definition of education essay

What Is Education For?

Read an excerpt from a new book by Sir Ken Robinson and Kate Robinson, which calls for redesigning education for the future.

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What is education for? As it happens, people differ sharply on this question. It is what is known as an “essentially contested concept.” Like “democracy” and “justice,” “education” means different things to different people. Various factors can contribute to a person’s understanding of the purpose of education, including their background and circumstances. It is also inflected by how they view related issues such as ethnicity, gender, and social class. Still, not having an agreed-upon definition of education doesn’t mean we can’t discuss it or do anything about it.

We just need to be clear on terms. There are a few terms that are often confused or used interchangeably—“learning,” “education,” “training,” and “school”—but there are important differences between them. Learning is the process of acquiring new skills and understanding. Education is an organized system of learning. Training is a type of education that is focused on learning specific skills. A school is a community of learners: a group that comes together to learn with and from each other. It is vital that we differentiate these terms: children love to learn, they do it naturally; many have a hard time with education, and some have big problems with school.

There are many assumptions of compulsory education. One is that young people need to know, understand, and be able to do certain things that they most likely would not if they were left to their own devices. What these things are and how best to ensure students learn them are complicated and often controversial issues. Another assumption is that compulsory education is a preparation for what will come afterward, like getting a good job or going on to higher education.

So, what does it mean to be educated now? Well, I believe that education should expand our consciousness, capabilities, sensitivities, and cultural understanding. It should enlarge our worldview. As we all live in two worlds—the world within you that exists only because you do, and the world around you—the core purpose of education is to enable students to understand both worlds. In today’s climate, there is also a new and urgent challenge: to provide forms of education that engage young people with the global-economic issues of environmental well-being.

This core purpose of education can be broken down into four basic purposes.

Education should enable young people to engage with the world within them as well as the world around them. In Western cultures, there is a firm distinction between the two worlds, between thinking and feeling, objectivity and subjectivity. This distinction is misguided. There is a deep correlation between our experience of the world around us and how we feel. As we explored in the previous chapters, all individuals have unique strengths and weaknesses, outlooks and personalities. Students do not come in standard physical shapes, nor do their abilities and personalities. They all have their own aptitudes and dispositions and different ways of understanding things. Education is therefore deeply personal. It is about cultivating the minds and hearts of living people. Engaging them as individuals is at the heart of raising achievement.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” and that “Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Many of the deepest problems in current systems of education result from losing sight of this basic principle.

Schools should enable students to understand their own cultures and to respect the diversity of others. There are various definitions of culture, but in this context the most appropriate is “the values and forms of behavior that characterize different social groups.” To put it more bluntly, it is “the way we do things around here.” Education is one of the ways that communities pass on their values from one generation to the next. For some, education is a way of preserving a culture against outside influences. For others, it is a way of promoting cultural tolerance. As the world becomes more crowded and connected, it is becoming more complex culturally. Living respectfully with diversity is not just an ethical choice, it is a practical imperative.

There should be three cultural priorities for schools: to help students understand their own cultures, to understand other cultures, and to promote a sense of cultural tolerance and coexistence. The lives of all communities can be hugely enriched by celebrating their own cultures and the practices and traditions of other cultures.

Education should enable students to become economically responsible and independent. This is one of the reasons governments take such a keen interest in education: they know that an educated workforce is essential to creating economic prosperity. Leaders of the Industrial Revolution knew that education was critical to creating the types of workforce they required, too. But the world of work has changed so profoundly since then, and continues to do so at an ever-quickening pace. We know that many of the jobs of previous decades are disappearing and being rapidly replaced by contemporary counterparts. It is almost impossible to predict the direction of advancing technologies, and where they will take us.

How can schools prepare students to navigate this ever-changing economic landscape? They must connect students with their unique talents and interests, dissolve the division between academic and vocational programs, and foster practical partnerships between schools and the world of work, so that young people can experience working environments as part of their education, not simply when it is time for them to enter the labor market.

Education should enable young people to become active and compassionate citizens. We live in densely woven social systems. The benefits we derive from them depend on our working together to sustain them. The empowerment of individuals has to be balanced by practicing the values and responsibilities of collective life, and of democracy in particular. Our freedoms in democratic societies are not automatic. They come from centuries of struggle against tyranny and autocracy and those who foment sectarianism, hatred, and fear. Those struggles are far from over. As John Dewey observed, “Democracy has to be born anew every generation, and education is its midwife.”

For a democratic society to function, it depends upon the majority of its people to be active within the democratic process. In many democracies, this is increasingly not the case. Schools should engage students in becoming active, and proactive, democratic participants. An academic civics course will scratch the surface, but to nurture a deeply rooted respect for democracy, it is essential to give young people real-life democratic experiences long before they come of age to vote.

Eight Core Competencies

The conventional curriculum is based on a collection of separate subjects. These are prioritized according to beliefs around the limited understanding of intelligence we discussed in the previous chapter, as well as what is deemed to be important later in life. The idea of “subjects” suggests that each subject, whether mathematics, science, art, or language, stands completely separate from all the other subjects. This is problematic. Mathematics, for example, is not defined only by propositional knowledge; it is a combination of types of knowledge, including concepts, processes, and methods as well as propositional knowledge. This is also true of science, art, and languages, and of all other subjects. It is therefore much more useful to focus on the concept of disciplines rather than subjects.

Disciplines are fluid; they constantly merge and collaborate. In focusing on disciplines rather than subjects we can also explore the concept of interdisciplinary learning. This is a much more holistic approach that mirrors real life more closely—it is rare that activities outside of school are as clearly segregated as conventional curriculums suggest. A journalist writing an article, for example, must be able to call upon skills of conversation, deductive reasoning, literacy, and social sciences. A surgeon must understand the academic concept of the patient’s condition, as well as the practical application of the appropriate procedure. At least, we would certainly hope this is the case should we find ourselves being wheeled into surgery.

The concept of disciplines brings us to a better starting point when planning the curriculum, which is to ask what students should know and be able to do as a result of their education. The four purposes above suggest eight core competencies that, if properly integrated into education, will equip students who leave school to engage in the economic, cultural, social, and personal challenges they will inevitably face in their lives. These competencies are curiosity, creativity, criticism, communication, collaboration, compassion, composure, and citizenship. Rather than be triggered by age, they should be interwoven from the beginning of a student’s educational journey and nurtured throughout.

From Imagine If: Creating a Future for Us All by Sir Ken Robinson, Ph.D and Kate Robinson, published by Penguin Books, an imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House, LLC. Copyright © 2022 by the Estate of Sir Kenneth Robinson and Kate Robinson.

What Is “Education”?

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Analytic philosophy of education focuses on clarifying such key terms as: “education”, “aims”, “goals”, “objectives”, “overt curriculum”, “covert curriculum”, “null curriculum”, “pedagogical content knowledge”. The understanding of these and other concepts is critical to enable contemporary education to be regarded as a truly professional domain.

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• Pedagogic content knowledge

The world of education—like law, medicine, business, and other spheres—has its own unique language. A discussion of this language is important for principals and teachers, parents, and students in order to facilitate a clear understanding of what education is. In this chapter, I analyze and clarify some key terms with a view to promoting a coherent and more precise educational practice.

Three Ways to Analyze the Term “Education”

There are three kinds of definitions of “education” (Scheffler 1960 ). The first type is called the descriptive . It is a statement that proposes to denote or explain the nature of the meaning of the word called “education” by using a variety of words to explain either what the phenomenon is or how the term is to be understood. This type of definition claims to describe precisely how the word denoted as “education” is most prominently used.

The second type of definition of “education” is the programmatic , which comes to advocate for or prescribe a belief of what education should be or should do. A programmatic definition is less preoccupied with what the phenomenon or language of education is and more concerned with promulgating a particular practice of education that is regarded as desirable. Sometimes prescriptive definitions are expressed in short, clipped sentences such as Pink Floyd’s “We don’t need no education” or the title of Jonathan Kozol’s description of education as Death at an Early Age (Kozol 1985 ). Programmatic definitions are ultimately short slogans or deeply felt preaching about the way education should be.

The third type of definition is the stipulative and its purpose is technical and utilitarian. It is basically a linguistic agreement or pact that enables a discussion to proceed smoothly without forcing a person to each time state, “This is what I mean by the term ‘education.’” It is essentially is a linguistic shortcut, in which one person’s explanation of the word “education” is called Version 1; a second person’s explanation is Version 2, and the third interpretation is called Version 3. This is a kind of a shortcut that enables the discussion to precede at a decent pace.

My concern in this chapter is the descriptive mode, namely, the endeavor to arrive at a clear and generally agreed-upon statement of what the word “education” means. My aim is to refer to terms that are generally used in everyday speech and to attempts to search for viable and relevant definitions that reflect as accurately as possible the common language usage of the term. There is a technique that students and some academics use in the attempt to understand the term, namely, to trace it back to its original linguistic roots. There are times when this is helpful, but very often this can be misleading, since the way it once was used does not necessarily help us understand the way it is used today. The contemporary word “education” is sometimes traced to the Latin root educare , which means “to train” or “to mold”. Based on this linguistic root, some people like to argue that training or molding is what education today should be. At the same time, the Latin word educere means “to lead out”, which suggests a totally different understanding of “education” as a process aimed at that freeing the person from the prison of ignorance. Generally, it is my sense that the technique of tracing back to former linguistic roots is more useful for understanding ways in which terms were understood in the past rather than helping us to grasp what they mean today.

Some Contemporary Meanings

Let’s now look at some diverse definitions of “education”. One understanding of the term is the conscious effort to equip the unequipped young with facts, knowledge, and skills that will enable them to function as adults in a specific society. This is often called the socialization model.

A second usage of the word “education” understands it as exposure to, understanding of, and practice in skillsets that a person needs to be able to function in contemporary culture. This notion is sometimes called the acculturation model.

A third notion of education focuses on the development of reflective thinking and feeling abilities so that the young will be able to carve out how they wish to exist. This model is sometimes known as the liberal or person-centered model of education.

A Proposed Definition of “Education”

I have found the discussion of diverse meanings of education to be very fruitful because it helps me see the world through different lenses and, particularly, enables me to think about and consider diverse meanings and practices of the dynamics of education. At the same time, since I believe that education is a practice, and in practice we need some very specific tools and toolkits to help us proceed, I have searched over time for a definition of “education” that I regard as both descriptively and programmatically useful for the educational practitioner. Ultimately, the definition that I regard as the most useful was shaped by Lawrence Cremin, who is regarded as the most distinguished historian of twentieth-century education:

Education is the deliberate, systematic, and sustained effort to transmit, provoke or acquire knowledge, values, attitudes, skills or sensibilities as well as any learning that results from the effort (Cremin, Public Education , p. 27)

This broad-based definition indicates that education is a purposeful activity. The word “education” is reserved for frameworks created with the considered and conscious intent to educate. This definition also understands education as a process and not a place. It is a purposeful activity that can happen within a wide range of frameworks and not only in buildings called schools. Moreover, this intentional activity does not only transmit knowledge, but it also is concerned with values, attitudes, skills, and sensibilities. Education is an activity which takes place in many diverse venues and is intended to develop knowledge, understanding, valuing, growing, caring, and behaving. It can happen “when you sit in your house, and when you go on the way, and when you lie down and when you rise” (Deuteronomy, 6:7). While contemporary societies have denoted schools as the agency responsible for education, in fact, education far transcends the certificates of achievement received from pre-school, elementary, secondary, and collegiate frameworks.

“Aims”, “Goals”, “Objectives”

The concept of education invites the question “Education for what?” What is the purpose of education? While the terms, “aims”, “goals”, and “objectives” of education are sometimes used interchangeably, philosophers of education describe three distinct activities related to “purpose”: Aims, Goals, Objectives = AGO (Noddings 2007 ).

“Aims” refer to the most general ideals, values, or principles, which a person, institution, or society regards as the ultimate desideratum of education. Aims are value statements which designate certain principles or values as the ultimate aspiration. Aims describe both the ideal target of an educational institution as well at its ultimate desired outcomes or achievements. Educational aims ultimately frame the overall direction of an educational system or institution.

“Goals” refer to a second stage, which is derivative from aims and focuses on contents and topics that should be studied so as to enable students to understand and actualize core ideals explicit in aims. Goals translate aims into specific contents or stepping-stones that should be part of the educational process. If one of the aims of twentieth-century American schooling was to teach a set of shared values for its diverse populations in order to socialize them into a core American society, then its goal was to provide them with skillsets such as language, science, and mathematics, which were then regarded as contents critical to enable realization of the larger shared American creed.

The word “objectives” refers to the most practical stage, which is the actual teaching materials—books textbooks, maps, videos, and visual aids—used in the classroom each day, week, and month in a year. These are the infamous “lesson plans” which are an hour by hour mapping out of how teachers will spend every single day in the classroom.

This AGO framework can be a useful structure for analyzing education, from its most abstract goals to its most immediate daily application. Moreover, if implemented properly, it would seem to reflect a useful dynamic from theory to practice. Unfortunately, in reality, what often happens is that aims and goals are skipped over and objectives—daily blueprints, and lesson plans—become the main preoccupation. Because of a multitude of exigencies, the thoughtful paradigm of aims, goals, and objectives is often neglected at the expense of “getting through the day” in practice.

Three Notions of “Curriculum”

An important term in the study of education is “curriculum”, which popularly refers to the overall subjects or contents of schooling. As the field of curriculum studies developed into a rigorous academic area of study in schools of education, broader understandings of the term were to emerge (Pinar et al. 1995 ).

One of the important sophistications in the study of curriculum has been the notion of overt, covert, and null curricula. The “overt curriculum” refers to the clearly stated and enunciated objectives, contents, subjects, topics, books, and resources, which are the official frameworks, and requirements of a school and its teachers. It is the approved and mandated contents that shape a school’s operation.

The “covert” curriculum refers to attitudes, values, and behaviors that characterize the norms of daily life in schools beyond the subjects formally taught in a classroom. The covert curriculum is the unspoken “culture’” shaped by a multitude of forces and factors. What is the décor of the school? What do the halls look like? What type examinations are given? What is the nature of student interaction? The covert curriculum refers to the multiple features of a school culture very much shaped by the lives, habits, and “lingo” of students which have significant impact on the actual rhythm and flow of daily school life.

The “null” curriculum refers to the books, subjects, topics, and artifacts that are consciously and purposefully not part of the school curriculum. This may include partial or no discussion of the history of indigenous populations in the teaching of American history. It includes the list of books, sources, ands ideas that have very consciously not been chosen in the formal curriculum. All education requires selection, and the topics not chosen—and why—are just as important as those that have been chosen. Indeed, there are political, racial, gender, aesthetic, moral, and spiritual issues that significantly shape the overt, covert, and null curriculum of each and every type of schooling.

These three terms alert us to the complicated nature of curriculum development. While there is a popular phrase that refers to an individual “writing a curriculum’”, in fact, curriculum development has become a specialized domain that involves subject matter experts classroom teachers, and educational leadership, and requires extensive deliberation, field testing, revision, and production. It is one of the most exciting and, at the same time most demanding of fields in contemporary education.

Pedagogical Content Knowledge (PCK)

An important dimension of education is what is commonly known as “pedagogy”, which is understood as the methodologies or the ways in which teaching should happen. Footnote 1 This is obviously a critical dimension of education because it is about what educators teach and how students learn—which are the ultimate domain of education. Pedagogy (sometimes called the “science of teaching”) is the assumption that there are universal patterns and procedures in teaching which should constitute an important part of academic teacher training. There were, and there still are, some general courses on pedagogy in university departments of education which reflect the assumption that there is a core set of methodologies generally appropriate for all sorts of teaching. Twentieth-century philosophers in multiple fields of study—for example, physics, mathematics, literature, and economics—began to focus on the notions of “realms of meaning” or “spheres of knowledge”, which led to the general consensus that there is a diversity of pedagogic methodologies that derive from the many different spheres of knowledge. This kind of thinking made it clear that because of the significant differences between science, mathematics, history, literature, and philosophy, there could be no one overall pedagogy appropriate for all subjects; consequently, such courses as “principles of pedagogy” were misleading. In the 1980s, through the innovative work of a group of educators of whom Professor Lee Shulman was a central figure, an important concept was to emerge which has had a profound effect on styles of teaching (Shulman 1986 ). This research led to the term “pedagogical content knowledge” (PCK). PCK refers to the fact that diverse spheres of knowledge utilize diverse methodologies of researching and understanding and therefore require diverse practices of teaching. In other words, the way a teacher teaches the subject depends on the nature of the subject and that all subjects are not the same. Just as it is clear that the ways we teach someone to drive a car or to learn how to swim have their own characteristics, so it is clear that the teaching of mathematics must differ from the teaching of literature, which differs from the teaching of civics, which differs from the teaching of languages. This notion indicates that one must be wary of general principles of “how to teach” and that quality teaching begins with and is related to an understanding of the subject matter being taught. To teach chemistry or physics one has to understand the role of experimentation. In teaching literature, one has to understand the importance of simile, metaphor, plot, and theme. PCK was to have a major impact particularly in the experimental subject areas, although there were also important implications for teaching literature and other areas. At the heart of PCK is the notion that methodology or “what to do” flows from the content one teaches, and the content one teaches ultimately flows from the “why” of education. In other words, education is an integrated dynamic in which the “why” affects the “what” and the “what” affects the “how”.

I learned about the importance of PCK during my travels over the years to all sorts of Jewish schools. One of the most prominent subjects (typically in the early years of elementary school) I observed was the teaching of Genesis Chapter 12 which describes a conversation between God and Abraham in which God makes a covenant—a legal agreement—with Abraham, that if he follows God’s ways, Abraham will be given a certain body of land for himself and for his children in perpetuity. How one teaches this section depends upon how one understands the nature of this ancient source. If this text is a verifiable history book (which was the mode that I observed in so many schools), it will be taught in one way; if this text is not a history book but rather a philosophical or theological work with profound religious, moral, and human messages, it will be taught in a totally different way. These two understandings result in dramatically diverse pedagogies and messages, depending on whether the text in Genesis 12 was presented as an authoritative history or a profound philosophy.

