between his old faith and his new one by identifying Judaism with material things (­the circumcision of the flesh, the letter of the law) and Christianity with spiritual things—­the circumcision of the heart, a new law “written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts.”

Simon Sebag Montefiore: The decolonization narrative is dangerous and false

Today this characterization of Jews as stubborn, heartless, and materialistic is seldom publicly expressed in the language of Christianity, as in the Middle Ages, or in the language of race, as in the late 19th century. But it is quite respectable to say exactly the same thing in the language of settler colonialism. As the historian David Nirenberg has written, “We live in an age in which millions of people are exposed daily to some variant of the argument that the challenges of the world they live in are best explained in terms of ‘Israel,’” except that today, Israel refers not to the Jewish people but to the Jewish state.

When those embracing the ideology of settler colonialism think about political evil, Israel is the example that comes instinctively to hand, just as Jews were for anti-Semitism and Judaism was for Christianity. Perhaps the most troubling reactions to the October 7 attacks were those of college students convinced that the liberation of Palestine is the key to banishing injustice from the world. In November 2023, for instance, Northwestern University’s student newspaper published a letter signed by 65 student organizations—­including the Rainbow Alliance, Ballet Folklórico Northwestern, and All Paws In, which sends volunteers to animal shelters—­defending the use of the slogan “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.” This phrase looks forward to the disappearance of any form of Jewish state between the Mediterranean and the Jordan, but the student groups denied that this entails “murder and genocide.” Rather, they wrote, “When we say from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free, we imagine a world free of Islamophobia, antisemitism, anti-­Blackness, militarism, occupation and apartheid.”

As a political program, this is nonsensical. How could dismantling Israel bring about the end of militarism in China, Russia, or Iran? How could it lead to the end of anti-Black racism in America, or anti-Muslim prejudice in India? But for the ideology of settler colonialism, actual political conflicts become symbolic battles between light and darkness, and anyone found on the wrong side is a fair target. Young Americans today who celebrate the massacre of Israelis and harass their Jewish peers on college campuses are not ashamed of themselves for the same reason that earlier generations were not ashamed to persecute and kill Jews—because they have been taught that it is an expression of virtue.

This essay is adapted from Adam Kirsch’s new book, On Settler Colonialism: Ideology, Violence, and Justice .

​When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

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Chrystul Kizer Got 11 Years in Prison for Killing Her Abuser. This Is Justice?

By Rachel Louise Snyder

Ms. Snyder is a contributing Opinion writer and the author of the book “No Visible Bruises: What We Don’t Know About Domestic Violence Can Kill Us.”

In 2018, a Black teenager named Chrystul Kizer shot and killed a 34-year-old white man named Randall Volar III, who had sexually abused and trafficked her starting when she was 16 years old; she was 17 at the time of the killing. This week, a Wisconsin judge sentenced her to 11 years in prison, with another five under supervision. Rather than serving justice, her case illustrates with searing clarity the sexism and racism that corrupt our criminal justice system.

In a 2019 investigation , The Washington Post detailed Ms. Kizer’s life: Her single mother, who struggled to support her four children. The abusive man and the family’s time in a homeless shelter. Ms. Kizer wanted money for snacks and school notebooks, so she placed an ad in an online forum called backpage.com , which was notorious for sex trafficking. (It has since been shut down.) Mr. Volar was the first one who answered. He showered her with gifts and took her to fancy dinners; she understood there was a price to these extravagances. But before long, she said he was taking her to hotels to have sex with other men. He’d wait outside for her and insist she turn the money over to him. He called himself an “escort trainer.” One night, when he wanted to have sex and she brushed him off, she said she fell to the ground and he jumped on top of her, trying to force off her clothes. She shot him twice in the head, and then, the police said, set his body on fire.

Ms. Kizer’s case has been in the national spotlight since she killed Mr. Volar; a petition to drop her charges garnered more than a million and a half signatures. In what was a major win for her side, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in 2022 that she could argue that her crime was justified because she was trafficked by Mr. Volar — a groundbreaking ruling for trafficking victims. In order to make that argument, however, she would have to take her chances on a long, difficult, very public trial. Or she could take a plea deal.

Four months before his death, Mr. Volar had been arrested after another young girl called 911 claiming he’d drugged her and was threatening to kill her. The police searched his home and found hundreds of videos of sexual abuse. He had a penchant for Black girls, like Ms. Kizer: Hers was among those young faces found in the videos. Mr. Volar was released without bail the same day, pending an investigation. The police saw girls in the videos that looked as young as 12 and 13, and yet, “In many and most of the cases, we didn’t know the age,” the prosecutor Michael Graveley told The Post . “So we literally did not know whether we had misdemeanors or felony.”

In other words, the girls were young enough to appear young, but apparently not so young that they warranted priority.