The contemporary language of education includes some key concepts—“schooling”, “aims”, “goals”, “curriculum”, and “pedagogy”—whose meanings are very important to the practice of education in schools and beyond. This conclusion suggests that the fields of education and Jewish education in the twenty-first century are sophisticated domains which call for serious deliberation and study by prospective educators. The educators of our young deserve the same level of training, investment, and rigor that we expect from the doctors who treat our bodies or from the engineers who build the bridges on which we travel. Education in the twenty-first century is a critical sphere that calls for deep reflection, training, and passion.

Adult education specialist Malcolm Knowles suggested that the term “pedagogy” be used to refer to the teaching of children and that the term “andragogy” be used to denote adult learning. (Knowles 2020 ).

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Chazan, B. (2022). What Is “Education”?. In: Principles and Pedagogies in Jewish Education. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83925-3_3

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Philosophy Of Education

Definition of philosophy of education.

The Philosophy of Education is a big thought bubble about how and why we learn. It’s filled with questions and deep thinking about the essence of education. To make it simpler, imagine two things:

Firstly, it’s about looking at education with a magnifying glass and asking, ‘What’s the point of school?’. Secondly, think of it as a toolbox, where the tools are different ways to understand and improve how people teach and learn.

Philosophy of Education isn’t a one-size-fits-all answer to these questions. It’s more like a conversation that helps us explore different angles of education, so we can all come up with our own ways to make it better.

So, this field is really about thinking super smart and being critical about what we want from education. If you’re curious about what makes a good teacher or why certain subjects are taught, you’re already dipping your toes into the world of Philosophy of Education!

Types of Philosophy of Education

There are many viewpoints on what Education should be like. Here are some key ones:

• Perennialism: This is the belief that some ideas are timeless. These educators often focus on teaching concepts and books that have stood the test of time, much like a classic song that never gets old.
• Essentialism: Essentialists are those who think that there are certain basic skills and knowledge everyone must learn. They prioritize particular subjects that they think are vital for students, like a “must-have” tools in a toolbox.
• Progressivism : This philosophy is all about learning by doing. Think of it as learning to swim by actually jumping in the water. These educators focus on hands-on experiences and making lessons relevant to real-life situations.
• Reconstructionism: This type of philosophy looks at education as a way to improve society. It’s about teaching students not just to learn for themselves, but to make the world a better place.
• Existentialism : Existentialist teachers help students explore themselves and their place in the universe. It’s a bit like self-reflection, pondering life’s big questions, and understanding one’s own identity.

Examples of Philosophy of Education

• A teacher who follows Perennialism may assign books by ancient thinkers like Plato because these works contain wisdom that remains relevant across the ages. They are examples of the topic because they emphasize learning from ideas that endure over time.
• An Essentialist classroom will focus on core subjects like reading, writing, and arithmetic, as these are viewed as essential building blocks of a person’s education. They serve as examples because they underscore the belief in imparting fundamental skills.
• Schools that value Progressivism might have students working on science experiments or group projects to apply what they’ve learned. This is an example because it demonstrates the importance placed on active learning and real-world application.
• Reconstructionist educators might encourage their students to participate in local cleanups to understand environmental issues, showcasing the philosophy’s focus on using education to drive social change.
• If a teacher believes in Existentialism , they may have deep discussions about life’s purposes, helping students to discover their own beliefs and identity, reflecting the existentialist idea of personal exploration.

Why is Philosophy of Education Important?

Understanding Philosophy of Education is like having a treasure map for learning. It guides us through the jungle of choices in teaching methods, subject matter, and educational goals. It also gives educators a mirror to see their teaching philosophies more clearly, helping them to improve their approach and connect better with their students.

Origin of Philosophy of Education

People have been sharing ideas about teaching and learning since ancient times. Famous thinkers from Greece like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle posed big questions about knowledge and learning that still influence us today. Over centuries, people have continued to add their own thoughts, making the field of Philosophy of Education really rich and varied.

Controversies in Philosophy of Education

Big questions often lead to big debates. In the Philosophy of Education, people argue about whether schools should focus more on practical skills or personal growth. There’s also disagreement about whether tests are the best way to check if students are learning, and how much technology should be used in classrooms.

The Worldwide View of Philosophy of Education

Around the world, education looks very different. Some countries emphasize things like respect for teachers or learning by heart, while others might encourage you to think outside the box. Looking at how various cultures approach schooling can teach us a lot about their values and ideas.

Personal Philosophy of Education

Just like fingerprints, everyone’s Philosophy of Education is unique. It’s based on your personal beliefs and experiences with learning. Teachers and students alike can have their own philosophy that might change over time as they learn and grow.

Putting it All Together

By digging into the Philosophy of Education, we can make smarter choices in how we teach and learn. This field isn’t just about stuffing facts into our heads; it’s about finding the ‘why’ and ‘how’ behind education, which helps us see the big picture and mold better futures for ourselves and others.

Related Topics

• Critical Thinking : This is about learning to think clearly and rationally, understanding the connection between ideas. It relates to Philosophy of Education because it’s a skill that’s valued across many educational philosophies.
• Educational Psychology: This field looks at how people learn and retain new information. It’s related because it helps identify effective teaching methods that different educational philosophies might use.
• Sociology of Education: This is the study of how public institutions and individual experiences affect education and its outcomes. It’s relevant because it looks at education within society, which is a major concern of some educational philosophies.
• Curriculum Development: This involves planning what students will be taught and how. It ties into Philosophy of Education because the curriculum is often based on a school or teacher’s educational philosophy.

The Philosophy of Education is a deep and fascinating area that gives us the tools to question and make sense of the world of learning. From the different types of philosophies like Perennialism and Existentialism to the personal beliefs of teachers and students, it’s a field that affects everyone in education. Understanding how these ideas fit together helps us all to become more thoughtful learners and educators. By exploring related topics like critical thinking and educational psychology, we can further enrich our understanding and approach to education, making sure it’s not just about knowing stuff, but about understanding it deeply and finding ways to apply it.

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philosophy of education , philosophical reflection on the nature, aims, and problems of education . The philosophy of education is Janus -faced, looking both inward to the parent discipline of philosophy and outward to educational practice. (In this respect it is like other areas of “applied” philosophy, such as the philosophy of law , the philosophy of science , and the philosophy of medicine, including bioethics .) This dual focus requires it to work on both sides of the traditional divide between theory and practice, taking as its subject matter both basic philosophical issues (e.g., the nature of knowledge) and more specific issues arising from educational practice (e.g., the desirability of standardized testing). These practical issues in turn have implications for a variety of long-standing philosophical problems in epistemology , metaphysics , ethics , and political philosophy . In addressing these many issues and problems, the philosopher of education strives for conceptual clarity, argumentative rigour, and informed valuation.

(Read Arne Duncan’s Britannica essay on “Education: The Great Equalizer.”)

The history of philosophy of education is an important source of concerns and issues—as is the history of education itself—for setting the intellectual agenda of contemporary philosophers of education. Equally relevant is the range of contemporary approaches to the subject. Although it is not possible here to review systematically either that history or those contemporary approaches, brief sketches of several key figures are offered next.

The Western philosophical tradition began in ancient Greece, and philosophy of education began with it. The major historical figures developed philosophical views of education that were embedded in their broader metaphysical , epistemological, ethical , and political theories. The introduction by Socrates of the “Socratic method” of questioning ( see dialectic ) began a tradition in which reasoning and the search for reasons that might justify beliefs, judgments, and actions was (and remains) fundamental; such questioning in turn eventually gave rise to the view that education should encourage in all students and persons, to the greatest extent possible, the pursuit of the life of reason. This view of the central place of reason in education has been shared by most of the major figures in the history of philosophy of education, despite the otherwise substantial differences in their other philosophical views.

Socrates’ student Plato endorsed that view and held that a fundamental task of education is that of helping students to value reason and to be reasonable, which for him involved valuing wisdom above pleasure, honour, and other less-worthy pursuits. In his dialogue Republic he set out a vision of education in which different groups of students would receive different sorts of education, depending on their abilities, interests, and stations in life. His utopian vision has been seen by many to be a precursor of what has come to be called educational “sorting.” Millennia later, the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952) argued that education should be tailored to the individual child, though he rejected Plato’s hierarchical sorting of students into categories.

Plato’s student Aristotle also took the highest aim of education to be the fostering of good judgment or wisdom, but he was more optimistic than Plato about the ability of the typical student to achieve it. He also emphasized the fostering of moral virtue and the development of character; his emphasis on virtue and his insistence that virtues develop in the context of community-guided practice—and that the rights and interests of individual citizens do not always outweigh those of the community—are reflected in contemporary interest in “virtue theory” in ethics and “communitarianism” in political philosophy.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) famously insisted that formal education, like society itself, is inevitably corrupting; he argued that education should enable the “natural” and “free” development of children, a view that eventually led to the modern movement known as “open education.” These ideas are in some ways reflected in 20th-century “progressivism,” a movement often (but not always accurately) associated with Dewey. Unlike Plato, Rousseau also prescribed fundamentally distinct educations for boys and girls, and in doing so he raised issues concerning gender and its place in education that are of central concern today. Dewey emphasized the educational centrality of experience and held that experience is genuinely educational only when it leads to “growth.” But the idea that the aim of education is growth has proved to be a problematic and controversial one, and even the meaning of the slogan is unclear. Dewey also emphasized the importance of the student’s own interests in determining appropriate educational activities and ends-in-view; in this respect he is usually seen as a proponent of “child-centred” education, though he also stressed the importance of students’ understanding of traditional subject matter. While these Deweyan themes are strongly reminiscent of Rousseau, Dewey placed them in a far more sophisticated—albeit philosophically contentious—context. He emphasized the central importance of education for the health of democratic social and political institutions, and he developed his educational and political views from a foundation of systematic metaphysics and epistemology.

Of course, the history of philosophy of education includes many more figures than Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Dewey. Other major philosophers, including Thomas Aquinas , Augustine , Thomas Hobbes , René Descartes , John Locke , David Hume , Immanuel Kant , John Stuart Mill , Karl Marx , Bertrand Russell , and, more recently, R.S. Peters in Britain and Israel Scheffler in the United States , have also made substantial contributions to educational thought. It is worth noting again that virtually all these figures, despite their many philosophical differences and with various qualifications and differences of emphasis, take the fundamental aim of education to be the fostering of rationality ( see reason ). No other proposed aim of education has enjoyed the positive endorsement of so many historically important philosophers—although, as will be seen below, this aim has come under increasing scrutiny in recent decades.

Philosophy of Education

All human societies, past and present, have had a vested interest in education; and some wits have claimed that teaching (at its best an educational activity) is the second oldest profession. While not all societies channel sufficient resources into support for educational activities and institutions, all at the very least acknowledge their centrality—and for good reasons. For one thing, it is obvious that children are born illiterate and innumerate, and ignorant of the norms and cultural achievements of the community or society into which they have been thrust; but with the help of professional teachers and the dedicated amateurs in their families and immediate environs (and with the aid, too, of educational resources made available through the media and nowadays the internet), within a few years they can read, write, calculate, and act (at least often) in culturally-appropriate ways. Some learn these skills with more facility than others, and so education also serves as a social-sorting mechanism and undoubtedly has enormous impact on the economic fate of the individual. Put more abstractly, at its best education equips individuals with the skills and substantive knowledge that allows them to define and to pursue their own goals, and also allows them to participate in the life of their community as full-fledged, autonomous citizens.

But this is to cast matters in very individualistic terms, and it is fruitful also to take a societal perspective, where the picture changes somewhat. It emerges that in pluralistic societies such as the Western democracies there are some groups that do not wholeheartedly support the development of autonomous individuals, for such folk can weaken a group from within by thinking for themselves and challenging communal norms and beliefs; from the point of view of groups whose survival is thus threatened, formal, state-provided education is not necessarily a good thing. But in other ways even these groups depend for their continuing survival on educational processes, as do the larger societies and nation-states of which they are part; for as John Dewey put it in the opening chapter of his classic work Democracy and Education (1916), in its broadest sense education is the means of the “social continuity of life” (Dewey, 1916, 3). Dewey pointed out that the “primary ineluctable facts of the birth and death of each one of the constituent members in a social group” make education a necessity, for despite this biological inevitability “the life of the group goes on” (Dewey, 3). The great social importance of education is underscored, too, by the fact that when a society is shaken by a crisis, this often is taken as a sign of educational breakdown; education, and educators, become scapegoats.

It is not surprising that such an important social domain has attracted the attention of philosophers for thousands of years, especially as there are complex issues aplenty that have great philosophical interest. Even a cursory reading of these opening paragraphs reveals that they touch on, in nascent form, some but by no means all of the issues that have spawned vigorous debate down the ages; restated more explicitly in terms familiar to philosophers of education, the issues the discussion above flitted over were: education as transmission of knowledge versus education as the fostering of inquiry and reasoning skills that are conducive to the development of autonomy (which, roughly, is the tension between education as conservative and education as progressive, and also is closely related to differing views about human “perfectibility”—issues that historically have been raised in the debate over the aims of education); the question of what this knowledge, and what these skills, ought to be—part of the domain of philosophy of the curriculum; the questions of how learning is possible, and what is it to have learned something—two sets of issues that relate to the question of the capacities and potentialities that are present at birth, and also to the process (and stages) of human development and to what degree this process is flexible and hence can be influenced or manipulated; the tension between liberal education and vocational education, and the overlapping issue of which should be given priority—education for personal development or education for citizenship (and the issue of whether or not this is a false dichotomy); the differences (if any) between education and enculturation; the distinction between educating versus teaching versus training versus indoctrination; the relation between education and maintenance of the class structure of society, and the issue of whether different classes or cultural groups can—justly—be given educational programs that differ in content or in aims; the issue of whether the rights of children, parents, and socio-cultural or ethnic groups, conflict—and if they do, the question of whose rights should be dominant; the question as to whether or not all children have a right to state-provided education, and if so, should this education respect the beliefs and customs of all groups and how on earth would this be accomplished; and a set of complex issues about the relation between education and social reform, centering upon whether education is essentially conservative, or whether it can be an (or, the ) agent of social change.

It is impressive that most of the philosophically-interesting issues touched upon above, plus additional ones not alluded to here, were addressed in one of the early masterpieces of the Western intellectual tradition—Plato's Republic . A.N. Whitehead somewhere remarked that the history of Western philosophy is nothing but a series of footnotes to Plato, and if the Meno and the Laws are added to the Republic , the same is true of the history of educational thought and of philosophy of education in particular. At various points throughout this essay the discussion shall return to Plato, and at the end there shall be a brief discussion of the two other great figures in the field—Rousseau and Dewey. But the account of the field needs to start with some features of it that are apt to cause puzzlement, or that make describing its topography difficult. These include, but are not limited to, the interactions between philosophy of education and its parent discipline.

1.1 The open nature of philosophy and philosophy of education

1.2 the different bodies of work traditionally included in the field, 1.3 paradigm wars the diversity of, and clashes between, philosophical approaches, 2.1 the early work: c.d. hardie, 2.2 the dominant years: language, and clarification of key concepts, 2.3 countervailing forces, 2.4 a new guise contemporary social, political and moral philosophy, 3.1 philosophical disputes concerning empirical education research, 3.2 the content of the curriculum, and the aims and functions of schooling, 3.3 rousseau, dewey, and the progressive movement, 4. concluding remarks, bibliography, other internet resources, related entries, 1. problems in delineating the field.

There is a large—and ever expanding—number of works designed to give guidance to the novice setting out to explore the domain of philosophy of education; most if not all of the academic publishing houses have at least one representative of this genre on their list, and the titles are mostly variants of the following archetypes: The History and Philosophy of Education , The Philosophical Foundations of Education , Philosophers on Education , Three Thousand Years of Educational Wisdom , A Guide to the Philosophy of Education , and Readings in Philosophy of Education . The overall picture that emerges from even a sampling of this collective is not pretty; the field lacks intellectual cohesion, and (from the perspective taken in this essay) there is a widespread problem concerning the rigor of the work and the depth of scholarship—although undoubtedly there are islands, but not continents, of competent philosophical discussion of difficult and socially-important issues of the kind listed earlier. On the positive side—the obverse of the lack of cohesion—there is, in the field as a whole, a degree of adventurousness in the form of openness to ideas and radical approaches, a trait that is sometimes lacking in other academic fields. This is not to claim, of course, that taken individually philosophers of education are more open-minded than their philosophical cousins!

Part of the explanation for this diffuse state-of-affairs is that, quite reasonably, most philosophers of education have the goal (reinforced by their institutional affiliation with Schools of Education and their involvement in the initial training of teachers) of contributing not to philosophy but to educational policy and practice. This shapes not only their selection of topics, but also the manner in which the discussion is pursued; and this orientation also explains why philosophers of education—to a far greater degree, it is to be suspected, than their “pure” cousins—publish not in philosophy journals but in a wide range of professionally-oriented journals (such as Educational Researcher , Harvard Educational Review , Teachers College Record , Cambridge Journal of Education, Journal of Curriculum Studies , and the like). Some individuals work directly on issues of classroom practice, others identify as much with fields such as educational policy analysis, curriculum theory, teacher education, or some particular subject-matter domain such as math or science education, as they do with philosophy of education. It is still fashionable in some quarters to decry having one's intellectual agenda shaped so strongly as this by concerns emanating from a field of practice; but as Stokes (1997) has made clear, many of the great, theoretically-fruitful research programs in natural science had their beginnings in such practical concerns—as Pasteur's grounbreaking work illustrates. It is dangerous to take the theory versus practice dichotomy too seriously.

However, there is another consequence of this institutional housing of the vast majority of philosphers of education that is worth noting—one that is not found in a comparable way in philosophers of science, for example, who almost always are located in departments of philosophy—namely, that experience as a teacher, or in some other education-related role, is a qualification to become a philosopher of education that in many cases is valued at least as much as depth of philosophical training. (The issue is not that educational experience is irrelevant—clearly it can be highly pertinent—but it is that in the tradeoff with philosophical training, philosophy often loses.) But there are still other factors at work that contribute to the field's diffuseness, that all relate in some way to the nature of the discipline of philosophy itself.

In describing the field of philosophy, and in particular the sub-field that has come to be identified as philosophy of education, one quickly runs into a difficulty not found to anything like the same degree in other disciplines. For example, although there are some internal differences in opinion, nevertheless there seems to be quite a high degree of consensus within the domain of quantum physics about which researchers are competent members of the field and which ones are not, and what work is a strong contribution (or potential contribution). The very nature of philosophy, on the other hand, is “essentially contested”; what counts as a sound philosophical work within one school of thought, or socio-cultural or academic setting, may not be so-regarded (and may even be the focus of derision) in a different one. Coupled with this is the fact that the borders of the field are not policed, so that the philosophically-untrained can cross into it freely—indeed, over the past century or more a great many individuals from across the spectrum of real and pseudo disciplines have for whatever reason exercised their right to self-identify as members of this broad and loosely defined category of “philosophers” (as a few minutes spent browsing in the relevant section of a bookstore will verify).

In essence, then, there are two senses of the term “philosopher” and its cognates: a loose but common sense in which any individual who cogitates in any manner about such issues as the meaning of life, the nature of social justice, the essence of sportsmanship, the aims of education, the foundations of the school curriculum, or relationship with the Divine, is thereby a philosopher; and there is a more technical sense referring to those who have been formally trained or have acquired competence in one or more areas such as epistemology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, logic, philosophy of science, and the like. If this bifurcation presents a problem for adequately delineating the field of philosophy, the difficulties grow tenfold or more with respect to philosophy of education.

This essay offers a description and assessment of the field as seen by a scholar rooted firmly in the formal branch of “philosophy of education”, and moreover this branch as it has developed in the English-speaking world (some of which, of course, has been inspired by Continental philosophy); but first it is necessary to say a little more about the difficulties that confront the individual who sets out, without presuppositions, to understand the topography of “philosophy of education”.

It will not take long for a person who consults several of the introductory texts alluded to earlier to encounter a number of different bodies of work (loosely bounded to be sure) that have by one source or another been regarded as part of the domain of philosophy of education; the inclusion of some of these as part of the field is largely responsible for the diffuse topography described earlier. What follows is an informal and incomplete accounting.

First, there are works of advocacy produced by those non-technical, self-identified “philosophers” described above, who often have an axe to grind; they may wish to destroy (or to save) common schooling, support or attack some innovation or reform, shore-up or destroy the capitalist mode of production, see their own religion (or none at all) gain a foothold in the public schools, strengthen the place of “the basics” in the school curriculum, and so forth. While these topics certainly can be, and have been, discussed with due care, often they have been pursued in loose but impressive language where exhortation substitutes for argumentation—and hence sometimes they are mistaken for works of philosophy of education! In the following discussion this genre shall be passed over in silence.

Second, there is a corpus of work somewhat resembling the first, but where the arguments are tighter, and where the authors usually are individuals of some distinction whose insights are thought-provoking—possibly because they have a degree of familiarity with some branch of educational activity, having been teachers (or former teachers), school principals, religious leaders, politicians, journalists, and the like. While these works frequently touch on philosophical issues, they are not pursued to any philosophical depth and can hardly be considered as contributions to the scholarship of the discipline. However, some works in this genre are among the classics of “educational thought”—a more felicitous label than “philosophy of education”; cases in point would be the essays, pamphlets and letters of Thomas Arnold (headmaster of Rugby school), John Wesley (the founder of Methodism), J.H. (Cardinal) Newman, T.H. Huxley, and the writings on progressive schooling by A.S. Neill (of Summerhill school). Some textbooks even include extracts from the writings or recorded sayings of such figures as Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin, and Jesus of Nazareth (for the latter three, in works spanning more than half a century, see Ulich, 1950, and Murphy, 2006). Books and extracts in this genre—which elsewhere I have called “cultured reflection on education”—are often used in teacher-training courses that march under the banner of “educational foundations”, “introduction to educational thought”, or “introduction to philosophy of education”.

Third, there are a number of educational theorists and researchers, whose field of activity is not philosophy but—for example—might be human development or learning theory, who in their technical work and sometimes in their non-technical books and reflective essays explicitly raise philosophical issues or adopt philosophical modes of argumentation—and do so in ways worthy of careful study. If philosophy (including philosophy of education) is defined so as to include analysis and reflection at an abstract or “meta-level”, which undoubtedly is a domain where many philosophers labor, then these individuals should have a place in the annals of philosophy or philosophy of education; but too often, although not always, accounts of the field ignore them. Their work might be subjected to scrutiny for being educationally important, but their conceptual or philosophical contributions are rarely focused upon. (Philosophers of the physical and biological sciences are far less prone to make this mistake about the meta-level work of reflective scientists in these domains.)

The educational theorists and researchers I have in mind as exemplars here are the behaviorist psychologist B.F. Skinner (who among other things wrote about the fate of the notions of human freedom and dignity in the light of the development of a “science of behavior”, and who developed a model of human action and also of learning that eschewed the influence of mental entities such as motives, interests, and ideas and placed the emphasis instead upon “schedules of reinforcement”); the foundational figure in modern developmental psychology with its near-fixation on stage theories, Jean Piaget (who developed in an abstract and detailed manner a “genetic epistemology” that was related to his developmental research); and the social psychologist Lev Vygotsky (who argued that the development of the human youngster was indelibly shaped by social forces, so much so that approaches which focused on the lone individual and that were biologically-oriented—he had Piaget in mind here—were quite inadequate).

Fourth, and in contrast to the group above, there is a type of work that is traditionally but undeservedly given a prominent place in the annals of philosophy of education, and which thereby generates a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding about the field. These are the books and reflective essays on educational topics that were written by mainstream philosophers, a number of whom are counted among the greatest in the history of the discipline. The catch is this: Even great philosophers do not always write philosophy! The reflections being referred-to contain little if any philosophical argumentation, and usually they were not intended to be contributions to the literature on any of the great philosophical questions. Rather, they expressed the author's views (or even prejudices) on educational rather than philosophical problems, and sometimes—as in the case of Bertrand Russell's rollicking pieces defending progressive educational practices—they explicitly were “potboilers” written to make money. (In Russell's case the royalties were used to support a progressive school he was running with his current wife.) Locke, Kant, and Hegel also are among those who produced work of this genre.

John Locke is an interesting case in point. He had been requested by a cousin and her husband—possibly in part because of his medical training—to give advice on the upbringing of their son and heir; the youngster seems to have troubled his parents, most likely because he had learning difficulties. Locke, then in exile in Europe, wrote the parents a series of letters in which alongside sensible advice about such matters as the priorities in the education of a landed gentleman, and about making learning fun for the boy, there were a few strange items such as the advice that the boy should wear leaky shoes in winter so that he would be toughened-up! The letters eventually were printed in book form under the title Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), and seem to have had enormous influence down the ages upon educational practice; after two centuries the book had run through some 35 English editions and well over thirty foreign editions, and it is still in print and is frequently excerpted in books of readings in philosophy of education. In stark contrast, several of Locke's major philosophical writings—the Essay Concerning Human Understanding , and the Letter on Toleration —have been overlooked by most educational theorists over the centuries, even though they have enormous relevance for educational philosophy, theory, policy, and practice. It is especially noteworthy that the former of these books was the foundation for an approach to psychology—associationism—that thrived during the nineteenth century. In addition it stimulated interest in the processes of child development and human learning; Locke's model of the way in which the “blank tablet” of the human mind became “furnished” with simple ideas that were eventually combined or abstracted in various ways to form complex ideas, suggested to some that it might be fruitful to study this process in the course of development of a young child (Cleverley and Phillips, 1986).

Fifth, and finally, there is a large body of work that clearly falls within the more technically-defined domain of philosophy of education. Three historical giants of the field are Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey, and there are a dozen or more who would be in competition for inclusion along with them; the short-list of leading authors from the second-half of the 20 th century would include Richard Peters, Paul Hirst, and Israel Scheffler, with many jostling for the next places—but the choices become cloudy as we approach the present-day, for schisms between philosophical schools have to be negotiated.

It is important to note, too, that there is a sub-category within this domain of literature that is made-up of work by philosophers who are not primarily identified as philosophers of education, and who might or might not have had much to say directly about education, but whose philosophical work has been drawn upon by others and applied very fruitfully to educational issues. (A volume edited by Amelie Rorty contains essays on the education-related thought, or relevance, of many historically-important philosophers; significantly the essays are almost entirely written by philosophers rather than by members of the philosophy of education community. This is both their strength and weakness. See Rorty, 1998.)

The discussion will turn briefly to the difficulty in picturing the topography of the field that is presented by the influence of these philosophers.

As sketched earlier, the domain of education is vast, the issues it raises are almost overwhelmingly numerous and are of great complexity, and the social significance of the field is second to none. These features make the phenomena and problems of education of great interest to a wide range of socially-concerned intellectuals, who bring with them their own favored conceptual frameworks—concepts, theories and ideologies, methods of analysis and argumentation, metaphysical and other assumptions, criteria for selecting evidence that has relevance for the problems that they consider central, and the like. No wonder educational discourse has occasionally been likened to Babel, for the differences in backgrounds and assumptions means that there is much mutual incomprehension. In the midst of the melee sit the philosophers of education.

It is no surprise, then, to find that the significant intellectual and social trends of the past few centuries, together with the significant developments in philosophy, all have had an impact on the content and methods of argument in philosophy of education—Marxism, psycho-analysis, existentialism, phenomenology, positivism, post-modernism, pragmatism, neo-liberalism, the several waves of feminism, analytic philosophy in both its ordinary language and more formal guises, are merely the tip of the iceberg. It is revealing to note some of the names that were heavily-cited in a pair of recent authoritative handbooks in the field (according to the indices of the two volumes, and in alphabetical order): Adorno, Aristotle, Derrida, Descartes, Dewey, Habermas, Hegel, Horkheimer, Kant, Locke, Lyotard, Marx, Mill, Nietzsche, Plato, Rawls, Richard Rorty, Rousseau, and Wittgenstein (Curren 2003; Blake, Smeyers, Smith, and Standish 2003). Although this list conveys something of the diversity of the field, it fails to do it complete justice, for the influence of feminist philosophers is not adequately represented.

No one individual can have mastered work done by such a range of figures, representing as they do a number of quite different frameworks or approaches; and relatedly no one person stands as emblematic of the entire field of philosophy of education, and no one type of philosophical writing serves as the norm, either. At professional meetings, peace often reigns because the adherents of the different schools go their separate ways; but occasionally there are (intellectually) violent clashes, rivaling the tumult that greeted Derrida's nomination for an honorary degree at Cambridge in 1992. It is sobering to reflect that only a few decades have passed since practitioners of analytic philosophy of education had to meet in individual hotel rooms, late at night, at annual meetings of the Philosophy of Education Society in the USA, because phenomenologists and others barred their access to the conference programs; their path to liberation was marked by discord until, eventually, the compromise of “live and let live” was worked out (Kaminsky, 1996). Of course, the situation has hardly been better in the home discipline; an essay in Time magazine in 1966 on the state of the discipline of philosophy reported that adherents of the major philosophical schools “don't even understand one another”, and added that as a result “philosophy today is bitterly segregated. Most of the major philosophy departments and scholarly journals are the exclusive property of one sect or another” ( Time , reprinted in Lucas, 1969, 32). Traditionally there has been a time-lag for developments in philosophy to migrate over into philosophy of education, but in this respect at least the two fields have been on a par.

Inevitably, however, traces of discord remain, and some groups still feel disenfranchised, but they are not quite the same groups as a few decades ago—for new intellectual paradigms have come into existence, and their adherents are struggling to have their voices heard; and clearly it is the case that—reflecting the situation in 1966—many analytically-trained philosophers of education find postmodern writings incomprehensible while scholars in the latter tradition are frequently dismissive if not contemptuous of work done by the former group. In effect, then, the passage of time has made the field more—and not less—diffuse. All this is evident in a volume published in 1995 in which the editor attempted to break-down borders by initiating dialogue between scholars with different approaches to philosophy of education; her introductory remarks are revealing:

Philosophers of education reflecting on the parameters of our field are faced not only with such perplexing and disruptive questions as: What counts as Philosophy of Education and why?; but also Who counts as a philosopher of education and why?; and What need is there for Philosophy of Education in a postmodern context? Embedded in these queries we find no less provocative ones: What knowledge, if any, can or should be privileged and why?; and Who is in a position to privilege particular discursive practices over others and why? Although such questions are disruptive, they offer the opportunity to take a fresh look at the nature and purposes of our work and, as we do, to expand the number and kinds of voices participating in the conversation. (Kohli, 1995, xiv).

There is an inward-looking tone to the questions posed here: Philosophy of education should focus upon itself, upon its own contents, methods, and practitioners. And of course there is nothing new about this; for one thing, almost forty years ago a collection of readings—with several score of entries—was published under the title What is Philosophy of Education? (Lucas, 1969). It is worth noting, too, that the same attitude is not unknown in philosophy; Simmel is reputed to have said a century or so ago that philosophy is its own first problem.

Having described the general topography of the field of philosophy of education, the focus can change to pockets of activity where from the perspective of this author interesting philosophical work is being, or has been, done—and sometimes this work has been influential in the worlds of educational policy or practice. It is appropriate to start with a discussion of the rise and partial decline—but lasting influence of—analytic philosophy of education This approach (often called “APE” by both admirers and detractors) dominated the field in the English-speaking world for several decades after the second world war, and its eventual fate throws light on the current intellectual climate.

2. Analytic philosophy of education, and its influence

Conceptual analysis, careful assessment of arguments, the rooting out of ambiguity, the drawing of clarifying distinctions—which make up part at least of the philosophical analysis package—have been respected activities within philosophy from the dawn of the field. But traditionally they stood alongside other philosophical activities; in the Republic , for example, Plato was sometimes analytic, at other times normative, and on occasion speculative/metaphysical. No doubt it somewhat over-simplifies the complex path of intellectual history to suggest that what happened in the twentieth century—early on, in the home discipline itself, and with a lag of a decade or more in philosophy of education—is that philosophical analysis came to be viewed by some scholars as being the major philosophical activity (or set of activities), or even as being the only viable or reputable activity (for metaphysics was judged to be literally vacuous, and normative philosophy was viewed as being unable to provide compelling warrants for whatever moral and ethical positions were being advocated).

So, although analytic elements in philosophy of education can be located throughout intellectual history back to the ancient world, the pioneering work in the modern period entirely in an analytic mode was the short monograph by C.D. Hardie, Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory (1941; reissued in 1962). In his Introduction, Hardie (who had studied with C.D. Broad and I.A. Richards) made it clear that he was putting all his eggs into the ordinary-language-analysis basket:

The Cambridge analytical school, led by Moore, Broad and Wittgenstein, has attempted so to analyse propositions that it will always be apparent whether the disagreement between philosophers is one concerning matters of fact, or is one concerning the use of words, or is, as is frequently the case, a purely emotive one. It is time, I think, that a similar attitude became common in the field of educational theory. (Hardie, 1962, xix)

The first object of his analytic scrutiny in the book was the view that “a child should be educated according to Nature”; he teased apart and critiqued various things that writers through the ages could possibly have meant by this, and very little remained standing by the end of the chapter. Then some basic ideas of Herbart and Dewey were subjected to similar treatment. Hardie's hard-nosed approach can be illustrated by the following: One thing that educationists mean by “education according to Nature” (later he turns to other things they might mean) is that “the teacher should thus act like a gardener” who fosters natural growth of his plants and avoids doing anything “unnatural”(Hardie, 1962, 3). He continues:

The crucial question for such a view of education is how far does this analogy hold? There is no doubt that there is some analogy between the laws governing the physical development of the child and the laws governing the development of a plant, and hence there is some justification for the view if applied to physical education. But the educationists who hold this view are not generally very much concerned with physical education, and the view is certainly false if applied to mental education. For some of the laws that govern the mental changes which take place in a child are the laws of learning …. [which] have no analogy at all with the laws which govern the interaction between a seed and its environment. (Hardie, 1962, 4)

About a decade after the end of the Second World War the floodgates opened and a stream of work in the analytic mode appeared; the following is merely a sample. D.J. O'Connor published An Introduction to Philosophy of Education (1957) in which, among other things, he argued that the word “theory” as it is used in educational contexts is merely a courtesy title, for educational theories are nothing like what bear this title in the natural sciences; Israel Scheffler, who became the paramount philosopher of education in North America, produced a number of important works including The Language of Education (1960), that contained clarifying and influential analyses of definitions (he distinguished reportive, stipulative, and programmatic types) and the logic of slogans (often these are literally meaningless, and should be seen as truncated arguments); Smith and Ennis edited the volume Language and Concepts in Education (1961); and R.D. Archambault edited Philosophical Analysis and Education (1965), consisting of essays by a number of British writers who were becoming prominent—most notably R.S. Peters (whose status in Britain paralleled that of Scheffler in the USA), Paul Hirst, and John Wilson. Topics covered in the Archambault volume were typical of those that became the “bread and butter” of analytic philosophy of education throughout the English-speaking world—education as a process of initiation, liberal education, the nature of knowledge, types of teaching, and instruction versus indoctrination.