Imagine a Black man, aged 34. Imagine him with videos of young white boys who appear to be 12, 13, 14 years old. Imagine those videos contained footage of grown men having sex with young boys. Imagine that 20 of those videos were shot by the suspect himself. Now tell me: In what world does law enforcement let such a person go free without bail? In what world do investigators hold on to those videos for months, seemingly baffled by the task of finding out the ages of the girls? In what world is the difference between a misdemeanor and a felony an excuse for this level of inaction?

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Justice Department Sues RealPage for Algorithmic Pricing Scheme that Harms Millions of American Renters

The Justice Department, together with the Attorneys General of North Carolina, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington, filed a civil antitrust lawsuit today against RealPage Inc. for its unlawful scheme to decrease competition among landlords in apartment pricing and to monopolize the market for commercial revenue management software that landlords use to price apartments. RealPage’s alleged conduct deprives renters of the benefits of competition on apartment leasing terms and harms millions of Americans. The lawsuit was filed today in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina and alleges that RealPage violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

The complaint  alleges that RealPage contracts with competing landlords who agree to share with RealPage nonpublic, competitively sensitive information about their apartment rental rates and other lease terms to train and run RealPage’s algorithmic pricing software. This software then generates recommendations, including on apartment rental pricing and other terms, for participating landlords based on their and their rivals’ competitively sensitive information. The complaint further alleges that in a free market, these landlords would otherwise be competing independently to attract renters based on pricing, discounts, concessions, lease terms, and other dimensions of apartment leasing. RealPage also uses this scheme and its substantial data trove to maintain a monopoly in the market for commercial revenue management software. The complaint seeks to end RealPage’s illegal conduct and restore competition for the benefit of renters in states across the country.

“Americans should not have to pay more in rent because a company has found a new way to scheme with landlords to break the law,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “We allege that RealPage’s pricing algorithm enables landlords to share confidential, competitively sensitive information and align their rents. Using software as the sharing mechanism does not immunize this scheme from Sherman Act liability, and the Justice Department will continue to aggressively enforce the antitrust laws and protect the American people from those who violate them.”

“Today’s complaint against RealPage illustrates our corporate enforcement strategy in action. We identify the most serious wrongdoers, whether individuals or companies, and focus our full energy on holding them accountable,” said Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco. “By feeding sensitive data into a sophisticated algorithm powered by artificial intelligence, RealPage has found a modern way to violate a century-old law through systematic coordination of rental housing prices — undermining competition and fairness for consumers in the process. Training a machine to break the law is still breaking the law. Today’s action makes clear that we will use all our legal tools to ensure accountability for technology-fueled anticompetitive conduct.” 

“RealPage’s egregious, anticompetitive conduct allows landlords to undermine fair pricing and limit housing options while stifling necessary competition,” said Acting Associate Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer. “The Department remains committed to rooting out illegal schemes and practices aimed at empowering corporate interests at the expense of consumers.” 

“As Americans struggle to afford housing, RealPage is making it easier for landlords to coordinate to increase rents,” said Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “Today, we filed an antitrust suit against RealPage to make housing more affordable for millions of people across the country. Competition – not RealPage – should determine what Americans pay to rent their homes.”

The complaint cites internal documents and sworn testimony from RealPage and commercial landlords that make plain RealPage’s and landlords’ objective to maximize rental pricing and profitability at the expense of renters. For example:

• RealPage acknowledged that its software is aimed at maximizing prices for landlords, referring to its products as “driving every possible opportunity to increase price,” “avoid[ing] the race to the bottom in down markets,” and “a rising tide raises all ships.”
• A RealPage executive observed that its products help landlords avoid competing on the merits, noting that “there is greater good in everybody succeeding versus essentially trying to compete against one another in a way that actually keeps the entire industry down.”
• A RealPage executive explained to a landlord that using competitor data can help identify situations where the landlord “may have a $50 increase instead of a $10 increase for the day.”
• Another landlord commented about RealPage’s product, “I always liked this product because your algorithm uses proprietary data from other subscribers to suggest rents and term. That’s classic price fixing…”

The complaint alleges that RealPage’s agreements and conduct harm the competitive process in local rental markets for multi-family dwellings across the United States. Armed with competing landlords’ data, RealPage also encourages loyalty to the algorithm’s recommendations through, among other measures, “auto accept” functionality and pricing advisors who monitor landlords’ compliance. As a result, RealPage’s software tends to maximize price increases, minimize price decreases, and maximize landlords’ pricing power. RealPage also trained landlords to limit concessions (e.g., free month(s) of rent) and other discounts to renters. The complaint also cites internal documents from RealPage and landlords touting the fact that landlords have responded by reducing renter concessions.

The complaint separately alleges that RealPage has unlawfully maintained its monopoly over commercial revenue management software for multi-family dwellings in the United States, in which RealPage commands approximately 80% market share. Landlords agree to share their competitively sensitive data with RealPage in return for pricing recommendations and decisions that are the result of combining and analyzing competitors’ sensitive data. This creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop that strengthens RealPage’s grip on the market and makes it harder for honest businesses to compete on the merits.

RealPage Inc., is a property management software company headquartered in Richardson, Texas.

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