Among the most influential products of APE was the analysis developed by Hirst and Peters (1970), and Peters (1973), of the concept of education itself. Using as a touchstone “normal English usage”, it was concluded that a person who has been educated (rather than instructed or indoctrinated) has been (i) changed for the better; (ii) this change has involved the acquisition of knowledge and intellectual skills, and the development of understanding; and (iii) the person has come to care for, or be committed to, the domains of knowledge and skill into which he or she has been initiated. The method used by Hirst and Peters comes across clearly in their handling of the analogy with the concept of “reform”, one they sometimes drew upon for expository purposes. A criminal who has been reformed has changed for the better, and has developed a commitment to the new mode of life (if one or other of these conditions does not hold, a speaker of standard English would not say the criminal has been reformed). Clearly the analogy with reform breaks down with respect to the knowledge and understanding conditions. Elsewhere Peters developed the fruitful notion of “education as initiation”.

The concept of indoctrination was also of great interest to analytic philosophers of education, for—it was argued—getting clear about precisely what constitutes indoctrination also would serve to clarify the border that demarcates it from acceptable educational processes. Unfortunately, ordinary language analysis did not lead to unanimity of opinion about where this border was located, and rival analyses of the concept were put forward (Snook, 1972). Thus, whether or not an instructional episode was a case of indoctrination was determined by: the content that had been taught; or by the intention of the instructor; or by the methods of instruction that had been used; or by the outcomes of the instruction; or, of course, by some combination of these. Adherents of the different analyses used the same general type of argument to make their case, namely, appeal to normal and aberrant usage. Two examples will be sufficient to make the point: (i) The first criterion mentioned above—the nature of the content being imparted—was supported by an argument that ran roughly as follows: “If some students have learned, as factual, some material that is patently incorrect (like ‘The capital city of Canada is Washington D.C.’), then they must have been indoctrinated. This conclusion is reinforced by the consideration that we would never say students must have been indoctrinated if they believe an item that is correct!” However, both portions of this argument have been challenged. (ii) The method criterion—how the knowledge was imparted to the students—usually was supported by an argument that, while different, clearly paralleled the previous one in its logic. It ran roughly like this: “We never would say that students had been indoctrinated by their teacher if he or she had fostered open inquiry and discussion, encouraged exploration in the library and on the net, allowed students to work in collaborative groups, and so on. However, if the teacher did not allow independent inquiry, quashed classroom questions, suppressed dissenting opinions, relied heavily on rewards and punishments, used repetition and fostered rote memorization, and so on, then it is likely we would say the students were being indoctrinated”. (The deeper issue in this second example is that the first method of teaching allows room for the operation of the learners' rationality, while the second method does not. Siegel, 1988, stresses this in his discussion of indoctrination.)

After a period of dominance, for a number of important reasons the influence of APE went into decline. First, there were growing criticisms that the work of analytic philosophers of education had become focused upon minutiae and in the main was bereft of practical import; I can offer as illustration a presidential address at a US Philosophy of Education Society annual meeting that was an hour-long discourse on the various meanings of the expression “I have a toothache”. (It is worth noting that the 1966 article in Time , cited earlier, had put forward the same criticism of mainstream philosophy.) Second, in the early 1970's radical students in Britain accused the brand of linguistic analysis practiced by R.S. Peters of conservatism, and of tacitly giving support to “traditional values”—they raised the issue of whose English usage was being analyzed?

Third, criticisms of language analysis in mainstream philosophy had been mounting for some time, and finally after a lag of many years were reaching the attention of philosophers of education. There even had been a surprising degree of interest in this arcane topic on the part of the general reading public in the UK as early as 1959, when Gilbert Ryle, editor of the journal Mind , refused to commission a review of Ernest Gellner's Words and Things (1959)—a detailed and quite acerbic critique of Wittgenstein's philosophy and its espousal of ordinary language analysis. (Ryle argued that Gellner's book was too insulting, a view that drew Bertrand Russell into the fray on Gellner's side—in the daily press, no less; Russell produced examples of insulting remarks drawn from the work of great philosophers of the past. See Mehta, 1963)

Richard Peters had been given warning that all was not well with APE at a conference in Canada in 1966; after delivering a paper on “The aims of education: A conceptual inquiry” that was based on ordinary language analysis, a philosopher in the audience (William Dray) asked Peters “ whose concepts do we analyze?” Dray went on to suggest that different people, and different groups within society, have different concepts of education. Five years before the radical students raised the same issue, Dray pointed to the possibility that what Peters had presented under the guise of a “logical analysis” was nothing but the favored usage of a certain class of persons—a class that Peters happened to identify with. (See Peters, 1973, where to the editor's credit the interaction with Dray is reprinted.)

Fourth, during the decade of the seventies when these various critiques of analytic philosophy were in the process of eroding its luster, a spate of translations from the Continent stimulated some philosophers of education in Britain and North America to set out in new directions, and to adopt a new style of writing and argumentation. Key works by Gadamer, Foucault, and Derrida appeared in English, and these were followed in 1984 by Lyotard's foundational work on The Postmodern Condition . The classic works of Heidegger and Husserl also found new admirers; and feminist philosophers of education were finding their voices—Maxine Greene published a number of pieces in the 1970s; the influential book by Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education , appeared the same year as the work by Lyotard, followed a year later by Jane Roland Martin's Reclaiming a Conversation . APE was no longer the center of interest.

By the 1980s, the rather simple if not simplistic ordinary language analysis practiced in philosophy of education, was reeling under the attack from the combination of forces sketched above, but the analytic spirit lived on in the form of rigorous work done in other specialist areas of philosophy—work that trickled out and took philosophy of education in rich new directions. Technically-oriented epistemology, philosophy of science, and even metaphysics, flourished; as did the interrelated fields of social, political and moral philosophy. John Rawls published A Theory of Justice in 1971; a decade later MacIntyre's After Virtue appeared; and in another decade or so there was a flood of work on individualism, communitarianism, democratic citizenship, inclusion, exclusion, rights of children versus rights of parents, rights of groups (such as the Amish) versus rights of the larger polity. From the early 1990s philosophers of education have contributed significantly to the debates on these and related topics—indeed, this corpus of work illustrates that good philosophy of education flows seamlessly into work being done in mainstream areas of philosophy. Illustrative examples are Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy , Callan (1997); The Demands of Liberal Education , Levinson (1999); Social Justice and School Choice , Brighouse (2000); and Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education , Reich (2002). These works stand shoulder-to-shoulder with semi-classics on the same range of topics by Gutmann, Kymlicka, Macedo, and others. An excerpt from the book by Callan nicely illustrates that the analytic spirit lives on in this body of work; the broader topic being pursued is the status of the aims of education in a pluralistic society where there can be deep fundamental disagreements:

… the distinction must be underlined between the ends that properly inform political education and the extent to which we should tolerate deviations from those ends in a world where reasonable and unreasonable pluralism are entangled and the moral costs of coercion against the unreasonable variety are often prohibitive. Our theoretical as well as our commonsense discourse do not always respect the distinction…. If some of the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church conflict with our best theory of the ends of civic education, it does not follow that we have any reason to revise our theory; but neither does it mean we have any reason to impose these ends on Catholic schools and the families that they serve. (Callan, 1997, 44)

Callan and White (2003) have given an analysis of why the topics described above have become such a focus of attention. “What has been happening in philosophy of education in recent years”, they argue, mirrors “a wider self-examination in liberal societies themselves”. World events, from the fall of communism to the spread of ethnic conflicts “have all heightened consciousness of the contingency of liberal politics”. A body of work in philosophy, from the early Rawls on, has systematically examined (and critiqued) the foundations of liberalism, and philosophy of education has been drawn into the debates. Callan and White mention communitarianism as offering perhaps “the most influential challenge” to liberalism, and they write:

The debate between liberals and communitarians is far more than a theoretical diversion for philosophers and political scientists. At stake are rival understandings of what makes human lives and the societies in which they unfold both good and just, and derivatively, competing conceptions of the education needed for individual and social betterment. (Callan and White, 2003, 95-96)

It should be appended here that it is not only “external” world events that have stimulated this body of work; events internal to a number of democratic societies also have been significant. To cite one example that is prominent in the literature in North America at least, the US Supreme Court issued a ruling ( Wisconsin v. Yoder ) in which members of the Amish sect were allowed to withdraw their children from public schools before they had reached the age of sixteen—for, it had been argued, any deeper education would endanger the existence of the group and its culture. In assessing this decision—as of course philosophers have frequently done (see, for example, Kymlicka, 1995)—a balance has to be achieved between (i) the interest of civic society in having an informed, well-educated, participatory citizenry; (ii) the interest of the Amish as a group in preserving their own culture; and (iii) the interests of the Amish children, who have a right to develop into autonomous individuals who can make reflective decisions for themselves about the nature of the life they wish to lead. These are issues that fall squarely in the domain covered by the works mentioned above.

So much work is being produced on the complex and interrelated issues just outlined, that in a different context it seemed fair for me to remark (descriptively, and not judgmentally) that a veritable cottage industry had sprung up in post-Rawlsian philosophy of education. There are, of course, other areas of activity, where interesting contributions are being made, and the discusion will next turn to a sampling of these.

3. Other areas of contemporary activity

As was stressed at the outset, and illustrated with a cursory listing of examples, the field of education is huge and contains within it a virtually inexhaustible number of issues that are of philosophical interest. To attempt comprehensive coverage of how philosophers of education have been working within this thicket would be a quixotic task for a large single volume, and is out of the question for a solitary encyclopedia entry. Nevertheless, a valiant attempt to give an overview was made in the recent A Companion to the Philosophy of Education (Curren, 2003), which contained more than six-hundred pages divided into fourty-five chapters each of which surveyed a subfield of work. The following random selection of chapter topics gives a sense of the enormous scope of the field: Sex education, special education, science education, aesthetic education, theories of teaching and learning, religious education, knowledge and truth in learning, cultivating reason, the measurement of learning, multicultural education, education and the politics of identity, education and standards of living, motivation and classroom management, feminism, critical theory, postmodernism, romanticism, purposes of universities in a fluid age, affirmative action in higher education, and professional education.

There is no non-arbitrary way to select a small number of topics for further discussion, nor can the topics that are chosen be pursued in great depth. The choice of those below has been made with an eye to filling out—and deepening—the topographical account of the field that was presented in the preceding sections. The discussion will open with a topic that was not included in the Companion , despite it being one that is of great concern across the academic educational community, and despite it being one where adherents of some of the rival schools of philosophy (and philosophy of education) have had lively exchanges.

The educational research enterprise has been criticized for a century or more by politicians, policymakers, administrators, curriculum developers, teachers, philosophers of education, and by researchers themselves—but the criticisms have been contradictory. Charges of being “too ivory tower and theory-oriented” are found alongside “too focused on practice and too atheoretical”; but particularly since publication of the book by Stokes mentioned earlier, and also in light of the views of John Dewey and William James that the function of theory is to guide intelligent practice and problem-solving, it is becoming more fashionable to hold that the “theory v. practice” dichotomy is a false one.

A similar trend can be discerned with respect to the long warfare between two rival groups of research methods—on one hand quantitative/statistical approaches to research, and on the other hand the qualitative/ethnographic family. (The choice of labels here is its not entirely risk-free, for they have been contested; furthermore the first approach is quite often associated with “experimental” studies, and the latter with “case studies”, but this is an over-simplification.) For several decades these two rival methodological camps were treated by researchers and a few philosophers of education as being rival paradigms (Kuhn's ideas, albeit in a very loose form, have been influential in the field of educational research), and the dispute between them was commonly referred-to as “the paradigm wars”. In essence the issue at stake was epistemolgical: members of the quantitative/experimental camp believed that only their methods could lead to well-warranted knowledge claims, especially about the causal factors at play in educational phenomena, and on the whole they regarded qualitative methods as lacking in rigor; on the other hand the adherents of qualitative/ethnographic approaches held that the other camp was too “positivistic” and was operating with an inadequate view of causation in human affairs—one that ignored the role of motives and reasons, possession of relevant background knowledge, awareness of cultural norms, and the like. Few if any commentators in the “paradigm wars” suggested that there was anything prohibiting the use of both approaches in the one research program—provided that if both were used, they only were used sequentially or in parallel, for they were underwritten by different epistemologies and hence could not be blended together. But recently the trend has been towards rapprochement, towards the view that the two methodological families are, in fact, compatible and are not at all like paradigms in the Kuhnian sense(s) of the term; the melding of the two approaches is often called “mixed methods research”, and it is growing in popularity. (For more detailed discussion of these “wars” see Howe, 2003, and Phillips, 2008.)

The most lively contemporary debates about education research, however, were set in motion around the turn of the millenium when the US Federal Government moved in the direction of funding only rigorously scientific educational research—the kind that could establish causal factors which could then guide the development of practically effective policies. (It was held that such a causal knowledge base was available for medical decisionmaking.) The definition of “rigorously scientific”, however, was decided by politicans and not by the research community, and it was given in terms of the use of a specific research method—the net effect being that the only research projects to receive Federal funding were those that carried out randomized controlled experiments or field trials (RFTs). It has beome common over the last decade to refer to the RFT as the “gold standard” methodology.

The National Research Council (NRC)—an arm of the U.S. National Academies of Science—issued a report, influenced by postpostivistic philosophy of science (NRC, 2002), that argued this criterion was far too narrow. Numerous essays have appeared subsequently that point out how the “gold standard” account of scientific rigor distorts the history of science, how the complex nature of the relation between evidence and policy-making has been distorted and made to appear overly simple (for instance the role of value-judgments in linking empirical findings to policy directives is often overlooked), and qualitative researchers have insisted upon the scientific nature of their work.

Nevertheless, and possibly because it tried to be balanced and supported the use of RFTs in some research contexts, the NRC report has been the subject of symposia in four journals, where it has been supported by a few and attacked from a variety of philosophical fronts: Its authors were positivists, they erroneously believed that educational inquiry could be value-neutral and that it could ignore the ways in which exercise of power constrains the research process, they misunderstood the nature of educational phenomena, they were guilty of advocating “your father's paradigm”(clearly this was not intended as a compliment). One critic with postmodernist leanings asserted that educational research should move “toward a Nietzschean sort of ‘unnatural science’ that leads to greater health by fostering ways of knowing that escape normativity”—a suggestion that evokes the reaction discussed in Section 1.3 above, namely, one of incomprehension on the part of most researchers and those philosophers of education who work within a different tradition where a “way of knowing”, in order to be a “way”, must inevitably be normative.

The final complexity in the debates over the nature of educational research is that there are some respected members of the philosophy of education community who claim, along with Carr, that “the forms of human association characteristic of educational engagement are not really apt for scientific or empirical study at all” (Carr, 2003, 54-5). His reasoning is that educational processes cannot be studied empirically because they are processes of “normative initiation”—a position that as it stands begs the question by not making clear why such processes cannot be studied empirically.

The issue of what should be taught to students at all levels of education—the issue of curriculum content—obviously is a fundamental one, and it is an extraordinarily difficult one with which to grapple. In tackling it, care needs to be taken to distinguish between education and schooling—for although education can occur in schools, so can mis-education (as Dewey pointed out), and many other things can take place there that are educationally orthogonal (such as the provision of free or subsidized lunches, or the development of social networks); and it also must be recognized that education can occur in the home, in libraries and museums, in churches and clubs, in solitary interaction with the public media, and the like.

In developing a curriculum (whether in a specific subject area, or more broadly as the whole range of offerings in an educational institution or in a system), a number of difficult decisions need to be made. Issues such as the proper ordering or sequencing of topics in the chosen subject, the time to be allocated to each topic, the lab work or excursions or projects that are appropriate for particular topics, can all be regarded as technical issues best resolved either by educationists who have a depth of experience with the target age group or by experts in the psychology of learning and the like. But there are deeper issues, ones concerning the validity of the justifications that have been given for including particular subjects or topics in the offerings of formal educational institutions. (Why is evolution included, or excluded, as a topic within the standard high school subject Biology? Why is Driver Education part of the high school curriculum, and methods of birth control usually not—even though sex has an impact on the life of teenagers that at least is comparable to the impact of car-driving? Is the justification that is given for teaching Economics in some schools coherent and convincing? Does the justification for not including the Holocaust or the phenomenon of wartime atrocities in the curriculum in some countries stand up to critical scrutiny?)

The different justifications for particular items of curriculum content that have been put forward by philosophers and others since Plato's brilliant pioneering efforts all draw upon, explicitly or implicitly, the positions that the respective theorists hold about at least three sets of issues. First, what are the aims and/or functions of education (aims and functions are not necessarily the same), or alternatively, what constitutes the good life and human flourishing. These two formulations are related, for presumably our educational institutions should aim to equip individuals to pursue this good life. Thus, for example, if our view of human flourishing includes the capacity to act rationally and/or autonomously, then the case can be made that educational institutions—and their curricula—should aim to prepare, or help to prepare, autonomous individuals. How this is to be done, of course, is not immediately obvious, and much philosophical ink has been spilled on the matter. One influential line of argument was developed by Paul Hirst, who argued that knowledge is essential for developing a conception of the good life, and then for pursuing it; and because logical analysis shows—he argued—that there are seven basic forms of knowledge, the case can be made that the function of the curriculum is to introduce students to each of these forms. Luckily for Hirst, the typical British high school day was made up of seven instructional periods. (Hirst, 1965; for a critique see Phillips, 1987, ch.11.)

Second, is it justifiable to treat the curriculum of an educational institution as vehicle for furthering the socio-political interests and goals of a ruler or ruling class; and relatedly, is it justifiable to design the curriculum so that it serves as a medium of control or of social engineering? In the closing decades of the twentieth century there were numerous discussions of curriculum theory, particularly from Marxist and postmodern perspectives, that offered the sobering analysis that in many educational systems, including those in Western democracies, the curriculum did indeed reflect, and serve, the interests of the ruling class. Michael Apple is typical:

… the knowledge that now gets into schools is already a choice from a much larger universe of possible social knowledge and principles. It is a form of cultural capital that comes from somewhere, that often reflects the perspectives and beliefs of powerful segments of our social collectivity. In its very production and dissemination as a public and economic commodity—as books, films, materials, and so forth—it is repeatedly filtered through ideological and economic commitments. Social and economic values, hence, are already embedded in the design of the institutions we work in, in the ‘formal corpus of school knowledge’ we preserve in our curricula….(Apple, 1990, 8-9)

Third, should educational programs at the elementary and secondary levels be made up of a number of disparate offerings, so that individuals with different interests and abilities and affinities for learning can pursue curricula that are suitable? Or should every student pursue the same curriculum as far as each is able—a curriculum, it should be noted, that in past cases nearly always was based on the needs or interests of those students who were academically inclined or were destined for elite social roles. Mortimer Adler and others in the late twentieth century (who arguably were following Plato's lead in the Republic ), sometimes used the aphorism “the best education for the best is the best education for all”.

The thinking here can be explicated in terms of the analogy of an out-of-control virulent disease, for which there is only one type of medicine available; taking a large dose of this medicine is extremely beneficial, and the hope is that taking only a little—while less effective—is better than taking none at all! Medically, this probably is dubious, while the educational version—forcing students to work, until they exit the system, on topics that do not interest them and for which they have no facility or motivation—has even less merit. (For a critique of Adler and his Paideia Proposal , see Noddings, 2007.) It is interesting to compare the modern “one curriculum track for all” position with Plato's system outlined in the Republic , according to which all students—and importantly this included girls—set out on the same course of study. Over time, as they moved up the educational ladder it would become obvious that some had reached the limit imposed upon them by nature, and they would be directed off into appropriate social roles in which they would find fulfillment, for their abilities would match the demands of these roles. Those who continued on with their education would eventually be able to contemplate the metaphysical realm of the “forms”, thanks to their advanced training in mathematics and philosophy. Having seen the form of the Good, they would be eligible after a period of practical experience to become members of the ruling class of Guardians.

Plato's educational scheme was guided, presumably, by the understanding he thought he had achieved of the transcendental realm of fixed “forms”. John Dewey, ever a strong critic of positions that were not naturalistic, or that incorporated a priori premises, commented as follows:

Plato's starting point is that the organization of society depends ultimately upon knowledge of the end of existence. If we do not know its end, we shall be at the mercy of accident and caprice…. And only those who have rightly trained minds will be able to recognize the end, and ordering principle of things. (Dewey, 1916, 102-3)

Furthermore, as Dewey again put it, Plato “had no perception of the uniqueness of individuals…. they fall by nature into classes”, which masks the “infinite diversity of active tendencies” which individuals harbor (104). In addition, Plato tended to talk of learning using the passive language of seeing, which has shaped our discourse down to the present (witness “Now I see it!” when a difficult point has become clear).

In contrast, for Dewey each individual was an organism situated in a biological and social environment in which problems were constantly emerging, forcing the individual to reflect and act, and learn. Dewey, following William James, held that knowledge arises from reflection upon our actions; and the worth of a putative item of knowledge is directly correlated with the problem-solving success of the actions performed under its guidance. Thus Dewey, sharply disagreeing with Plato, regarded knowing as an active rather than a passive affair—a strong theme in his writings is his opposition to what is sometimes called “the spectator theory of knowledge”. All this is made clear enough in a passage containing only a thinly-veiled allusion to Plato's famous analogy of the prisoners in the cave whose eyes are turned to the light by education:

In schools, those under instruction are too customarily looked upon as acquiring knowledge as theoretical spectators, minds which appropriate knowledge by direct energy of intellect. The very word pupil has almost come to mean one who is engaged not in having fruitful experiences but in absorbing knowledge directly. Something which is called mind or consciousness is severed from the physical organs of activity. (164)

This passage also illuminates a passage that many have found puzzling: “philosophy is the theory of education” (387). For in the sentences above it is easy to see the tight link between Dewey's epistemology and his views on education—his anti-spectator epistemology morphs directly into advocacy for anti-spectator learning by students in school—students learn by being active inquirers. Over the past few decades this view of learning has inspired a major tradition of research by educational psychologists, and related theory-development (the “situated cognition” framework); and these bodies of work have in turn led to innovative efforts in curriculum development. (For a discussion of these, see Phillips, 2003.)

The final important difference with Plato is that, for Dewey, each student is an individual who blazes his or her unique trail of growth; the teacher has the task of guiding and facilitating this growth, without imposing a fixed end upon the process. Dewey sometimes uses the term “curriculum” to mean “the funded wisdom of the human race”, the point being that over the course of human history an enormous stock of knowledge and skills has accumulated and the teacher has the task of helping the student to make contact with this repertoire—but helping by facilitating rather than by imposing. (All this, of course, has been the subject of intense discussion among philosophers of education: Does growth imply a direction? Is growth always good—can't a plant end up misshapen, and can't a child develop to become bad? Is Dewey some type of perfectionist? Is his philosophy too vague to offer worthwhile educational guidance? Isn't it possible for a “Deweyan” student to end up without enough relevant knowledge and skills to be able to make a living in the modern world?)

Dewey's work was of central importance for the American progressive education movement in its formative years, although there was a fair degree of misunderstanding of his ideas as progressives interpreted his often extremely dense prose to be saying what they personally happened to believe. Nevertheless, Dewey became the “poster child” or the “house philosopher” of progressive education, and if he didn't make it onto many actual posters he certainly made it onto a postage stamp.

His popularity, however, sharply declined after the Soviets launched Sputnik, for Dewey and progressive education were blamed for the USA losing the race into space (illustrating the point about scapegoating made at the start of this essay). But he did not remain in disgrace for long; and for some time has been the focus of renewed interest—although it is still noticeable that commentators interpret Dewey to be holding views that mirror their own positions or interests. And interestingly, there now is slightly more interest in Dewey on the part of philosophers of education in the UK than there was in earlier years, and there is growing interest by philosophers from the Continent (see, for example, Biesta and Burbules, 2003).

To be a poster child for progressivism, however, is not to be the parent. Rather than to Dewey, that honor must go to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and to his educational novel written in soaring prose, Emile (1762). Starting with the premise that “God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil” (Rousseau, 1955, 5), Rousseau held that contemporary man has been misshapen by his education; the “crushing force” of social conventions has stifled the “Nature within him”. The remedy adopted in the novel is for the young Emile to be taken to his family estate in the country where, away from the corrupting influence of society, and under the watchful eye of his tutor, “everything should … be brought into harmony with these natural tendencies”. (This idea of education according to nature, it will be recalled, was the object of Hardie's analytic attention almost two centuries later.)

Out in the countryside, rather than having a set curriculum that he is forced to follow, Emile learns when some natural stimulus or innate interest motivates him—and under these conditions learning comes easily. He is allowed to suffer the natural consequences of his actions (if he breaks a window, he gets cold; if he takes the gardener's property, the gardener will no longer do him favors), and experiences such as these lead to the development of his moral system. Although Rousseau never intended these educational details to be taken literally as a blueprint (he saw himself as developing and illustrating the basic principles), over the ages there have been attempts to implement them, one being the famous British “free school”, A.S. Neill's Summerhill. (It is worth noting that Neill claimed not to have read Rousseau; but he was working in a milieu in which Rousseau's ideas were well-known—intellectual influence can follow a less than direct path.) Furthermore, over the ages these principles also have proven to be fertile soil for philosophers of education to till.

Even more fertile ground for comment, in recent years, has been Rousseau's proposal for the education of girls, developed in a section of the novel (Book V) that bears the name of the young woman who is destined to be Emile's soul-mate, Sophy. The puzzle has been why Rousseau—who had been so far-sighted in his discussion of Emile's education—was so hide-bound if not retrograde in his thinking about her education. One short quotation is sufficient to illustrate the problem: “If woman is made to please and to be in subjection to man, she ought to make herself pleasing in his eyes and not provoke him …her strength is in her charms” (324).

The educational principles developed by Rousseau and Dewey, and numerous educational theorists and philosophers in the interregnum, are alive and well in the twenty-first century. Of particular contemporary interest is the evolution that has occurred of the progressive idea that each student is an active learner who is pursuing his or her own individual educational path. By incorporating elements of the classical empiricist epistemology of John Locke, this progressive principle has become transformed into the extremely popular position known as constructivism, according to which each student in a classroom constructs his or her own individual body of understandings even when all in the group are given what appears to be the same stimulus or educational experience. (A consequence of this is that a classroom of thirty students will have thirty individually-constructed, and possibly different, bodies of “knowledge”, in addition to that of the teacher!) There is also a solipsistic element here, for constructivists also believe that none of us—teachers included—can directly access the bodies of understandings of anyone else; each of us is imprisoned in a world of our own making. It is an understatement to say that this poses great difficulties for the teacher. The education journals of the past two decades contain many thousands of references to discussions of this position, which elsewhere I claimed has become a type of educational “secular religion”; for reasons that are hard to discern it is particularly influential in mathematics and science education. (For a discussion of the underlying philosophical ideas in constructivism, and for an account of some of its varieties, see the essays in Phillips, ed., 2000.)

As stressed earlier, it is impossible to do justice the whole field of philosophy of education in a single encyclopedia entry. Different countries around the world—France, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, to mention only a few—have their own intellectual traditions, and their own ways of institutionalizing philosophy of education into the academic universe, and no discussion of any of this appears in the present essay. But even in the Anglo-American world, there is such a diversity of approaches to the discipline that any author attempting to produce a synoptic account will quickly run into the borders of his or her areas of competence. Clearly this has happened in the present case.

Fortunately, in the last twenty years or so resources have become available that significantly alleviate these problems. There has been a flood of encyclopedia entries, commenting on the field as a whole or on many specific topics not well-covered in the present essay (see, as a sample, Burbules, 1994; Chambliss, 1996; Phillips, 1985; Siegel, 2007; Smeyers, 1994); two large volumes—a “Guide” (Blake, Smeyers, Smith and Standish, 2003) and a “Companion” (Curren, 2003)—have been produced by Blackwell in their well-known philosophy series; and the same publisher recently released an anthology, with 60 papers considered to be important in the field, and which also are representative of the range of work that is being done (Curren, 2007). Several encyclopedias of philosophy of education have been published or are in the works (for example, Chambliss, 1996; Siegel, 2008); there is a dictionary of key concepts in the field (Winch and Gingell, 1999), and a good textbook or two (see Noddings, 2007); in addition there are numerous volumes both of reprinted selections and of specially commissioned essays on specific topics, some of which were given short shrift in the present work (for another sampling see A. Rorty, 1998; Smeyers and Marshall, 1995; Stone, 1994); and several international journals appear to be flourishing— Educational Philosophy and Theory , Educational Theory , Journal of Philosophy of Education , Studies in Philosophy and Education , Theory and Research in Education . Thus there is enough material available to keep the interested reader busy, and to provide alternative assessments to the ones presented in this present essay.

• Apple, M., 1990, Ideology and Curriculum , New York: Routledge, 2 nd . Editon.
• Archambault, R., (ed.), 1965, Philosophical Analysis and Education , London: Routledge.
• Biesta, G., and Burbules, N., 2003, Pragmatism and Educational Research , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
• Blake, N., Smeyers, P., Smith, R., and Standish, P., (eds.), 2003, The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Brighouse, H., 2000, Social Justice and School Choice , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Burbules, N., 1994, “Marxism and Educational Thought”, in The International Encyclopedia of Education , (Volume 6), T. Husen and N. Postlethwaite (eds.), Oxford: Pergamon, 2 nd . Edition, pp. 3617-22.
• Callan, E., 1997, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy , Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford.
• Callan, E., and White, J., 2003, “Liberalism and Communitarianism”, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education , N. Blake, P. Smeyers, R. Smith and P. Standish (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp.95-109.
• Carr, D., 2003, Making Sense of Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy and Theory of Education and Teaching , London: RoutledgeFalmer.
• Chambliss, J., 1996, “History of Philosophy of Education”, in Philosophy of Education: An Encyclopedia , J. Chambliss (ed.), New York: Garland, pp.461-72.
• Cleverley, J., and Phillips, D.C., 1986, Visions of Childhood , New York: Teachers College Press.
• Curren, R., (ed.), 2003, A Companion to the Philosophy of Education , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Curren, R., (ed.), 2007, Philosophy of Education: An Anthology , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Dewey, J., 1916, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education , New York: Macmillan.
• Gellner, E., 1959, Words and Things , London: Gollancz.
• Hardie, C., 1962, Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory , New York: Teachers College Bureau of Publications.
• Hirst, P., 1965, “Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge”, in Philosophical Analysis and Education , R. Archambault, (ed.), London: Routledge, pp. 113-138.
• Hirst, P., and Peters, R., 1970, The Logic of Education , London: Routledge.
• Howe, K., 2003, Closing Methodological Divides: Toward Democratic Educational Research . Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Kaminsky, J., 1996, “Philosophy of Education: Professional Organizations In”, in Philosophy of Education: An Encyclopedia , J. Chambliss, (ed.), New York: Garland, pp. 475-79.
• Kohli, W., (ed.), 1995, Critical Conversations in Philosophy of Education , New York: Routledge.
• Kymlicka, W., 1995, Multicultural Citizenship , Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford.
• Levinson, M., 1999, The Demands of Liberal Education , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lucas, C., (ed.), 1969, What is Philosophy of Education? London: Macmillan.
• Martin, J., 1985, Reclaiming a Conversation , New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
• Mehta, V., 1963, Fly and the Fly-Bottle : London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
• Murphy, M., (ed.), 2006, The History and Philosophy of Education: Voices of Educational Pioneers , New Jersey: Pearson.
• Noddings, N., 1984, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education , Berkeley: University of California Press.
• –––, 2007, Philosophy of Education , Boulder, CO: Westview, 2 nd . Edition.
• National Research Council (NRC), 2002, Scientific Research in Education , Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
• O'Connor, D., 1957, An Introduction to Philosophy of Education , London: Routledge.
• Peters, R., (ed.), 1973, The Philosophy of Education , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Phillips, D.C., 1985, “Philosophy of Education”, in International Encyclopedia of Education, T. Husen and N. Postletwaite, (eds.), pp.3859-3877.
• –––, 1987, Philosophy, Science, and Social Inquiry , Oxford: Pergamon.
• –––, (ed.), 2000, Constructivism in Education: Opinions and Second Opinions on Controversial Issues , (Series: 99 th . Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• –––, 2003, “Theories of Teaching and Learning”, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Education , R. Curren, (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 232-245.
• –––, 2008, “Empirical Educational Research: Charting Philosophical Disagreements in an Undisciplined Field”, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education , H. Siegel (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press.
• Reich, R., 2002, Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Rorty, A., (ed.), 1998, Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives , New York: Routledge.
• Rousseau, J-J., 1955, Emile , B. Foxley, (tr.), London: Dent/Everyman.
• Scheffler, I., 1960, The Language of Education , Illinois: Thomas.
• Siegel, H., 1988, Educating Reason: rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education , New York: Routledge.
• –––, 2007, “Philosophy of Education”, in Britannica Online Encyclopedia , [ Available online ].
• –––, (ed.), 2008, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education , Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press.
• Smeyers, P., 1994, “Philosophy of Education: Western European Perspectives”, in The International Encyclopedia of Education , (Volume 8), T. Husen and N. Postlethwaite, (eds.), Oxford: Pergamon, 2 nd . Edition, pp. 4456-61.
• Smeyers, P., and Marshall, J., (eds.), 1995, Philosophy and Education: Accepting Wittgenstein's Challenge , Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Smith, B., and Ennis, R., (eds.), 1961, Language and Concepts in Education , Chicago: Rand McNally.
• Snook, I., 1972, Indoctrination and Education , London: Routledge.
• Stokes, D., 1997, Pasteur's Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation , Washington, DC: Brookings.
• Stone, L., (ed.), 1994, The Education Feminism Reader , New York: Routledge.
• Ulich, R., 1954, Three Thousand Years of Educational Wisdom , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Revised Ed.
• Winch, C., and Gingell, J., 1999, Key Concepts in the Philosophy of Education , London: Routledge.
• PES (Philosophy of Education Society, North America)
• PESA (Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia)
• PESGB (Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain)
• INPE (International Network of Philosophers of Education)
• UNESCO/International Bureau of Education: Thinkers on Education

autonomy: personal | -->Dewey, John --> | feminist (interventions): ethics | feminist (interventions): liberal feminism | feminist (interventions): political philosophy | -->feminist (topics): perspectives on autonomy --> | feminist (topics): perspectives on disability | Foucault, Michel | Gadamer, Hans-Georg | liberalism | Locke, John | -->Lyotard, Jean François --> | -->ordinary language --> | Plato | postmodernism | Rawls, John | rights: of children | -->Rousseau, Jean Jacques -->

• Essay on Importance of Education

Importance of Education Essay

Education is one of the key components for an individual’s success. It has the ability to shape one’s life in the right direction. Education is a process of imparting or acquiring knowledge, and developing the powers of reasoning and judgement. It prepares growing children intellectually for a life with more mature understanding and sensitivity to issues surrounding them. It improves not only the personal life of the people but also their community. Thus, one cannot neglect the significance of Education in life and society. Here, we have provided an essay on the Importance of Education. Students can use this essay to prepare for their English exam or as a speech to participate in the school competition.

Importance of Education

The importance of education in life is immense. It facilitates quality learning for people throughout their life. It inculcates knowledge, belief, skill, values and moral habits. It improves the way of living and raises the social and economic status of individuals. Education makes life better and more peaceful. It transforms the personality of individuals and makes them feel confident.

Well said by Nelson Mandela, “Education is the most powerful weapon to change the world”. To elaborate, it is the foundation of the society which brings economic wealth, social prosperity and political stability. It gives power to people to put their views and showcase their real potential. It strengthens democracy by providing citizens with the tools to participate in the governance process. It acts as an integrative force to foster social cohesion and national identity.

In India, education is a constitutional right of every citizen. So, people of any age group, religion, caste, creed and region are free to receive education. An educated person is respected everywhere and well-treated in society. As a kid, every child dreams of being a doctor, lawyer, engineer, actor, sportsperson, etc. These dreams can come true through education. So, investment in education gives the best return. Well-educated people have more opportunities to get a better job which makes them feel satisfied.

In schools, education is divided into different levels, i.e., preschool, primary, secondary and senior secondary. School education comprises traditional learning which provides students with theoretical knowledge. However, now various efforts are being made to establish inbuilt application-based learning by adding numerous experiments, practicals and extracurricular activities to the school curriculum. Students learn to read, write and represent their viewpoints in front of others. Also, in this era of digital Education, anyone can easily access information online at their fingertips. They can learn new skills and enhance their knowledge.

Steps Taken By Government To Promote Education

Education is evidently an important aspect that no government can ignore in order to ensure the equitable development of a nation. Unfortunately, some children still do not have access to education. The Government has thereby taken initiatives to improve education quality and made it accessible to everyone, especially the poor people.

The Government passed the Right to Education Act 2009 (RTE Act 2009) on 4 August 2009. This Act came into effect on 1 April 2010, following which education has become the fundamental right of every child in India. It provides free and compulsory elementary education to children of the age group of 6-14 years in a neighbourhood school within 1 km, up to Class 8 in India. On similar lines, there are other schemes launched by the government, such as Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan , Mid-Day Meal , Adult Education and Skill Development Scheme, National Means cum Merit Scholarship Scheme, National Program for Education of Girls at Elementary Education, Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya, Scheme for Infrastructure Development in Minority Institutions, Beti Bachao , Beti Padhao, etc.

For our country’s growth, we require a well-educated population equipped with the relevant knowledge, attitude and skills. This can be achieved by spreading awareness about the importance of Education in rural areas. There is a famous saying that “If we feed one person, we will eliminate his hunger for only one time. But, if we educate a person, we will change his entire life”. Henceforth he will become capable of earning a livelihood by himself.

This essay on the Importance of Education must have helped students to improve their writing section for the English exam. They can also practice essays on other topics by visiting the CBSE Essay page. Keep learning and stay tuned with BYJU’S for the latest updates on CBSE/ICSE/State Board/Competitive Exams. Also, download the BYJU’S App for interactive study videos.

Frequently Asked Questions on Education Essay

How can the literacy rate in india be increased.

People in rural areas must be informed about the importance of providing education to their children. Also, with the COVID-19 situation, the government should take steps by providing laptops/phones for children to follow online classes.

Are girl children still denied their right to get educated?

Although awareness has now improved, there are still many villages in India where girl children are not provided with proper education or allowed to enrol themselves in schools. This mentality has to change for the betterment of the society.

Teaching subjects/academics alone is enough, or should students be introduced to other forms of educational activities too?

Extracurricular activities, moral value education, etc., are also as important as regular academic teachings.

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Essay on Education for School Students and Children

500+ words essay on education.

Education is an important tool which is very useful in everybody’s life. Education is what differentiates us from other living beings on earth. It makes man the smartest creature on earth. It empowers humans and gets them ready to face challenges of life efficiently. With that being said, education still remains a luxury and not a necessity in our country. Educational awareness needs to be spread through the country to make education accessible. But, this remains incomplete without first analyzing the importance of education. Only when the people realize what significance it holds, can they consider it a necessity for a good life. In this essay on Education, we will see the importance of education and how it is a doorway to success.

Importance of Education

Education is the most significant tool in eliminating poverty and unemployment . Moreover, it enhances the commercial scenario and benefits the country overall. So, the higher the level of education in a country, the better the chances of development are.

In addition, this education also benefits an individual in various ways. It helps a person take a better and informed decision with the use of their knowledge. This increases the success rate of a person in life.

Subsequently, education is also responsible for providing with an enhanced lifestyle. It gives you career opportunities that can increase your quality of life.

Similarly, education also helps in making a person independent. When one is educated enough, they won’t have to depend on anyone else for their livelihood. They will be self-sufficient to earn for themselves and lead a good life.

Above all, education also enhances the self-confidence of a person and makes them certain of things in life. When we talk from the countries viewpoint, even then education plays a significant role. Educated people vote for the better candidate of the country. This ensures the development and growth of a nation.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Doorway to Success

To say that education is your doorway to success would be an understatement. It serves as the key which will unlock numerous doors that will lead to success. This will, in turn, help you build a better life for yourself.

An educated person has a lot of job opportunities waiting for them on the other side of the door. They can choose from a variety of options and not be obligated to do something they dislike. Most importantly, education impacts our perception positively. It helps us choose the right path and look at things from various viewpoints rather than just one.

With education, you can enhance your productivity and complete a task better in comparison to an uneducated person. However, one must always ensure that education solely does not ensure success.

It is a doorway to success which requires hard work, dedication and more after which can you open it successfully. All of these things together will make you successful in life.

In conclusion, education makes you a better person and teaches you various skills. It enhances your intellect and the ability to make rational decisions. It enhances the individual growth of a person.

Education also improves the economic growth of a country . Above all, it aids in building a better society for the citizens of a country. It helps to destroy the darkness of ignorance and bring light to the world.

FAQs on Education

Q.1 Why is Education Important?

A.1 Education is important because it is responsible for the overall development of a person. It helps you acquire skills which are necessary for becoming successful in life.

Q.2 How does Education serve as a Doorway to Success?

A.2 Education is a doorway to success because it offers you job opportunities. Furthermore, it changes our perception of life and makes it better.

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Article contents

John dewey and teacher education.

• Margaret Schmidt Margaret Schmidt Arizona State University
• , and  Randall Everett Allsup Randall Everett Allsup Teachers College Columbia University
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264093.013.475
• Published online: 29 July 2019

John Dewey’s writings on schooling are extensive, and characteristically wide-ranging: teachers are expected to think deeply about knowledge construction, how we think and learn, the purpose of curriculum in the life of the child, and the role of school and societal reform. He worked throughout his life to develop and refine his philosophy of experience, describing all learning as defined by the quality of interactions between the learner and the social and physical environment. According to Dewey, teachers have a responsibility to structure educational environments in ways that promote educative learning experiences, those that change the learner in such a way as to promote continued learning and growth. The capacity to reflect on and make meaning from one’s experiences facilitates this growth, particularly in increasing one’s problem-solving abilities.

While Dewey wrote little that specifically addressed the preparation of teachers, his 1904 essay, “The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education,” makes clear that he grounds his beliefs about teachers’ learning in this same philosophy of experiential learning. Dewey argued that thoughtful reflection on previous and current educational experiences is especially important in teacher preparation; teacher educators could then guide beginners to examine and test the usefulness of the beliefs formed from those experiences. Teacher educators, therefore, have a responsibility to arrange learning environments for beginning teachers to promote sequential experiences leading to increased understanding of how children learn, “how mind answers to mind.” These experiences can then help beginning teachers grow, not as classroom technicians, but as true “students of teaching.”

Dewey’s ideas remain relevant, but must also be viewed in historical context, in light of his unfailing belief in education and the scientific method as ways to promote individual responsibility and eliminate social problems. His vision of a democratic society remains a fearless amalgam of human adaptation, continuity, change, and diversity: public schools are privileged locations in a democracy for the interplay and interrogation of old and new ideas. Teacher preparation and teacher wellbeing are crucial elements; they can provide experiences to educate all children for participation in their present lives in ways that facilitate their growth as citizens able to fully participate in a democracy. Despite criticism about limitations of his work, Dewey’s ideas continue to offer much food for thought, for both research and practice in teacher education.

• teacher preparation
• preservice teachers
• learning from experience
• progressive education

Introduction

Few 20th- and 21st-century philosophers have written as prolifically as John Dewey ( 1859–1952 ), capturing ideas in wide-ranging domains such as nature, psychology, science, politics, metaphysics, ethics, and art. Like the ancients Plato and Confucius, Dewey saw philosophy and education as nearly synonymous. And like Plato and Confucius, Dewey sensed the immense power that education could play in shaping not only the individual, but more importantly, the individual in society. Dewey was exceptional in the importance he placed on education, learning, schools, and teachers.

Although practices and beliefs about the preparation of teachers have continued to evolve in the nearly 70 years since Dewey’s death, his writings are regularly referenced among teacher educators. Our intent in this article is to engage with those ideas that have continuing relevance for teacher education, drawing upon the following seminal writings on teachers and teaching: The School and Society ( 1899 ); The Child and the Curriculum ( 1902 ); How We Think ( 1933 ); Experience and Education ( 1938 ); Moral Principles in Education ( 1909 ); Democracy and Education ( 1916 ); “The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education” (1904a), and several essays. As practicing university music teacher educators, we will use examples from the world of music education that are general enough for any discipline.

To understand Dewey’s ideas about how teachers may best learn to teach, Dewey’s own starting point is first approached—that education, and indeed all learning, cannot be understood apart from experience. Next, Dewey’s description of reflective thinking, by which all learners make meaning from their experiences, is presented. Dewey’s ideas specific to teacher education follow: his understanding of the relationship between educational theory and educational practice, and the sequence of experiences he proposed for pre-service teachers. Dewey’s ideas about teaching methods and learning in laboratories are then discussed. The article concludes with reflections placing Dewey’s writings in historical context, and questions for continued research and practice in the Deweyian tradition.

Learning and Experience

All learning, Dewey ( 1938 , p. 7) believed, results from experience—not just in school, but in the individual’s life beyond school as well. Due to the “intimate and necessary relation between the processes of actual experience and education,” he wanted educators to develop deep understanding of the function of experience in learning. Dewey ( 1933 , 1938 ) defined an experience as an interaction between an individual and the environment, suggesting that all experiences—good and bad—involve doing (how the individual interacts with the environment) and undergoing (how the experience changes the individual). Dewey ( 1938 , p. 13) continually emphasized that, while all students unquestionably have “experiences” in schools, “everything depends upon the quality of the experience which is had.”

The quality of an experience can be judged in relation to two simultaneously occurring processes or principles: interaction and continuity (Dewey, 1938 ). As an individual interacts with her physical environment, she creates insights derived from her interests and curiosities (doing). A child playing the piano for the first time will soon discover gradations of high and low, loud and soft. To her delight, she will soon find out that the pedal somehow makes the sound keep going. But from the standpoint of formal education and requisites of growth, a “quality” experience requires that her discoveries become useful to her needs and her community (undergoing growth in understanding). She needs to be given a place to share and test what she has learned with others, thus affording meaningful contributions to the people around her (Dewey, 1916 , 1938 ). Quality experiences require quality interactions, and teachers are tasked with enriching and enlarging the classroom environment, “in other words, whatever conditions interact with personal needs, desires, purposes, and capacities to create the experience which is had” (Dewey, 1938 , p. 25).

The principle of continuity states that the effect of a “good” or “educative” experience is cumulative and enriching. Dewey is famously paraphrased as saying that the purpose of growth is more growth. But such an oversimplification ignores the critical role that teachers play in helping the learner make sense of what has been discovered so that further growth is not misshaped. Whether on the playground or from a history book, all teachers know that wrong lessons can be learned. For Dewey ( 1933 , 1938 ), mis-educative experiences result in insights that impede further learning, while non-educative experiences fail to connect one experience with another, leaving the learner unchanged or merely incurious. In contrast, educative experiences live on in further experiences. “Hence, the central problem of an education based upon experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences” (Dewey, 1938 , p. 13). A teacher’s work is thus “moral,” because educators are charged with the fraught task of interfering in the incidental nature of most social learning (Dewey, 1909 ). A society trusts teachers to select experiences (via curriculum, via pedagogy) that then produce “quality” growth in “other people’s children” (Delpit, 1995 ). Likewise, according to Dewey, teachers have a moral responsibility to become familiar with their students’ home cultures and design lessons that appeal to their interests (Gay, 2010 ; Ladson-Billings, 1995 ), using conditions in the local community “as educational resources” (Dewey, 1938 , p. 23).

Dewey ( 1938 , p. 5) frequently critiqued what he and others have called “traditional education.” While we admit that the term is both imprecise and problematic, Dewey used it to refer to classrooms where teachers expected students to repeat back whatever isolated knowledge was presented to them for use in some distant future; such experiences, devoid of meaningful connections are at best noneducative, and at worst mis-educative. As music educators, the authors of this article are aware of the many dangers of isolated knowledge; for example, teaching musical notation as if its purpose were self-evident and universal (say), or teaching Western classical art music as if it were a-historical or context-free. As university teacher educators, we have too often seen beginning teachers ask children for solutions to “so-called problems” that are “simply assigned tasks ” (Dewey, 1933 , p. 233) or “activities” (Dewey, 1916 ), rather than genuine problems leading to meaningful insights. Dewey ( 1938 , p. 23, italics in the original) similarly cautioned proponents of “progressive education,” those “parents and some teachers [who seem to be] acting upon the idea of subordinating objective conditions to internal ones.” For Dewey ( 1938 , p. 63, italics in the original), the issue was not “new versus old education;” rather, his concern was “a question of what anything whatever must be to be worthy of the name education .” He believed that a middle, more pragmatic approach could help students use the interactions between their internal inclinations and the external environment to both connect present experiences with past experiences and prepare them for continued future growth. Drawing on the principles of interaction and continuity, teachers could learn “how to utilize the surroundings, physical and social, that exist so as to extract from them all that they have to contribute to building up experiences that are worthwhile” (Dewy, 1938 , p. 22; also, see Hildebrand, 2018 , for a summary of how Dewey developed these philosophical ideas over time.)

Making Meaning Through Reflective Thinking

To further develop the educative potential of experience, Dewey believed that quality of thought is the basis of all meaningful learning, both in school and in life. Dewey identifies three types of thinking: idle thought, belief, and reflection. Idle thought is “inconsequential trifling with mental pictures, random recollections . . . [and] half-developed impressions” (Dewey, 1933 , p. 114). Beliefs are ideas that “are picked up—we know not how” through “tradition, instruction, imitation . . . Even when they happen to be correct, their correctness is a matter of accident as far as the person who entertains them is concerned” (Dewey, 1933 , p. 116). In contrast, reflective thought is the “active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey, 1933 , p. 118). For Dewey, critical or reflective thinking is the only educational aim that can foster freedom of mind and action; he applied this principle equally to the learning and teaching of everyone involved in education, including students, pre-service teachers, and experienced teachers.

Similar to the consummatory experiences in art described by Dewey in his book Art as Experience ( 1934 ), reflective thinking has a kind of rhythm through which insights emerge. The cycle begins with “a perplexed, troubled, or confused situation,” a deviation from the expected situation, that Dewey ( 1933 , p. 200) identifies as a pre- reflective phase; the cycle concludes temporarily in a post -reflective state, a space of intellectual satisfaction—before a new puzzle or trouble reveals itself:

In between, as states of thinking, are (1) suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution; (2) an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity that has been felt (directly experienced) into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought; (3) the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material; (4) the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense in which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and (5) testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action.

Reflecting mindfully about experiences “done” and “undergone” creates growth-enhancing habits , which for Dewey ( 1938 , p. 19) include emotional and intellectual dispositions, as well as “our basic sensitivities and ways of meeting and responding to all the conditions which we meet in living.” A large part of learning—and learning to teach—involves the development of productive attitudes and habits of thought. Both teachers and teacher educators must actively cultivate reflective attitudes of open-mindedness, whole-heartedness, and responsibility with their students. Open-mindedne ss, for Dewey ( 1916 , p. 182), is “accessibility of mind to any and every consideration that will throw light upon the situation that needs to be cleared up, and that will help determine the consequences of acting this way or that,” listening to all sides, and considering “the possibility of error even in the beliefs that are dearest to us” (Dewey, 1933 , p. 136). Whole-hearted involvement in finding a solution or creating meaning, a complete absorption in learning, may be cultivated by experiences that create a sense of suspense in learners, an element of story with “plot interest” (Dewey, 1933 , p. 320). Once a pre-service teacher has considered various reasonable possibilities for resolving a problem, an attitude of intellectual responsibility requires projecting and accepting the consequences of a chosen action, “mak[ing] clear what is involved in really knowing and believing a thing” (Dewey, 1916 , p. 186). Together, open-mindedness, whole-heartedness, and responsibility promote “retention of the capacity to grow” for learners of all ages, as “the reward of such intellectual hospitality” (Dewwy, 1916 , p. 182).

Dewey ( 1916 , p. 183) encouraged educators to welcome diversity of thought, to allow children and preservice teachers time to follow their ideas and make errors, and to resist seeking only “speedy, accurately measurable, correct results”:

Results (external answers or solutions) may not be hurried; processes may not be forced. They take their own time to mature. Were all instructors to realize that the quality of mental process, not the production of correct answers, is the measure of educative growth something hardly less than a revolution in teaching would be worked.

The student’s reasoning while solving a problem was far more important to Dewey than the answer itself. A good math teacher will ask students to show their work. A good art teacher will ask students about their intentions and the problems they encountered along the way. A good teacher educator will ask a preservice teacher to explain her thought process in responding to a child’s unexpected response. Dewey ( 1933 , p. 239) recommended that teachers and teacher educators regularly encourage students to conceptualize their reasoning in words, to check that educative meanings were being formed; “without this conceptualizing or intellectualizing, nothing is gained that can be carried over to the better understanding of new experiences. The deposit is what counts, educationally speaking.”

Dewey ( 1899 , p. 12) firmly believed that individuals learn from “books or the sayings of others only as they are related to [personal] experience;” he regularly criticized efforts to require children to memorize information and facts disconnected from their own lives and culture. Such strategies would lead students to repeat meaningless information in efforts to please the teacher or to avoid punishment. In contrast, an emphasis on reflection or “good habits of thinking” (Dewey, 1916 , p. 159) will motivate learners to understand the purposes for which skills and information could be applied, providing further motivation for learning by “arous[ing] curiosity, strengthen[ing] initiative, and set[ting] up desires and purposes that are sufficiently intense to carry a person over dead places in the future” (Dewey, 1938 , pp. 20–21).

For Dewey ( 1916 , p. 166), all children can be creative, no matter the age or domain: “The child of three who discovers what can be done with blocks, or of six who finds out what he can make by putting five cents and five cents together, is really a discoverer.” As learners return to their discoveries, their insights will deepen. Once the child discovers that the pedals on a piano keep the sound ringing, she is likely to explore the very mechanics of the instrument, to lift the lid and look inside. She might even ask a friend to hold down the pedal for her while she touches or plucks the steel wires. Trading places, these intrepid discoverers are likely to create a tentative theory that they bring to the teacher. The music teacher, if she is clever, will help the discoverers find new tricks and delightful problems. “There are no limits to the possibility of carrying over into the objects and events of life, meanings originally acquired by thoughtful examination, and hence no limit to the continual growth of meaning in human life” (Dewey, 1933 , p. 128).

Similarly, beginning teachers must engage in “thoughtful examination” of their educational experiences. For productive reflection, they must reframe a “difficulty or perplexity that has been felt (directly experienced) into a problem to be solved” (Dewey, 1933 , p. 200).

No hard and fast rules decide whether a meaning suggested is the right and proper meaning to follow up. The individual’s own good (or bad) judgment is the guide. There is no label on any given idea or principle which says automatically, “Use me in this situation”—as the magic cakes of Alice in Wonderland were inscribed “Eat me.” The thinker has to decide. (Dewey, 1933 , p. 215)

Unlike the beginning teacher, experienced teachers, in considering children’s conceptual learning, have a store of reflected-upon experiences from which they have learned to predict typical responses. This frees them to focus on surprises that arise in the classroom, and thus they are more likely to be able to frame and reflect on the situation and develop and test hypothetical resolutions. Beginning teachers do not yet have this bank of experiences from which to examine student learning. With so many things happening around them, much of which is surprising, preservice teachers may need guidance to identify or frame a specific problem for productive reflection.

Not Theory Versus Practice: Theory and Practice

The principles of experiential learning and reflection apply equally to teachers working with children and to teacher educators guiding preservice teachers’ learning experiences. Dewey’s important essay, “The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education,” is one of his few that specifically addresses the problems of preparing teachers to do the work of teaching. Dewey ( 1904a , p. 247) “assumes without argument” that both theory and practice are necessary components of teacher preparation; the question in his mind was the purpose of “practical work.” He criticized the apprentice model that was practiced in many programs during his time (and has continued to remain popular) because it too often focuses the apprentice on the immediate results of instructional practices, rather than on long-term growth. Dewey ( 1904a , pp. 255, 251, italics in the original) proposed instead a “laboratory view” of practice, where theory and practice “grow together out of and into the teacher’s personal experience,” and where beginners acquire “ control of the intellectual methods required for personal and independent mastery of practical skill, rather than at turning out at once masters of the craft.” This creates a challenge for teacher educators, as preservice teachers are more interested, at least initially, in “what works” and “what doesn’t” than in general “intellectual methods.” Dewey ( 1904a , p. 256) argued that an early focus on acquiring technical skills is a dangerous shortcut, helpful at the beginning stages of one’s career, but harmful in the longer term:

For immediate skill may be got at the cost of power to go on growing. The teacher who leaves the professional school with power in managing a class of children may appear to superior advantage the first day, the first week, the first month, or even the first year, as compared with some other teacher who has a much more vital command of the psychology, logic, and ethics of development. But later “progress” may with such consist only in perfecting and refining skill already possessed. Such persons seem to know how to teach, but they are not students of teaching . . . Unless a teacher is such a student, he may continue to improve in the mechanics of school management, but he can not grow as a teacher, an inspirer and director of soul-life.

Dewey ( 1904a , p. 258) suggests that teacher education classes begin with critical reflection on preservice teachers’ own “direct and personal” learning experiences, both within and outside school, as “the greatest asset” in their possession. This store of experiences provides preservice teachers with “plenty of practical material by which to illustrate and vitalize theoretical principles and laws of mental growth in the process of learning,” as well as “plenty of practical experience by which to illustrate cases of arrested development—instances of failure and maladaptation and retrogression, or even degeneration” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 258). Through guided reflection about the past experiences that most enthused and confused them when they were young learners, preservice teachers might better connect educational theory with actual practice, becoming better equipped to test out their insights in their current setting.

The principle of continuity suggests both the importance and the possibility of guiding preservice teachers to transition from a student’s perspective on schooling and learning to a teacher’s perspective on education and teaching .

Only by beginning with the values and laws contained in the [preservice teacher’s] own experience of his own mental growth, and by proceeding gradually to facts connected with other persons of whom he can know little; and by proceeding still more gradually to the attempt actually to influence the mental operations of others, can educational theory be made most effective. Only in this way can the most essential trait of the mental habit of the teacher be secured—that habit which looks upon the internal, not upon the external; which sees that the important function of the teacher is the direction of the mental movement of the student, and that the mental movement must be known before it can be directed. (Dewey, 1904a , p. 262)

By focusing preservice teachers’ attention on “how teacher and pupils react upon each other—how mind answers to mind” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 260), the function of practical experiences becomes enriching their understanding of “the knowledge of subject-matter and the principles of education” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 249). Dewey believed that practical experiences could offer a rich source from which to develop, through reflection, a broad understanding of educational psychology and curriculum development, with a goal to develop “intellectual responsibility” and become independent practitioners, not just masters of a craft of teaching.

Sequence of Experiences in the Teacher Education Program

Dewey believed the popular apprenticeship model of learning through “cadetting” or student teaching was not adequate to meet the long-term well-being of future teachers. He developed many of his ideas about teacher education in the context of the laboratory schools he helped found at the University of Chicago ( 1896–1904 ), with later refinements as professor of philosophy at Columbia University. Dewey ( 1904a ) outlined a sequence of experiences that, in conjunction with a laboratory school, could help preservice teachers integrate their theoretical studies with their teaching practices.

Dewey ( 1904a , p. 268) recommended that preservice teachers’ reflection on their own past experiences be supplemented with initial observations in a school classroom—not so much to see how teachers teach, but “to get material for psychological observation and reflection, and some conception of the educational movement of the school as a whole.” According to Dewey ( 1904a , p. 260), these early observations should be focused “to see how teacher and pupils react upon each other—how mind answers to mind. . . . What the student needs most at this stage of growth is ability to see what is going on in the minds of a group of persons who are in intellectual contact with one another.” Only then, after developing a richer understanding of the workings of the school through reflective writing and observation, could preservice teachers begin to serve as assistants for “more intimate introduction to the lives of the children and the work of the school” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 268).

When preservice teachers are ready for the next challenge, after assisting the cooperating teacher with small tasks and putting theory and practice together through observation and reflection, they may begin to select and arrange subject matter. In typical Deweyian fashion, this third stage is pragmatically considered. Dewey believed that initial curriculum-making should not include the common task of writing isolated make-believe or “practice” lesson plans. Rather, the preservice teacher should focus on one subject area across grade levels to develop “the habit of viewing the entire curriculum as a continuous growth, reflecting the growth of mind itself” (Dewey, 1904a , pp. 267–268). In this third sequence of development, the prospective teacher co-participates in lesson planning by helping the cooperating teacher find supplementary materials, creating authentic discipline-specific problems, or developing a “scheme of possible alternative subjects for lessons and studies” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 269).

Once the preservice teacher is deemed ready, she may move to the fourth stage, actual teaching. Interestingly, in this penultimate period of preparation, the prospective teacher is “given the maximum amount of liberty possible” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 269).

Students should be given to understand that they not only are permitted to act upon their own intellectual initiative, but that they are expected to do so, and their ability to take hold of situations for themselves would be a more important factor in judging them than their following any particular set method or scheme. (Dewey, 1904a , p. 269)

Dewey ( 1904a , pp. 269–270) recommended that supervisors keep observation and feedback to a minimum, thereby allowing the preservice teacher time to overcome the “shock” of being newly in charge of a classroom, and “to get enough experience to make him capable of seeing the fundamental bearing of criticism upon work done.”

At this fourth stage, only when the preservice teacher begins to feel comfortable, may the instructor or supervisor offer suggestions. But rather than criticizing specific elements of the teaching or lesson planning, the supervisor should guide “the student to judge his own work critically, to find out for himself in what respects he has succeeded and in what failed, and to find the probable reasons for both failure and success” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 270). Building on a similar process from the third stage, Dewey ( 1904a , p. 270) recommended allowing the prospective educator to “assume responsibility for the development of some one topic . . . [rather than] to teach a certain number (necessarily smaller in range) of lessons in a larger number of subjects.” This posture would afford student teachers a deeper understanding of the principles of teaching, with less focus on the methods of teaching. “No greater travesty” could happen in a preservice teacher’s development than for the supervisor to assign “a brief number of lessons, have him under inspection in practically all the time of every lesson, and then criticise him almost, if not quite, at the very end of each lesson.” Such oversight might give the person “some of the knacks and tools of the trade,” but would not “develop a thoughtful and independent teacher” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 270).

Dewey’s fifth and final stage is actual apprenticeship. He insists that apprenticeship is only useful if the program is long enough for the beginning teacher to be grounded in “educational theory and history, in subject-matter, in observation, and in practice work of the laboratory type” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 271), and if the “practice schools are sufficiently large to furnish the required number of children” to offer all prospective teachers this opportunity (Dewey, 1904a , p. 270). Even here, Dewey ( 1904a , p. 271) recommends limiting oversight and criticism, while allowing the apprentice teacher “as much responsibility and initiative as he is capable of taking.” Preservice teachers’ reflective thinking about their teaching experiences remains critical here. The goal of supervision in this period is not for supervisors to “turn out teachers who will perpetuate their own notions and methods, but in the inspiration and enlightenment that come through prolonged contact with mature and sympathetic persons” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 271).

Dewey ( 1899 , p. 39) believed that this could be accomplished best by “getting things into connection with one another, so that they work easily, flexibly, and fully.” He advocated for more connection at all levels of education from kindergarten through college, connection among content areas, connection of theory and practice, connection of school with life; failing such relationships, “each side suffers from the separation” (Dewey, 1899 , p. 43).

Developing Teaching Methods

Dewey was consistent in his aversion to binary thinking. A concept like method (Latin methodus /Greek méthodos = pursuit) is neither inherently good, nor inherently evil—it is merely a strategic pursuit. A method, after all, is a natural aspect of life and living, defined in this article as the application of intelligence to the contingencies of an ever-changing world. Teaching methods are rightly criticized when they act as proxy for teacher strategy (Allsup & Westerlund, 2012 ; Dewey, 1916 ). In Deweyian logic, the most effective methods are funded by experience and self-reflection. For example, when introducing a new plant to a flower garden, the savvy gardener will call upon her past experiences to forecast how her new addition will thrive. Likewise, a music teacher will draw upon past experience to create interest in an unsuspecting but enthusiastic beginner who wants to play an instrument. In either situation, she knows that flourishing is never guaranteed. In these examples, our hypothetical methodologist will observe and take note, but be ready to make changes should her strategy require it.

In Dewey’s ( 1916 , p. 177) vision for teacher preparation, methods arise from a thorough understanding of one’s disciplinary domain, but subject matter is always balanced by a deep understanding of the principles of learning and teaching: “In brief, the method of teaching is the method of an art, of action intelligently directed by ends.” Using aesthetic language, teaching methods are never counterfeits or copies from fellow artists, but sincere forms of self-expression: “an expression of [teachers’] own intelligent observations” of children. Dewey ( 1916 , p. 177) argues that artists both follow their own inspiration and “study the operations and results of those in the past who have succeeded greatly.” The art of choosing an appropriate method is “the problem of establishing conditions that will arouse and guide curiosity ; of setting up the connections in things experienced that will on later occasions promote the flow of suggestions , create problems and purposes that will favor consecutiveness in the succession of ideas” through productive reflection (Dewey, 1933 , p. 157).

Dewey ( 1916 ) distinguishes “general method” from “individual method.” Preservice teachers can and should learn general methods from a more experienced teacher, including “knowledge of the past, of current technique, of materials, of the ways in which one’s own best results are assured,” supplemented with “child-study, psychology, and a knowledge of social environment” and a thorough knowledge of subject matter (Dewey, 1916 , pp. 177, 180). An understanding of general methods alone, however, is “worse than useless”—or even harmful—if it “get[s] in the way of [the teacher’s] own common sense” (Dewey, 1916 , p. 179). For example, Dewey ( 1933 , p. 207) suggests that there is “nothing especially sacred about the number five” in the phases of reflection that he outlines; depending on the situation, two phases may run together or a phase may be expanded to include more small steps. Dewey ( 1916 , pp. 178–179) viewed general methods, not as “ready-made models” for instruction, but as “aids in sizing up the needs, resources, and difficulties of the unique experiences” of individual learners.

As young teachers develop “the working tendencies of observation, insight, and reflection” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 256) of their students, and of themselves as educators, they may gain confidence and be freed to create their own individual methods as needed for different learners in varied social settings. As preservice teachers deepen their understanding of curriculum and educational theory, they may become more like jazz musicians, more improvisatory—more capable of allowing “these principles to work automatically, unconsciously, and hence promptly and effectively” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 256). The specific methods used by individual teachers with particular students thus “will vary as [their] past experiences and [their] preferences vary . . . [thus] no catalogue can ever exhaust [the] diversity of form and tint” of methodological approaches (Dewey, 1916 , p. 180).

Conceptualizing method as “a statement of the way the subject matter of an experience develops most effectively and fruitfully” (Dewey, 1916 , p. 186) can help young teachers to understand how to sequence problems for children’s experimentation and reflection in ways that, through continuity of learning, build deeper and deeper conceptual understanding of various subjects. Dewey ( 1916 , p. 164) suggests that “a large part of the art of instruction lies in making the difficulty of new problems large enough to challenge thought, and small enough so that, in addition to the confusion naturally attending the novel elements, there shall be luminous familiar spots from which helpful suggestions may spring” to connect with prior learning.

As mentioned, for Dewey ( 1916 , p. 160), the basis of any method (as with all learning) is experience. He suggests that “the first stage of contact with any new material, at whatever age of maturity” and no matter the subject matter, must allow children opportunities to experiment with material through trial and error, taking action (doing) and observing the consequences of the actions (undergoing), “trying to do something and having the thing perceptibly do something to one in return.” Once students have sufficient experience with an object or concept, “memory, observation, reading, communication” may all become “avenues for supplying data” for reflection and problem solving (Dewey, 1916 , p. 164).

Dewey warns that preservice teachers are likely to teach the way they were taught; they may fail to recognize that a new generation of students will always bring new problems to the classroom, or that a different social environment requires different considerations. He believed “thoughtful and alert student[s] of education” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 256) have a moral duty to learn about their students’ interests and prior experiences in order to design appropriate and effective learning experiences for them. The more teachers know about their students’ world, the better they may “understand the forces at work that need to be directed and utilized for the formation of reflective habits” (Dewey, 1933 , pp. 140–141). The teacher should “give pupils something to do, not something to learn; and the doing is of such a nature as to demand thinking, or the intentional noting of connections; learning naturally results” (Dewey, 1916 , p. 161).

To emphasize, Dewey ( 1933 , p. 157) saw the concept of “method” as richer than a pedagogical technique or the sequence of a lesson plan. Method must be understood in its very broadest sense:

Method covers not only what [the teacher] intentionally devises and employs for the purpose of mental training, but also what he does without any conscious reference to it—anything in the atmosphere and conduct of the school that reacts in any way upon the curiosity, the responsiveness, and the orderly activity of children.

Dewey calls this unconscious transmission “collateral learning,” a notion that predates current ideas about the “hidden curriculum” (e.g., Apple, 2004 ; Eisner, 1994 ; Giroux & Penna, 1979 ). Students will learn many things in a classroom, intended or not. For example, methods that require a student to memorize “predigested materials” might inadvertently teach the student that school is not a democratic space, nor one concerned with justice. Dewey ( 1938 , p. 27) believed that inappropriate collateral learning would dull the child’s innate curiosity, and might cause her to engage “in the mental truancy of mindwandering” or to build “an emotional revulsion against the subject” or schooling in general. Collateral learning may be educative or mis-educative, but it appears to be a constant in education.

Everything the teacher does, as well as the manner in which he does it, incites the child to respond in some way or other, and each response tends to set the child’s attitude in some way or other . The teacher is rarely (and even then never entirely) a transparent medium of the access of another mind to a subject. (Dewey, 1933 , p. 159, italics in the original)

Committed and ongoing reflection, Dewey believed, helps teachers, preservice teachers, and teacher educators remain alert for the development of their students’ attitudes toward learning.

Learning in Laboratories

Dewey is sometimes referred to as America’s first postmodernist because of his deep antipathy toward dualistic thinking (Hickman, 2007 ). Dewey was specifically worried that binaries misdirect the focus of our attention. The child, for example, should never be defined in opposition to the curriculum, or seen as an unformed or “miniature” adult (Dewey, 1902 ). Importantly, for Dewey, the public school must never be viewed as somehow isolated from the larger community in which it is located. Referring to the classroom as a “laboratory” was one way that Dewey could skirt the easy dualism that most people associated with schools—those all-too-familiar spaces that, with their tiny desks and green chalkboards, do not resemble much of anything else in society. Rather, the public school in a democracy is embryonic : a nondualistic metaphor that suggests an environment that is both safely apart and protected, but also incorporated into the “body” of society.

To do this means to make each one of our schools an embryonic community life, active with types of occupations that reflect the life of the larger society, and permeated throughout with the spirit of art, history, and science. [Hence] the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction. (Dewey, 1899 , pp. 19–20)

Set apart, protected, and incorporated, “the school in turn will be a laboratory in which the student . . . sees theories and ideas demonstrated, tested, criticized, enforced, and the evolution of new truths” (Dewey, 1899 , p. 56).

In contrast to the factory model of education, Dewey believed that the public school could be a place where the violence of industrial life (e.g., slaughter houses, iron foundries, railroad work, indentured servitude) is remedied and remediated, where displaced persons could be taught new life skills. Jane Addams in Chicago and Grace Dodge in New York City envisioned the school as a community hub—part library, museum, gymnasium, hospital, clubhouse, and savings bank—one that was centered around learning through community-building (Addams, 2002 ; Lagemann, 1979 ). Evelyn Dewey, writing with her father, makes a case for the school as a “social settlement,” a set-aside place that is deeply committed to the unique concerns of a particular neighborhood:

Schools all over the country are finding that the most direct way of vitalizing their work is through closer relations with local interest and occupations. That period of American school history which was devoted to building up uniformity of subject matter, method, administration, was obliged to neglect everything characteristic of the local environment, for attention to that meant deviation from uniformity . . . in aiming to hit all children by exactly the same educational ammunition, none were really deeply touched. Efforts to bring the work into vital connection with people’s experiences necessarily began to vary school materials to meet the special needs and definite features of local life. (Dewey & Dewey, 1915 , p. 339)

So integrated did Dewey ( 1899 , p. 45) consider the relationship between the school and democratic society that he composed a blueprint—a visual thought experiment—of the school’s relationship to community stakeholders, as well as disciplinary boundaries to each other. On the north side of the re-imagined school are openings to commercial businesses, on the east one sees arrows pointing to home and family life. In this metaphorical blueprint, a garden is located on the school’s south side, and the local university interacts with the school through its westward opening. In another chart, the school houses a museum at the center of the building with openings on four sides leading to chemistry, biology, art, and music labs. On another floor, one finds a library that is provocatively connected to the kitchen, the dining room, the shop, and the textile industries ( 1899 , pp. 52, 49).

Dewey concedes that most people will think of the laboratory as a specialized space, reserved for experts like physicists and physicians. If we leave aside the white-coated scientists in their protected eyewear, what else might we envision?—Activity? Quiet conversation? Focused attention? Group work?

The first great characteristic of a laboratory is that in it there is carried on an activity, an activity which involves contact with technical equipment, as tools, instruments and other apparatus, and machinery which require the use of the hands and the body. There is dealing with real materials and not merely, as in the old, traditional education, with the symbols of learning. (Dewey, 1932 , p. 108)

In this activity-privileged setting, there is a distinction between discovering knowledge and taking information. “I think the laboratory gives a good example of what I mean,” Dewey ( 1923 , p. 176) writes, “The individual has to be using his hands, doing things, but his experimenting in the laboratory is not simply running wild and at random. He has to have enough physical activity to see that his ideas are made definite and precise; that he is getting principles rather than taking information on faith at the word of the teacher or textbook.”

In the early 21st-century context of benchmarks, standards, high-stakes assessment, and accountability, the laboratory provides an antidote to the problem of isolated knowledge and teacher-assigned tasks. Call them inquirers, researchers, or discoverers: laboratory students will necessarily work within and across a discipline’s standards and norms. However, in an authentic laboratory, discoverers are just as likely to reassemble or build new norms and general principles. Dewey would argue that when students test the knowledge that they are given, they will do one of three things: (1) discard that knowledge if it is not useful; (2) alter it to fit a new context; or (3) accept the knowledge as worthwhile for the time being . In this sense, learners—even young learners—are practicing freedom . Standards alone do not fund freedom; that is, they do not inherently enlarge personal capacity or directly aid in problem-solving. But standards that are tested, discarded, altered, or kept in the light of present circumstances are acts of learner agency.

Norms and standards of practice are needed in the laboratory. Indeed, they help us build warranted assertions, which if tested, may assume new forms of knowledge. As Dewey suggests in the previous paragraph, the choices that warrant an assertion, claim, or solution cannot be informed solely by authority, which alone cannot help one make good judgments. Laboratory settings are democratic spaces where debate can occur, where the usefulness or validity of an emerging truth or act of creation is tested and debated with others (Allsup, 2016 ). For all learners who participate in it—students, preservice teachers, and cooperating teachers—the laboratory school, thus, can be characterized as:

a place of creativity, construction, imagination;

a place to test, perform, critique, and verify responses to authentic problems;

a place of warranted assertability; a place of hypothesis-building;

a “real”—but supportive—community, like those that exist outside classrooms, but affording students opportunities to succeed and fail;

a place of knowledge-making, where groups can collectively add to the sum of facts (asserted and tested) and principles (emerging and verified).

Dewey believed that such a laboratory setting within a teacher education program would provide preservice teachers with imaginative experiences that could help them develop understandings of the principles of education in its most ideal sense. Formal and informal settings, no matter the design, might aim for similar ends. Thus, laboratories—in their broadest, most non-binary sense—become both places to test specialized knowledge and everyday settings where (say) a new recipe could be tried out, or a previous lesson plan could be altered and studied for its results.

Dewey’s Work in Historical Context

Dewey’s writings have demonstrated consistent staying power in educational circles, with many ideas that remain relevant well beyond the 70 years during which he wrote them ( 1882–1952 ). His educational work, however, has also been criticized for saying too little about the role of schools and other democratic institutions in addressing social inequities (e.g., Brick, 2005 ; Portelli & Vilbert, 2002 ). It is essential, however, to consider Dewey’s work in the context of his time. Dewey’s ideas about reforming education were in response to the needs of a changing society, one that was undergoing rapid industrialization and mass migration. Electricity, the telegraph, and improved mail service sped communication across great distances. New discoveries in medicine and medical practice helped people live longer. We emphasize, however, that Dewey lived in an era when many in American society, like Dewey ( 1899 , pp. 6–7, 17, 7; see also 1930 , regarding Dewey’s faith in the scientific method), clung to the era’s faith that science could solve problems that were previously intractable.

One can hardly believe there has been a revolution in all history so rapid, so extensive, so complete. Through it the face of the earth is making over, even as to its physical forms; political boundaries are wiped out and moved about, as if they were indeed only lines on a paper map. . . . Even our moral and religious ideas and interests, the most conservative because the deepest-lying things in our nature, are profoundly affected. . . . Travel has been rendered easy; freedom of movement with its accompanying exchange of ideas, indefinitely facilitated. The result has been an intellectual revolution. Learning has been put into circulation; . . . a distinctively learned class is henceforth out of the question. It is an anachronism. Knowledge is no longer an immobile solid; it has been liquefied. . . . That this revolution should not affect education in some other than a formal and superficial fashion is inconceivable.

This description, written by Dewey in 1899 , bears striking resemblance to social conditions in the first quarter of the 21st century . Writing in 1930 , Dewey (p. 275) recognized that “progress” could have negative effects as well; international tensions fostered during and after World War I meant that “race and color prejudice have never had such opportunity as they have now to poison the mind, while nationalism is elevated into a religion called patriotism.” But there remains a hopeful fascination to Dewey’s tone, an inherent faith in the inevitability of progress and growth that is contradicted by the decades that followed his death. Dewey is often described as lacking a sense of the tragic. Should he have lived to see it, the violence of the latter half of the 20th century may have surprised him, particularly as business interests have remade public education according to market principles. And the promises of progressive education are mostly located in private universities and expensive “independent” schools, undermining Dewey’s democratic ideals. While Dewey’s principles clearly address the 21st century’s global interest in the standardization, privatization, and accountability of education, we believe he would continue to argue against any totalizing, one-size-fits-all approach to any reform movement.

Dewey viewed universities as laboratory spaces for social repair and experimentation. At the end of “Theory into Practice” (1904a), Dewey believed that within “the next decade,” more normal schools would become four-year bachelor’s-degree-granting programs. Dewey was hopeful that extending the teacher preparation program from two to four years, within a model of a laboratory school in conjunction with a university, would provide adequate time for preservice teachers to develop deep understandings of theory integrated with their practice and methods of teaching. Those who would graduate from such a program would become lifelong learners and genuine “students of teaching” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 256).

One fundamental and striking element in the significance of the [University of Chicago] School of Education is the desire and resolute purpose to promote the cause of education, not only here, but everywhere, through inspiring teachers with more vital and adequate conceptions of the nature of their work, and through furnishing them with the intellectual equipment necessary to make them effective and apt in carrying out such broadened and deepened ideals. (Dewey, 1904b , pp. 274–275)

Although this goal seemed tantalizingly close in Dewey’s laboratory school experiments, he admitted the model might be challenging to replicate in other settings. Dewey ( 1899 ) cites critics who accuse him of developing his ideas in the context of ideal circumstances: a small teacher–student ratio, close collaboration between university researchers and K-12 faculty, a teaching faculty sharing common beliefs and focused on learning together in community, among other benefits not common to most educators. Dewey ( 1899 , p. 56) responded that genuine experiments, in education as much as in science and industry, required carefully controlled conditions, “working out and testing a new truth, or a new method,” before “applying it on a wide scale, making it available” to others. Ultimately, he left the lab school after seven contentious years (Knoll, 2014 ), although it has continued to offer learning experiences in the Deweyian tradition into the 21st century (University of Chicago Lab Schools, n.d. ).

We now benefit from far deeper knowledge of psychology, which was a young science in Dewey’s time. Dewey did not have access to 21st-century understandings of the intersectionality of race, ethnicity, and class, and the multiple ways these contribute to continued inequities in education and teacher education. We also must admit to a far more complex understanding of educational and social problems, arising from, as in Dewey’s ( 1899 , pp. 8–9) day, an “increase in toleration, in breadth of social judgment, the larger acquaintance with human nature, the sharpened alertness in reading signs of character and interpreting social situations, greater accuracy of adaptation to differing personalities.” We continue to expand our vision of what education in a democracy means, who it is for, and how to work toward Dewey’s vision of education for all, with the goal of citizens prepared to participate fully in a democratic society. We have experienced an additional century of research, with solutions proposed and tried with varying success, yet Dewey’s ideas continue to offer teacher educators ample food for thought and practice.

Questions for Continued Research and Practice

Dewey’s writings remain provocative; even a century later, his insights seem ahead of their time. University teacher educators in the early 21st century , like those in Dewey’s day, are still pressured by myriad stakeholders to provide preservice teachers with predetermined outcomes and conclusions. But over and again, Dewey ( 1916 , p. 183) reminds us that the reflective process cannot be rushed, that knowledge and pedagogy “take their own time to mature.” Recognizing that few preparation programs offer all the characteristics of Dewey’s ideal laboratory school, how can we best incorporate the principles of learning Dewey sets forth? What types of experiences hold the greatest educative potential? How can we include both the breadth and depth of experiences needed to develop theoretical understanding and thoughtful practice? How can university teacher educators help preservice teachers create sustained continuity among all their educational experiences? What learning experiences may guide preservice teachers to enlarge their vision of the goals and practices of education and to reconceptualize possibilities for their work with children?

The authors of this article concede that experiential learning does not present itself as “efficient,” at least not in the short term; and front-loading student teaching through reflection and observation takes more time than the apprentice or “cadet” model. Guaranteed outcomes, furthermore, are prohibited in a Deweyian framework. Learners, including preservice teachers, must always make their own meanings from their experiences, and thus no preparation program or student teaching experience can guarantee skill or expertise in teaching. Dewey wrote about teacher preparation during an era when, like ours, teacher education programs were becoming more standardized and less creative. He would be the first to argue against any single definition of teacher quality or standardized curriculum (see, e.g., Dewey & Dewey, 1915 ). What would he say about 21st-century national standards for content-area learning and teacher evaluation systems that are based on student test scores, all of which consider children and their teachers “ en masse , as an aggregate of units” (Dewey, 1899 , p. 22)? He believed this view was responsible for “the uniformity of method and curriculum . . . [with] next to no opportunity for adjustment to varying capacities and demands.” Such “ready-made results and accomplishments to be acquired by all children alike in a given time” conflicted with Dewey’s beliefs about the growing child or the developing teacher: “The moment children [or teachers] act they individualize themselves; they cease to be a mass and become the intensely distinctive beings that we are acquainted with out of school, in the home, the family, on the playground, and in the neighborhood” (Dewey, 1899 , p. 22).

Substituting “teachers” for “children” in the previous statement may offer some insight into potential concerns Dewey would have with policies that evaluate teachers in light of “ready-made results and accomplishments.” Given the policy climate in the early 21st century , how can university teacher educators meaningfully respond to calls for accountability in the preparation of a student teacher? How can we honor the individuality of a preservice teacher while preparing her to meet mandated standards? After four or five years in a preparation program (or four semesters in some), how can the beginner teacher be “holistically” evaluated and deemed ready, both for immediate placement and for potential for continued growth? What types of experiences might best help her to examine, construct, or reconstruct her experiences and then demonstrate an expansive understanding of educational theory and practice? How can she exhibit this knowledge in a way that is developmentally appropriate? And if a universal benchmark is not possible—at least according to Dewey—how then do stakeholders know when a preservice teacher is ready for her own classroom, or not?

Dewey’s ideas about reflection on experience have inspired a vast body of research in teacher education. Studies have explored various strategies for engaging preservice teachers in reflection on their personal beliefs and lived histories (e.g., Grimmett & Erickson, 1988 ; Knowles, 1992 ; Schön, 1987 ). Drawing on Deweyian premises, researchers have studied educative and mis-educative beliefs and their possible source (e.g., Dolloff, 1999 ; Fives & Gill, 2014 ; Schmidt, 2013 ); the role of teaching experience in teacher development (e.g., Boyle-Baise & McIntyre, 2008 ; Clift & Brady, 2005 ; Feiman-Nemser & Buchmann, 1985 ; Miksza & Austin, 2010 ; Tabachnick & Zeichner, 1984 ); and how beginning teachers make meaning in and through content area courses (Amador, Kimmons, Miller, & Desjardins, 2015 ; Floden & Meniketti, 2005 ; Grossman, 2005 ). The authors of this article believe that more research is needed to identify context-specific practices that engage preservice teachers in truly meaningful reflection based on genuine problems, not “so-called problems” or “simply assigned tasks ” (Dewey, 1933 , p. 233).

Most research in teacher education is focused on preservice teachers’ learning and development. But more studies could be designed to examine the experiences that help preservice teachers develop an invested and strategic curiosity about children and how they think and learn, “to see how teacher and pupils react upon each other—how mind answers to mind” (Dewey, 1904a , p. 260). How can beginning teachers, generally very concerned with their own need-to-teach, focus more on the child’s needs and interests, and learn to view their students as multifaceted individuals? As an extension of this question, what experiences might help beginning teachers better understand and serve the needs of underserved students, viewing them in terms of the potential of their minds to answer to educational opportunities, rather than through a deficit lens? Research might help us design courses to better challenge preservice teachers’ perceptions of their own learning as the norm for all students; such classes could help new teachers foster a genuine desire to learn about and understand the experiences that their future students bring to school from their home cultures (e.g., Delpit, 1995 ; Gay, 2010 ; Ladson-Billings, 1995 ; Lind & McKoy, 2016 ).

Researchers could consider more longitudinal studies, following preservice teachers’ growth throughout a program or even into the early years of teaching (e.g., Bullough, 1989 ; Bullough & Baughman, 1997 ; Wetzel, Hoffman, Roach, & Russell, 2018 ). Such studies might provide insights into ways that preservice teachers make connections among their learning experiences both in and out of class, and how they create continuity among their past, present, and future. In an age of teacher de-professionalization, what can we learn about educational experiences that help preservice teachers develop a larger vision of—and a greater commitment to—their own lifelong learning?

It goes without saying that most classic philosophers of education are encountered by contemporary readers in ways that require context and some degree of generosity. Plato’s writings on education should not probably be read too literally, but we can go to The Republic to think deeply about the ways in which a society is strategically shaped through the education of its citizens. We can read Confucius and find new questions about how personhood is shaped through tradition. But Dewey, a classic American philosopher, remains highly relevant to educational concerns in the early 21st century . Indeed, he requires little contextual apology. We can, for example, return to Dewey to find inspiration in his faith in the professional capacity of teachers. He never spoke of children through a deficit lens. Dewey’s abiding belief in hands-on learning—his constant focus on the child and the child’s interests—is a counter-narrative to contemporary educational discourses that see children as future human resources. Given his belief in the power of experiential learning, the lasting influence of his educational writings almost seems counter-intuitive. Yet based on our own experiences as university teacher educators, we have found the principles presented in this article to hold great potential for continued experimentation and reflection in our own practices.

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UNESCO provides global and regional leadership in education, strengthens education systems worldwide and responds to contemporary global challenges through education with gender equality an underlying principle.

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UNESCO leads the coordination and monitoring of the  Global Education 2030 Agenda  through Sustainable Development Goal 4  and using the  Education 2030 Framework for Action  as a roadmap.

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The education sector is shifting and evolving towards a more explicit, active commitment to addressing gender-related barriers within and beyond the education system. This shift is being accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic with more NGOs, local governments as well as national governments recognizing the role education has in promoting gender-transformative change. Many are responding to this shift with innovations that aim to address the persistent challenges faced by girls and women in education. By highlighting these key practices through the Prize, we can contribute to inspiring more action for girls and women.

We speak about the importance of gender-transformative change both in and beyond education. Can you define what this means for you?

Gender-transformative education aims not only to respond to gender disparities within the education system but also to harness the full potential of education to transform attitudes, practices and discriminatory gender norms. Education can support critical changes for gender equality, such as promoting women’s leadership, preventing gender-based violence, and catalyzing boys' and men's engagement to embrace gender equality.

I have been very impressed by the capacity shown by many organizations and individuals nominated to adapt to the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure they could maintain the delivery of their programmes. We know that fewer girls and women have access to and use the internet, and the digital gender gap is growing, particularly in developing countries. Many found new ways of delivering educational content and finding solutions to conduct fully online or blended approaches to learning, often in low-resource settings where access to the internet is extremely limited.  

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